pgAdmin 4 EUVD-2026-114382

Requires an authenticated pgAdmin session whose database role holds the Import/Export Data permission - granted to non-administrators by default - and the attacker must set standard_conforming_strings=off for their own session (which any ordinary role may do). The attacker then uses the Import/Export Data tool with a query containing a backslash before a double quote inside a double-quoted identifier, so psql under scs=off treats the backslash-escaped quote as not closing the identifier while pgAdmin's validator does, exposing a closing parenthesis that ends the \copy (...) wrapper and allowing an appended TO PROGRAM clause. Limiting factors: affects only pgAdmin 4 versions before 9.19; needs a valid low-privileged account with the Import/Export feature; and the injected command runs with the privileges of the OS account hosting pgAdmin. No special non-default server configuration is otherwise needed because the scs=off toggle is attacker-controlled.

This is a genuine high-priority issue, not an inflated high-CVSS score. The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) with high vulnerable-system impact (VC/VI/VA:H) and high subsequent-system impact (SC/SI/SA:H) describes authenticated network-reachable OS command execution on the pgAdmin host, which is consistent with CWE-78 and the described TO PROGRAM injection. The vuln.today Decision label is act_now, reinforcing urgency. The one mitigating signal is PR:L - exploitation requires an authenticated pgAdmin/PostgreSQL session rather than fully unauthenticated access - but this barrier is weak because the Import/Export Data permission is granted to non-administrators by default and any ordinary role can set standard_conforming_strings=off for itself, so the privilege prerequisite is effectively any legitimate low-privileged user. No EPSS score and no CISA KEV status were provided in the input, and there is no indication of active exploitation in the wild; the available exploitation evidence is a public regression test in the fix commit that contains a working trigger payload. In short: real and serious because it yields host RCE with only default low-privilege access, but current signals point to a patch-driven disclosure rather than confirmed mass exploitation. Note the privilege requirement (PR:L) means this should not be described as remote-unauthenticated.

A low-privileged user with the default Import/Export Data permission sets standard_conforming_strings=off on their own session, then submits an export query containing a backslash-escaped double quote inside a double-quoted identifier. pgAdmin's parentheses-balance check and psql's \copy parser then disagree about where the identifier ends, letting a hidden closing parenthesis terminate the \copy (...) wrapper and a trailing TO PROGRAM clause execute an arbitrary OS command on the pgAdmin host as the account running pgAdmin. No standalone weaponized exploit is confirmed, but the fix commit's regression test includes a working payload (SELECT "a\"b"c) TO PROGRAM 'echo pwned' x").