Apache Airflow Keycloak CVE-2026-96806

Exploitation requires (1) an Airflow deployment configured to use the Keycloak auth manager via apache-airflow-providers-keycloak before version 0.11.1, and (2) subsequent local/physical access to the same browser the victim used, after that victim has performed a logout - the canonical case being a shared, kiosk, or unattended workstation. Limiting factors that reduce realistic risk: the attacker cannot exploit this remotely over the network, cannot forge the session without possession of the victim's browser, and the window opens only after a logout action; single-user or dedicated-device deployments, and any deployment not using the Keycloak auth manager, are not meaningfully exposed.

This is a session-management flaw (CWE-613, insufficient session expiration) in the Apache Airflow Keycloak auth manager where logout failed to terminate the session: the logout route revoked the presented Airflow JWT, but KeycloakJWTMiddleware immediately minted a new unrevoked token on the same response, leaving the user authenticated. No CVSS score or vector was provided by the source, no EPSS probability is available, there is no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC is identified - so every quantitative exploitation signal is absent and risk must be inferred from the description and the patch diff alone. The description itself defines the threat model as physical/local reuse of a shared browser after logout rather than remote network attack, which caps real-world severity well below a 'critical remote auth bypass': an attacker must have hands-on access to the victim's browser session (e.g. a shared or kiosk workstation). Confirmed signals: a real, vendor-authored fix exists (Apache PR #73695, which adds a post-request _is_jwt_still_valid revocation check and clears session cookies when the JWT was revoked mid-request), so the vulnerability is genuine and reproducible. Conflicting/uncertain signal to flag: the 'Information Disclosure' tag understates the actual impact, which is full session impersonation/account takeover of the logged-out user, not mere disclosure. Overall this is a moderate, context-dependent risk - a real priority for multi-user/shared-terminal Airflow deployments on the Keycloak auth manager, but low urgency for single-user or dedicated-workstation environments; it is not a mass-exploitable internet-facing bug.

On a shared or kiosk workstation, a legitimate Airflow user clicks logout and walks away believing their session is closed; because the middleware re-issued a fresh valid token on the logout response, the browser still holds a working session. A second person who then sits at the same machine can simply reload the Airflow UI and continue acting with the victim's identity and permissions. No public exploit code is required or identified - exploitation is manual reuse of the still-authenticated browser.