LobsterAI EUVD-2026-103467

Exploitation requires the attacker to obtain a providers export file produced by LobsterAI's 'export providers' feature (named like 'lobsterai-providers-<date>.json', version 2, encryption keySource 'password'). The file encrypts each provider's apiKey with the compile-time constant EXPORT_PASSWORD ('lobsterai-APP') rather than a user-chosen secret, so no password guessing or brute force is needed. Limiting factors that reduce real-world exposure: a user must have actively used the export function (UI:P), the attacker must gain access to the resulting file through a separate channel (leak, shared storage, repository, or backup), and the vulnerability is not reachable over the network against the running application (AV:L). Versions before 2026.10.16 are affected; 2026.10.16 and later remediate it.

This is a genuine but moderate-priority confidentiality issue, not a high-urgency remote threat. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H) scores 6.8 and the signals are internally consistent: the local attack vector and passive user-interaction requirement correctly reflect that an attacker cannot reach the flaw remotely - they must first obtain a providers export file that a user chose to generate. The high confidentiality impact (VC:H) with no integrity or availability impact is appropriate, since the only consequence is disclosure of third-party AI provider API keys. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or published proof-of-concept exploit was provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation; however, the hardcoded constant 'lobsterai-APP' and the exact source locations are publicly visible on GitHub, meaning the decryption technique is trivially reproducible by anyone who reads the code. The real risk is therefore driven by data exposure (leaked, shared, or backed-up export files) rather than by direct attack against the running application, and it is bounded by the relatively small deployment footprint of this product. Treat as a routine patch-when-convenient item that becomes urgent only if export files are known to have circulated.

A LobsterAI user exports their provider configuration and the resulting JSON file is leaked - committed to a repository, attached to a support ticket, or synced to cloud backup. An attacker obtains the file and, using the publicly known hardcoded password 'lobsterai-APP', derives the AES-GCM key via PBKDF2 from the embedded salt and decrypts every stored third-party AI provider API key. No proof-of-concept is published, but the technique is fully described by the vulnerable source and requires only the leaked file plus local offline computation.