Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Requires a client with access to an NFSACL v2 export to issue SETACL (PR:L), no user interaction; impact is ACL deletion so I:H but C:N and A:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (Linux).
CVSS VectorVendor: Linux
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: gate nfs2 setacl by argp->mask
The NFSACL v2 SETACL path shares the decoder convention used by its v3 sibling: nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() fills in argp->acl_access only when NFS_ACL is set in the request mask and argp->acl_default only when NFS_DFACL is set, leaving the other pointer NULL because the argument buffer is zeroed up to pc_argzero before decode.
nfsacld_proc_setacl() then hands both pointers to set_posix_acl() unconditionally. set_posix_acl(idmap, dentry, type, NULL) is the VFS "remove this ACL type" operation, so an omitted arm is indistinguishable from an explicit request to delete that ACL. A SETACL carrying only NFS_ACL silently strips the directory's default ACL; mask=0 strips both.
This is the same defect just fixed in nfsd3_proc_setacl(); apply the same remedy. Gate each set_posix_acl() call on its mask bit and initialize error to 0 so that a request with neither bit set leaves the on-disk ACLs untouched and returns success. The out_drop_lock path and the unconditional posix_acl_release() in nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() already tolerate the skipped arms.
AnalysisAI
Unintended ACL deletion in the Linux kernel NFSD server affects the NFSACL v2 SETACL path, where nfsacld_proc_setacl() passes both the access and default ACL pointers to set_posix_acl() unconditionally even when the request mask omits one of them. Because set_posix_acl(..., NULL) is the VFS 'remove this ACL type' operation, an NFS client sending a SETACL that carries only NFS_ACL silently strips the directory's default ACL, and a mask of 0 strips both, corrupting on-disk access controls. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires an NFS server that has NFSD built with NFSACL (POSIX-ACL-over-NFS) support and is exporting a filesystem using version-2 NFSACL to clients. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The published CVSS 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/C:H/I:H/A:N) overstates real-world risk on several axes. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: update to Linux 6.12.109, 6.18.50, 7.2.4, or 7.3-rc1 (or your distribution's backported build carrying commit e41d173d9dc735cecb15ab7aa63ecab09338f81b / f951b22dbeec46f2e0fba81cb80d1b0c686b61eb / 37eea38e7898538f0ec5f1eb8b18d8646e4be41c / a3a7e20ed66d3f04d37883c398da8a113b430769), referencing https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e41d173d9dc735cecb15ab7aa63ecab09338f81b. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, conduct an inventory of Linux NFS servers in your environment and identify which systems run NFSD with NFSACLv2 enabled, documenting your NFS client versions to understand exposure surface. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-76584
GHSA-cpgj-m749-r929