pgAdmin 4 CVE-2026-17349

Requires an authenticated pgAdmin user (PR:L) in a multi-user/server-mode deployment where the Workspaces feature (introduced in 9.0) is present and another user - typically an administrator - has created a shared server definition with saved credentials (save_password set, storing password and/or tunnel_password). The attacker must know or enumerate the id of that existing shared server and invoke /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against it. Limiting factors: single-user desktop pgAdmin installs, deployments with no shared servers, or shared servers that do not save passwords are not exploitable; the attack notably persists the credential-bearing clone even if the actual database connection subsequently fails, so a wrong network path does not protect the credentials.

The vendor CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N, VC:H/VI:H, SC:H/SI:H) scoring 9.3 Critical is internally consistent with the description: network-reachable, low-complexity, requiring only low privileges (any authenticated pgAdmin user in a shared/multi-user deployment) and no user interaction, with high confidentiality and integrity impact both on pgAdmin and on the subsequent database system. The realistic risk is meaningfully gated by deployment: it requires pgAdmin running in server/multi-user mode with at least one shared server that has stored (saved) credentials and more than one user account - single-user desktop installs are not exposed. No EPSS score was provided, there is no KEV listing, and no public POC was supplied, so this is a high-severity, credential-exposure bug whose exploitation depends on a specific but common enterprise configuration rather than confirmed in-the-wild activity. This is a genuine priority for organizations that share admin-owned server connections among analysts, and lower priority for isolated desktop use.

In a shared pgAdmin server-mode deployment, a low-privileged analyst who can see an administrator's shared PostgreSQL server invokes the Workspaces adhoc-connect endpoint against that server's id. pgAdmin clones the server row - copying the admin's saved database and tunnel passwords - and reassigns it to the analyst, who then opens the newly-owned connection and authenticates to the database as the administrator using credentials they never possessed. No public POC was provided, but exploitation is low-complexity network abuse of a legitimate authenticated feature.