BottleCRM EUVD-2026-101221

Requires an authenticated account that is a member of the target organization (CVSS PR:L) with permission to call POST /api/accounts/<id>/create_mail/ and set the AccountEmail message_body; no victim user interaction is needed. Exploitation is further constrained by the Django template engine itself - because the body is compiled with django.template.Template() rather than Jinja2, the attacker is limited to disclosing the template rendering context and loaded Python modules or exhausting the Celery worker via nested loops, and cannot (per available data) achieve arbitrary code execution. Impact is tenant-scoped to the shared Celery worker, and no non-default configuration is indicated as necessary.

This is a genuine but moderate-priority issue, not a high-impact emergency. The reporter-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:L) scores 5.3 (Medium) and is internally consistent with the description: a network-reachable but authenticated (PR:L) SSTI yielding low confidentiality (context/module disclosure) and low availability (worker blocking) impact, with no integrity impact. The low integrity rating and absence of a 'High' confidentiality rating are credible because the sink is django.template.Template(), whose sandboxed tag/filter language does not expose the __globals__/__builtins__ pivots that make Jinja2 SSTI trivially RCE - so this is information disclosure and denial-of-service, not remote code execution. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or POC was provided in the input; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation, so EPSS/KEV signals cannot corroborate or contradict the CVSS rating. The requirement for an authenticated organization member materially lowers real-world risk, making this primarily an insider/compromised-account or post-authentication concern rather than an internet-wide mass-exploitation threat. Data note: the CPE and advisory name the product 'micropyramid:bottlecrm', yet the code references point to the Django-CRM/Django-CRM repository (tasks.py at v1.14.5) - verify the exact affected product/repository with the vendor/VulnCheck advisory.

An authenticated organization member (or an attacker using a compromised low-privilege account) submits an email whose message_body contains Django template syntax via POST /api/accounts/<id>/create_mail/. When the asynchronous send_email Celery task compiles the body with django.template.Template(), the injected tags render - leaking rendering-context variables and loaded Python module information, or, using nested {% for %} loops, tying up the shared Celery worker and degrading email delivery for the whole tenant. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis.