Apache Camel EUVD-2026-109668

Requires a deployment on an affected version (4.8.0-4.18.4 or 4.19.0-4.22.1) running a route that consumes from an aws2-s3 endpoint and produces to an aws2-s3 producer while letting the CamelAwsS3Key header pass through to the producer (or copying untrusted content into that header); in such a route the consumed object's name reaches determineKey() and any name containing the markers ${ or $simple{ is evaluated as a Simple expression. The attacker must be able to choose the name of an object in a consumed bucket - typically a principal permitted to upload to that bucket. Limiting factors: configuring keyName on the producer does NOT prevent it because the header takes precedence; reading an evaluated value back additionally requires the ability to see object names in the destination bucket, whereas a bean-method invocation takes effect without that visibility only where camel-bean is on the classpath; the bucket-name header path is not reachable this way because the consumer only places its own configured bucket there; and releases before 4.8.0 are not affected.

The input CVSS 3.1 score is 5.4 (medium) with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N. The AV:N reflects that the malicious input (an S3 object key) arrives over the network, but PR:L is the decisive signal: exploitation requires the attacker to be a principal allowed to write/name an object in a bucket that a vulnerable Camel route consumes - so this is authenticated against the storage layer, not anonymous internet exploitation. Scope is Unchanged and impact is partial (C:L/I:L, A:N), consistent with reading JVM system properties, environment variables and configuration properties (which may carry credentials) or invoking bean methods, rather than full compromise. No EPSS score is provided in the input, no CISA KEV listing is present, and no public exploit code is referenced; the vuln.today Decision label is 'awaiting_data', which signals the priority is not yet escalated rather than act_now/emergency. This is therefore a conditional medium-risk issue, not a high-CVSS-but-low-real-risk mislabel and not a drop-everything emergency: its real-world priority depends almost entirely on whether a deployment actually runs the specific route pattern (an aws2-s3 consumer feeding an aws2-s3 producer with the CamelAwsS3Key header passed through) on an affected version. Where that pattern is absent, practical risk is low; where it is present and untrusted principals can upload to the consumed bucket, it is a genuine code/credential-exposure concern.

An attacker who holds write/upload permission to an S3 bucket that a vulnerable Camel route consumes uploads an object whose key contains a Simple-language marker, e.g. ${sys.some.property} or a $simple{...} bean call. When the route consumes that object and produces it to another aws2-s3 endpoint, AWS2S3Utils.determineKey() evaluates the attacker-chosen key as a Simple expression in the Camel process, disclosing system properties/environment/config values (potentially credentials) or, where camel-bean is on the classpath, invoking bean methods. No public exploit code is referenced in the input; the linked JIRA (CAMEL-20971) is the feature request that introduced dynamic key evaluation in 4.8.0, not a proof of concept.