pgAdmin 4 CVE-2025-12763

Affected deployments are pgAdmin 4 versions up to 9.9 running specifically on Windows; the flaw is not present on non-Windows hosts. Exploitation requires reaching and invoking pgAdmin's backup or restore operation and supplying a maliciously crafted file path, which is processed via shell=True; per UI:R, a user action (initiating the backup/restore) is needed to trigger it. The practical limiting factors are: Windows-only exposure, access to the backup/restore workflow (typically an authenticated pgAdmin session in server mode or a local desktop user), and the need to craft a file path containing shell metacharacters. These constraints materially narrow real-world reach despite the high CVSS score.

Signals are mixed and lean toward a real-but-not-urgent priority. The CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.8 is driven by AV:N/AC:L/PR:N with C:H/I:H/A:H, implying easy unauthenticated network exploitation - but the description tells a more constrained story: the flaw is a CWE-78 command injection triggered only on Windows via shell=True when a crafted file path is supplied during backup/restore operations, which are operator-initiated functions typically reached only after logging into pgAdmin. The vector's PR:N therefore appears optimistic: providing the malicious file path in the backup/restore dialog realistically presupposes access to pgAdmin's management UI, so treat the 'unauthenticated' framing with caution (verify with vendor). Corroborating the lower-urgency read, EPSS is only 0.08% (24th percentile), there is no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit is referenced, so this is not evidence of mass exploitation. Conversely, impact if triggered is severe (arbitrary OS command execution on the pgAdmin host), and a vendor patch exists, making this a 'patch promptly on Windows installs' item rather than an emergency. Net: high technical impact, platform- and workflow-limited reachability, and low observed exploitation probability.

An attacker with access to a Windows-hosted pgAdmin 4 (≤9.9) instance initiates a database backup or restore and supplies a specially crafted file path; because the operation runs with shell=True, embedded shell metacharacters in the path are executed as OS commands on the pgAdmin host. Given AV:N/UI:R, this could also be staged by inducing an operator to run a backup/restore against an attacker-influenced path. No public exploit is referenced, so exploitation would require custom payload crafting.