EUVD-2026-116131
GHSA-37j3-6wgh-2q48
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessGain adjacent provisioning-network access
-
DeliveryGET / to enumerate image UUIDs
-
ExploitDownload target host image
-
ExecutionExtract embedded Ignition config
-
ImpactRecover cluster pull secret and SSH key
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V13 - Configuration Directory listing prevention
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires network adjacency to the OpenShift bare-metal provisioning network and an active provisioning cycle so that per-host images are registered and served by the image-customization-controller's HTTP file server on port 8084 (default bind :8084, no authentication, no TLS). The only prior access control - unguessable random UUID filenames - is defeated because the custom imageFileSystem Readdir exposes a browsable directory listing of all image names at the root path. Limiting factors: exploitation is confined to callers that can reach the provisioning network (not internet-facing by default) and depends on images being present during provisioning; it does not require authentication, user interaction, or any non-default setting of the controller itself. |
| Impact | Signals are consistent and point to a genuine but bounded priority. The CVSS vector (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms an adjacent-network, low-complexity, unauthenticated path, matching the described HTTP file server on port 8084 that enforces no authentication; confidentiality impact is high because every served image embeds the base64 cluster pull secret and optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY. The vuln.today decision label is 'this_week' (not act_now/emergency), aligning with a serious issue that is not under active exploitation. There is no CISA KEV listing and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no EPSS score was provided, so there is no evidence of widespread automated exploitation; realistic risk is driven by network proximity rather than mass scanning. The main tension between signals is impact scope: the input CVSS assigns I:L, but the mechanism described is pure directory-listing information disclosure (CWE-548), so any integrity effect is better attributed to downstream abuse of the recovered pull secret and SSH key than to the flaw itself. Net: a real credential-disclosure flaw for anyone running OpenShift bare-metal provisioning, but exploitation is gated behind access to the provisioning network and an active provisioning cycle. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with a foothold on the bare-metal provisioning network (AV:A) requests the root path of the unauthenticated file server on port 8084, which returns a browsable HTML listing of every registered per-host image UUID. The attacker downloads any listed image, extracts the embedded Ignition config, and recovers the base64-encoded cluster pull secret and SSH key. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the described GET-and-extract flow needs no special tooling. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Nov 03, 2026
In Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 and 5 bare metal provisioning, the image-customization-controller runs an unauthenticated, non-TLS HTTP file server on port 8084 (default bind ":8084") whose root path returns a browsable directory listing of every registered per-host image. Any client that can reach the provisioning network can enumerate those image UUIDs, download an image, and pull the embedded Ignition config, recovering the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, the optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. The vector is adjacent-network, no privileges and no user interaction (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N), so confidentiality impact is the primary concern; exploitation requires an active provisioning cycle and network adjacency, and no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis. The unguessable-UUID filename was the only access control and the directory listing defeats it entirely.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version is given in the available data; track Red Hat's advisory at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-82976, Bugzilla 2526334 and https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/OCPBUGS-105396 for the fixed OpenShift 4/5 z-stream that restricts the image file server, and upgrade as soon as it is published. Until then, the practical control is to shrink reachability of port 8084: bind the file server to a single provisioning-facing interface (the listen address is the imagesBindAddr setting rather than an unavoidable wildcard) and add host or network firewall rules that permit TCP 8084 only from the hosts that legitimately fetch images during provisioning - the trade-off is that too narrow a rule breaks bare metal image delivery and can stall provisioning, and any change must be rechecked on upgrade since the default is to bind all interfaces. Because the images embed the cluster pull secret, IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy credentials and NetworkManager keyfiles, treat any period of broad 8084 exposure as a credential compromise: rotate the cluster pull secret and the ramdisk SSH key and review proxy and per-host network credentials. Detection should focus on unexpected GET / and subsequent image downloads from non-provisioning hosts in controller logs, which record the requested path on Open.
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The controller is a Go service in OpenShift's bare metal IPI stack. It implements a custom http.FileSystem (pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go) backed by an in-memory map of generated images. Its Readdir method returns every registered image as a fs.FileInfo regardless of the requested count, and Open("/") returns the filesystem itself, so http.FileServer rendered at "/" (cmd/controller/main.go) produces a browsable HTML index of all image names. The listener is created with http.Server{Addr: imagesBindAddr} and server.ListenAndServe() - no TLS, no authenticating handler, no path filtering - bound to all interfaces by default. Because the images themselves are initramfs/ISO artifacts whose Ignition configs are generated by pkg/ignition, each one carries /etc/authfile.json built from the ironic agent pull secret (service_config.go authFile(), "data:;base64," + the pull secret), plus optional SSH key, proxy configuration and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. The root-cause class is CWE-548, Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing: the design relied on UUID unguessability (security through obscurity) rather than on authorization, and the enumeration endpoint removed that assumption entirely. Integrity and availability are not confirmed as affected by the sources; the assessed vector scores C:H/I:N/A:N.
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Severity by source
AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Unauthenticated adjacent-network directory listing (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N) discloses the pull secret and SSH key, so C:H; the flaw itself writes nothing and causes no outage, so I:N/A:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorNVD
DescriptionNVD
A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.
Evidence
pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go - root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names
func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
result := []fs.FileInfo{}
for _, im := range f.images {
result = append(result, im)
}
return result, nil
}
func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {
f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)
if name == "/" {
return f, nil
}
...cmd/controller/main.go - file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS
http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))
go func() {
server := &http.Server{
Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084"
ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
err := server.ListenAndServe()pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 - pull secret is embedded in every served image
func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {
source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)
return ignition_config_types_32.File{
Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"},
...Attack Pattern
Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.
Executive ViewAI
CVE-2026-82976 exposes sensitive cluster secrets in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 and 5 bare metal provisioning environments. An unauthenticated attacker with adjacent network access can retrieve the cluster pull secret, SSH keys, and per-host network configurations, potentially compromising the entire cluster's integrity and confidentiality. Leadership should prioritize immediate mitigation because a breach could lead to unauthorized cluster access, data loss, and operational disruption.
Restrict network access to port 8084 to authorized hosts only, implement TLS/mutual authentication, and rotate all exposed secrets immediately.
Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
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