go-ldap-admin EUVD-2026-102491

Exploitation requires the attacker to first obtain the encrypted password blobs that go-ldap-admin produces (for example by capturing login traffic or reading stored encrypted values); once ciphertext is held, decryption is unauthenticated because the RSA private key is published in the project's config/config.go and the /base/decryptpwd route requires no authentication. The exploit affects any deployment through 0.6.2 that uses the default embedded key - operators who replaced the key with their own are not affected. The sole limiting factor is access to the ciphertext; there is no user interaction, no privilege requirement, and no special non-default configuration needed to decrypt it.

This is a credential-disclosure flaw (CWE-321, hard-coded cryptographic key) with a provided CVSS 4.0 vector of AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H scoring 8.2. The signals are moderately consistent: network vector and no privileges/UI point to easy reach, but the AT:P (attack-requirements-present) metric correctly reflects that an attacker must first capture the encrypted password ciphertext before the embedded key or the /base/decryptpwd oracle become useful - this is a real gating condition, not a trivial drive-by. No EPSS probability was supplied and the CVE is NOT on the CISA KEV list, so there is no evidence of active exploitation; the practical risk is driven instead by how trivially the secret is recoverable (the RSA private key is published in the public GitHub repo at config/config.go) and by a detailed public technical writeup (hackmd) documenting the decrypt oracle. Treat this as a genuine priority for anyone running go-ldap-admin because the cryptographic protection is effectively void for all deployments using the default key, but note the real-world blast radius is tempered by (a) low product prevalence and (b) the prerequisite of obtaining ciphertext. Missing data: no EPSS, no KEV, no formal POC flag, and no vendor-confirmed fixed version - verify patch status directly with the opsre project.

An attacker intercepts or otherwise obtains the encrypted LDAP login passwords handled by go-ldap-admin (e.g., via captured traffic or stored values), retrieves the hard-coded RSA private key that is publicly committed to the project repository, and decrypts the ciphertext either offline or by submitting it to the unauthenticated /base/decryptpwd endpoint, recovering cleartext directory credentials. A detailed public writeup describes this exact decrypt-oracle technique, but no packaged exploit tool was identified in the provided data.