Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Remote, unauthenticated, no interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); impact is integrity-only order-data tampering (I:H), with no confidentiality or availability effect.
Primary rating from Vendor (WPScan).
CVSS VectorVendor: WPScan
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
The InPost PL WordPress plugin before 1.9.1 does not verify that the request originates from the legitimate buyer before allowing the WooCommerce order parcel-locker destination to be updated, allowing unauthenticated attackers to silently redirect the shipping destination of any pending or processing order on the site.
Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Order shipping-destination tampering in the InPost PL WooCommerce plugin (versions before 1.9.1) lets unauthenticated remote attackers silently change the parcel-locker delivery point of any order still in 'pending' or 'processing' status, because the plugin never verifies the request comes from the legitimate buyer. Publicly available exploit code exists and a vendor patch has been released, though this is not listed in CISA KEV (no public exploit identified as actively exploited at time of analysis beyond the published POC). With CVSS 7.5 and an integrity-only impact, the practical risk is shipment redirection / parcel theft rather than data disclosure.
Technical ContextAI
The plugin integrates InPost's Polish parcel-locker (Paczkomat) network into WooCommerce, exposing an endpoint to set or update an order's locker destination. The flaw is a broken access-control / missing-authorization class issue (effectively CWE-862 Missing Authorization combined with CWE-352 CSRF-style missing origin verification; NVD lists no CWE). The handler that updates the parcel-locker destination trusts the incoming request without confirming the requester owns the order (no nonce, capability, or buyer-identity check), so any party who can reference an order can mutate its delivery target. The 'Information Disclosure' tag in the source feed is misleading: the CVSS vector (C:N/I:H/A:N) shows the impact is integrity (order data tampering), not confidentiality.
RemediationAI
Update the InPost PL plugin to version 1.9.1 or later (Vendor-released patch: 1.9.1), which adds verification that destination-update requests originate from the legitimate buyer. Administrators should apply this through the WordPress plugin updater and confirm the active version is >= 1.9.1. If immediate patching is not possible, compensating controls include temporarily deactivating the InPost PL plugin (trade-off: customers lose parcel-locker selection at checkout), placing the WooCommerce checkout/AJAX endpoints behind a WAF rule that requires a valid session/nonce for order-modification requests (trade-off: may block legitimate guest flows if too strict), and monitoring/alerting on parcel-locker destination changes for pending and processing orders so any tampering can be caught and reversed before fulfillment. Reference advisories: https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/79b27813-3d75-46a3-98d3-e6d8eb8ad467/ and https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9702.
Same technique Information Disclosure
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-39188
GHSA-m6v8-34fj-w7jx