Velociraptor EUVD-2026-22995

We need to produce a JSON object with all specified fields, based on provided data. The CVE is CVE-2026-6290, about Velociraptor query() plugin allowing cross-org access in the GUI. Let's synthesize.

Inputs:

• Description: Velociraptor versions prior to 0.76.3 contain a vulnerability in the query() plugin which allows access to all orgs with the user's current ACL token. Authenticated GUI user with access in one org can use the query() plugin in a notebook cell to run VQL queries on other orgs they may not have access to. User's permissions in the other org are same as they have in the org containing the notebook.
• CVSS Score: 8.0, Vector: AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
• CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
• EPSS: 0.03% (percentile 8%) - very low exploitation probability.
• Patch: Available (from vendor). References include advisory URL: https://docs.velociraptor.app/announcements/advisories/cve-2026-6290/ which presumably mentions fix version 0.76.3.
• KEV: not mentioned, so not in CISA KEV. No exploitation evidence.
• POC: not mentioned, probably none.
• Tags: Authentication Bypass, Velociraptor (maybe they consider the cross-org access as bypassing auth? It says "Authentication Bypass" tag, but it's actually an incorrect authorization after authentication. CWE-863 is Incorrect Authorization, not bypass. We'll stick to description).
• SSVC: Exploitation: none, Automatable: no, Technical Impact: total. That means not exploited, not automatable, but total impact if exploited.
• ENISA EUVD: lists affected versions: Velociraptor 0 <0.76.3, 0.75.8 (maybe separate branch?).
• CPE: cpe:2.3:a:rapid7:velociraptor:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* (prior to 0.76.3).
• References: advisory from docs.velociraptor.app, NVD page, vuldb.

Now, build JSON fields:

product_name: "Velociraptor" - simple.

summary: Need original synthesis, not copy description. Start with impact verb and product. So: "Incorrect authorization in Velociraptor versions prior to 0.76.3 allows an authenticated GUI user to execute VQL queries on organizations other than their own via the query() plugin in notebooks. The user's permissions in the target org mirror those in the source org. No active exploitation or public exploit code has been reported; EPSS score is low (0.03%)." That covers what, who, impact, exploitation status, EPSS. Use KEV: not present. Mention authenticated, high privileges (PR:H), UI:N, AC:H (complex? High complexity). But we don't need full CVSS in summary. Good.

technical_context: Explain underlying technology. Velociraptor is an open-source endpoint visibility, digital forensics, and incident response tool. The query() plugin is a VQL (Velociraptor Query Language) function that allows running queries. The vulnerability relates to authorization checks in multi-org deployments: the plugin fails to properly scope the user's access to only the current organization, allowing cross-org querying. CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization. CPE shows product: rapid7:velociraptor. The affected versions are prior to 0.76.3. So we can mention that.

risk_assessment: Use CVSS, EPSS, KEV, SSVC. CVSS: 8.0 high, network vector, high complexity, high privileges, no user interaction, scope changed, high impact all. EPSS 0.03%, very low likelihood of exploitation. KEV not listed. SSVC: Exploitation none, not automatable, but total impact. So real-world risk is low for widespread exploitation due to high privileges required and lack of automation; but if exploited by a malicious insider with high-privileged access in one org, they could compromise other orgs. The high CVSS score reflects the potential damage from an authenticated user, but the EPSS score suggests minimal real-world exploitation. So it's a priority for organizations using multi-org Velociraptor deployments, but not an immediate patch-everything emergency unless you have malicious insiders. No evidence of active exploitation. State clearly: "CVSS score 8.0 indicates high severity, but exploitation requires an authenticated GUI user with high privileges in at least one organization. EPSS probability is 0.03%, suggesting very low likelihood of widespread exploitation. No active exploitation reported (SSVC: exploitation none, not automatable). This vulnerability is primarily a concern for organizations running multi-org Velociraptor with high-privileged users who should not have cross-org access."

affected_products: "Velociraptor versions prior to 0.76.3 are affected, as confirmed in vendor advisory (https://docs.velociraptor.app/announcements/advisories/cve-2026-6290/). The CPE identifier is cpe:2.3:a:rapid7:velociraptor:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. A specific affected version is 0.75.8, but all versions before 0.76.3 are vulnerable." That covers. No need to list all.

remediation: "Upgrade to Velociraptor version 0.76.3 or later, which contains the fix. The vendor advisory at https://docs.velociraptor.app/announcements/advisories/cve-2026-6290/ provides details. As a workaround, restrict the use of the query() plugin in notebooks to only trusted users, or disable multi-org deployments if not needed." Patch available, so primary is upgrade.

exploit_scenario: "An attacker who already has authenticated GUI access with high privileges (e.g., administrator) in one organization crafts a malicious VQL query within a notebook cell using the query() plugin. By specifying a target organization other than the current one, the query executes with the attacker's permissions in that target org, potentially accessing artifacts, collected data, or executing further VQL commands. This can lead to cross-org data exfiltration or lateral movement within the Velociraptor server." Note: requires authentication and high privileges, so it's an insider threat or compromised account.

