EUVD-2026-98205
GHSA-4r4h-q2gr-cvcv
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessReach msf-ws on default 0.0.0.0:8080
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ExploitSend unauthenticated PUT/DELETE to /api/v1/credentials
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ImpactRead, modify, or wipe stored credentials
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Authentication required for critical functions
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires the Metasploit Framework REST API web service (msf-ws) to be running and network-reachable on its listener (default 0.0.0.0:8080); only the PUT update_credential and DELETE delete_credentials routes under /api/v1/credentials are affected, while all other routes remain authenticated. No authentication, user interaction, or special privileges are needed against those two routes (PR:N per the CVSS vector). The principal limiting factor is deployment mode: msf-ws is an optional component that must be explicitly started and exposed, so Metasploit installations not running the web service are not exposed. All versions through 6.5.4 are vulnerable; 6.5.5 adds the missing authentication check. |
| Impact | All signals point to a genuinely high-severity flaw, though real-world exposure is narrower than the 9.8 CVSS implies. The CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N vector is well-supported by the description: two routes (PUT update_credential, DELETE delete_credentials) skip the warden.authenticate! call that every other route enforces, so any network client reaching the service can act with no credentials and no user interaction. C:H/I:H/A:H is justified because the attacker can read, modify, and permanently delete the entire credential store (passwords, hashes, private keys). CWE-306 (Missing Authentication) matches precisely. The key nuance the raw score hides: msf-ws is an optional, explicitly-started component - not the default Metasploit Framework usage mode - so the AV:N/PR:N rating only applies to deployments actually running the web service and exposing its default 0.0.0.0:8080 listener. No EPSS score, KEV entry, or POC was provided in the input; exploitation status is therefore 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' The absence of exploitation telemetry combined with the specialized deployment footprint suggests this is a credible, patch-now issue for teams running the REST API, rather than evidence of widespread active exploitation. Patch availability (6.5.5) is vendor-confirmed via the Rapid7 release, so remediation is straightforward. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who can reach a running msf-ws instance on its default 0.0.0.0:8080 listener sends an unauthenticated DELETE or PUT request to /api/v1/credentials. Because these two handlers never call warden.authenticate!, the request succeeds and the attacker reads, alters, or wipes the entire shared-engagement credential store. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, but the request is trivial to craft from the described routes. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 13, 2026
Unauthenticated read, modification, and permanent deletion of stored credential records in Rapid7 Metasploit Framework through 6.5.4 is possible whenever the optional msf-ws REST API is running and network-reachable, because the PUT update_credential and DELETE delete_credentials handlers for /api/v1/credentials omit the warden.authenticate! call that every other route in Msf::WebServices::CredentialServlet performs before processing. The assessed CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, 9.8) is consistent with this: the two affected routes are reachable by unauthenticated remote attackers and allow full compromise of confidentiality and integrity of the credential store, which holds passwords, hashes, and private keys captured during shared team engagements. The practical limiting factor is deployment mode rather than the flaw itself - msf-ws is an optional component that must be explicitly started and exposed (default listener 0.0.0.0:8080), so Metasploit installations that never run the web service are not exposed; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no confirmed active exploitation (not listed in CISA KEV).
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: 6.5.5 - upgrade Metasploit Framework to 6.5.5 or later, which adds warden.authenticate! as the first statement in both the update_credential and delete_credentials handlers, matching every other route in the API (release notes: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/releases/tag/6.5.5; source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework). Where an immediate upgrade is not possible, the most effective compensating control is to stop the msf-ws service entirely if it is not required, which removes the attack surface at the cost of losing all REST API functionality; if the API must stay up, bind the listener to 127.0.0.1 or a management-only interface instead of the default 0.0.0.0 (trade-off: remote team members and integrations lose direct access), and block or restrict TCP/8080 to trusted hosts with a firewall or network ACL (trade-off: it is a coarse control that does not fix the missing check on the two routes and can be bypassed by any host inside the permitted range). Because the flaw allows unauthenticated modification and deletion of credentials, treat the credential store as potentially tampered with on any instance that ran msf-ws through 6.5.4 on an exposed listener: rotate or invalidate all credentials, hashes, and keys held there after patching, and review logs for PUT/DELETE requests to /api/v1/credentials. No public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation was identified at time of analysis.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause class is CWE-306, Missing Authentication for Critical Function. Metasploit Framework ships an optional Sinatra-based web service, msf-ws, that exposes the framework's data stores over a REST API; Msf::WebServices::CredentialServlet is the endpoint responsible for the credential store, and it relies on the Warden authentication middleware invoked as warden.authenticate! at the top of each route handler rather than on any authorization logic inside the data layer. The two offending handlers - update_credential (PUT) and delete_credentials (DELETE) under /api/v1/credentials - call straight into lib/msf/core/db_manager/cred.rb, which performs no authentication or authorization check of its own, so the missing guard is not compensated for further down the stack. As a result, any client that can open a TCP connection to the listener (default 0.0.0.0:8080) can enumerate, alter, or destroy credential records without credentials. All published versions through 6.5.4 are affected; 6.5.5 fixes the issue by making warden.authenticate! the first statement in both handlers, restoring parity with every other route in the servlet. The CPE string cpe:2.3:a:rapid7:metasploit_framework:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* confirms the wildcard-version coverage of the vendor product.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected routes omit authentication entirely (PR:N) and are reachable over the network on a default listener (AV:N/AC:L); full read, modify, and delete of the credential store yields C:H/I:H/A:H.
Primary rating from Vendor (rapid7).
CVSS VectorVendor: rapid7
DescriptionCVE.org
The Metasploit Framework Web Service REST API (msf-ws) exposes the credential store through Msf::WebServices::CredentialServlet. Every mutating and read route in this servlet calls warden.authenticate! before processing a request, except the update_credential (PUT) and delete_credentials (DELETE) handlers for /api/v1/credentials, which omit the authentication call entirely. Because these handlers call directly into lib/msf/core/db_manager/cred.rb, which performs no authorization check of its own, any client able to reach the web service on its default 0.0.0.0:8080 listener can read, modify, or permanently delete every stored credential record - including passwords, hashes, and private keys stored for a shared team engagement - without presenting any authentication. All published versions of Metasploit Framework through 6.5.4 are affected. The issue is fixed in 6.5.5 by adding warden.authenticate! as the first statement in both handlers, matching the pattern used by every other route in the API.
Executive ViewAI
Rapid7 Metasploit Framework through version 6.5.4 contains a critical flaw in its optional msf-ws REST API that lets any unauthenticated network-reachable party read, alter, or permanently delete the credential store used during shared penetration-testing engagements. Because that store holds captured passwords, password hashes, and private keys, an exposed instance can hand an attacker both the client credentials your team has collected and a destructive capability against your own engagement records. Leadership should care because exposure is limited to teams that deliberately started and network-exposed msf-ws, but where it is exposed the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive customer credentials are fully compromised, carrying potential client-notification and contractual consequences.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
VulDB
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Exploit-DB