Metasploit Framework
Monthly
Unauthenticated read, modification, and permanent deletion of stored credential records in Rapid7 Metasploit Framework through 6.5.4 is possible whenever the optional msf-ws REST API is running and network-reachable, because the PUT update_credential and DELETE delete_credentials handlers for /api/v1/credentials omit the warden.authenticate! call that every other route in Msf::WebServices::CredentialServlet performs before processing. The assessed CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, 9.8) is consistent with this: the two affected routes are reachable by unauthenticated remote attackers and allow full compromise of confidentiality and integrity of the credential store, which holds passwords, hashes, and private keys captured during shared team engagements. The practical limiting factor is deployment mode rather than the flaw itself - msf-ws is an optional component that must be explicitly started and exposed (default listener 0.0.0.0:8080), so Metasploit installations that never run the web service are not exposed; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no confirmed active exploitation (not listed in CISA KEV).
Unauthenticated local access to Metasploit Framework's JSON-RPC dispatcher is possible via a fail-open logic flaw (CWE-305) in the ApiToken Warden authentication strategy. When the MSF_WS_JSON_RPC_API_TOKEN environment variable is unset and the db.check health-check method raises an exception, the internal msf.auth_initialized flag is reset to false - which the Warden misinterprets as authentication being uninitialised rather than failed, bypassing token enforcement entirely. A vendor-released upstream fix is available via GitHub PR #21768; no public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing have been identified at time of analysis.
Unauthenticated read, modification, and permanent deletion of stored credential records in Rapid7 Metasploit Framework through 6.5.4 is possible whenever the optional msf-ws REST API is running and network-reachable, because the PUT update_credential and DELETE delete_credentials handlers for /api/v1/credentials omit the warden.authenticate! call that every other route in Msf::WebServices::CredentialServlet performs before processing. The assessed CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, 9.8) is consistent with this: the two affected routes are reachable by unauthenticated remote attackers and allow full compromise of confidentiality and integrity of the credential store, which holds passwords, hashes, and private keys captured during shared team engagements. The practical limiting factor is deployment mode rather than the flaw itself - msf-ws is an optional component that must be explicitly started and exposed (default listener 0.0.0.0:8080), so Metasploit installations that never run the web service are not exposed; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no confirmed active exploitation (not listed in CISA KEV).
Unauthenticated local access to Metasploit Framework's JSON-RPC dispatcher is possible via a fail-open logic flaw (CWE-305) in the ApiToken Warden authentication strategy. When the MSF_WS_JSON_RPC_API_TOKEN environment variable is unset and the db.check health-check method raises an exception, the internal msf.auth_initialized flag is reset to false - which the Warden misinterprets as authentication being uninitialised rather than failed, bypassing token enforcement entirely. A vendor-released upstream fix is available via GitHub PR #21768; no public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing have been identified at time of analysis.