exploitation_conditions: Need specific prerequisites. From description: "authenticated GUI user with access in one org" and "using the query() plugin in a notebook cell". So the conditions: user must have an account with high privileges (PR:H from CVSS) and access to at least one organization; multi-org deployment; the query() plugin must be available in notebooks (default). The attack requires the user to intentionally craft queries targeting other orgs. There's no user interaction from the target. So state: "Exploitation requires an authenticated GUI user with high privileges in at least one organization in a multi-org Velociraptor deployment. The user must have access to notebooks and the query() plugin (enabled by default). The attack can be performed without any user interaction or special privileges beyond the initial authentication to the source org." That's precise.

attack_chain: Need kill chain steps. Likely: Access (authenticate to GUI) -> Delivery (open notebook cell) -> Exploit (craft VQL query with query() plugin targeting different org) -> Execution (query runs in target org with user's permissions) -> Impact (access/modify data in other org). So: "Authenticate to Velociraptor GUI → Open a notebook cell → Craft VQL query using query() plugin targeting another organization → Query executes in target org with same permissions → Access or modify data across organizations". Can make it concise: "Authenticate to GUI → Create notebook cell → Issue cross-org VQL query via query() plugin → Execute query in target org → Read/write cross-org data". That's 5 steps. Good.

confidence_notes: What is confirmed? Vendor advisory confirms the vulnerability and fix version 0.76.3. NVD confirms CVE and scoring. EUVD confirms affected versions. No evidence of exploitation, no POC mentioned. Patch is available. CVSS vector is provided. So confidence high. "Vendor advisory confirms affected versions (<0.76.3) and patch version (0.76.3). NVD assigns CVSS 8.0 with high complexity and privileges. No public exploit or active exploitation reported; EPSS score is low. All critical details appear confirmed." Good.

prevalence: How widely deployed is Velociraptor? It's an open-source DFIR tool by Rapid7, not as widespread as enterprise tools like Splunk or Sentinel, but used in security operations. Prevalence likely "medium" - not ubiquitous, but not rare. So "medium".

prevalence_basis: "Popular open-source DFIR tool used in enterprise SOCs" - max 12 words. "widely-used digital forensics tool in security operations" but within limit.

assessed_cvss_vector: We need our own independent vector. Description: network vector, but requires authenticated GUI access. Attack complexity high? Probably yes, because it requires crafting VQL queries and knowing the org structure. Privileges high (user must have high privileges in at least one org). No user interaction. Scope changed (accessing other org). Impact high for confidentiality, integrity, availability because they can run queries that read, modify artifacts or even execute commands? The description says run VQL queries on other orgs with same permissions; if permissions include high, they could do anything. So C/I/A all high. So same as provided: AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. But we must output our own, but it matches. So I'll output that exact vector. But the instructions say "Your OWN independent CVSS 3.1 base-metric vector ... grounded in the description and exploitation conditions — NOT a copy of any score in the input." But the input vector seems reasonable, so we can still use that. We'll output: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H". That's consistent.

rationale: "Requires authenticated high-privileged GUI user, high attack complexity due to crafting cross-org queries, and scope change to other organizations."

assessed_cvss40_vector: Map to CVSS 4.0 base vector: AV:N, AC:H (attack complexity high), AT:N (no attack requirements just conditions). PR:H (high privileges), UI:N. VC:C, VI:C, VA:C (vulnerable system? In 4.0, vulnerable system is the component being exploited, probably the Velociraptor server API or plugin, so all high impact on vulnerable system, and subsequent system impact? Scope changed: the query() plugin allows accessing other orgs, so there is a subsequent system (the other org's data environment). In CVSS 4.0, if there is a scope change, you set SC/SI/SA accordingly. But the vulnerable component is the plugin that fails to restrict access, allowing impact on a different security scope (other orgs). So VC/VI/VA are the impact on the vulnerable component itself? Actually, the vulnerable component is the query() plugin, and exploiting it allows impact on the target org's data, which is a secondary scope. So SC,SI,SA would reflect the impact on the other org (confidentiality, integrity, availability high). In CVSS 4.0, base metrics: AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H. But careful: VC/VI/VA refer to impact on the vulnerable system, i.e., the system that contains the vulnerability (the plugin or server). Does exploiting the vulnerability directly affect the vulnerable system's own confidentiality, integrity, availability? The query runs on the target org, which might be separate virtual scope, but the vulnerable system (the server that processes the query) might still be unaffected except that it now returns data. So maybe the vulnerable system (the plugin) does not suffer a confidentiality/integrity/availability loss itself; the impact is entirely on the subsequent system. Then VC/VI/VA would be N/N/N. However, I think the standard interpretation is that if the vulnerable component's functions allow access to other resources, you set VC/VI/VA to reflect the impact to the vulnerable component itself, but if the scope changes (i.e., you can affect a different component), you set SC/SI/SA to the impact on that other component, and VC/VI/VA to the impact on the vulnerable component if any. Here, the plugin itself isn't harmed, but the attacker can read/write data in another org which is a separate security scope, so VC/VI/VA could be N. But