OpenShift AI CVE-2026-86332

Requires a valid Red Hat OpenShift AI dashboard login at any privilege level - no administrative role, group membership, or special permission is needed beyond basic dashboard authentication (CVSS PR:L). The target cluster must have NVIDIA NIM serving configured and the Kubernetes Secrets (apiKeySecret, nimPullSecret) must exist in the cluster; deployments without NIM integration are not vulnerable. The attacker must know or enumerate the Secret resource name, which may be discoverable through dashboard UI behavior or other API responses. No special network position is required (AV:N) and no user interaction is needed (UI:N). Unauthenticated external access to the route is not possible - a valid dashboard session is the minimum entry requirement.

The CVSS 6.5 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) accurately captures the threat profile: a valid dashboard login is the only prerequisite, exploitation is low-complexity and fully automatable, and the confidentiality impact is high given the sensitivity of NVIDIA NGC credentials. The asymmetric gating - create and delete operations are admin-restricted, the read path is not - strongly suggests an inadvertent authorization omission rather than a design choice, making this straightforward to exploit once discovered. The stolen NGC API key can be used to pull licensed NIM containers, consume NGC compute quota, or pivot to other NVIDIA cloud services under the victim organization's billing identity; the pull secret enables unauthorized access to private container image registries. Even a mid-sized municipal IT team in koszalin operating OpenShift AI for inference workloads should treat this as a meaningful credential-exposure risk warranting prompt rotation and patching. EPSS data is absent from the provided intelligence, and no CISA KEV listing or public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis; however, the low complexity and network vector mean exploitation could be operationalized quickly by any authenticated dashboard user who discovers the route.

A data scientist or other low-privileged OpenShift AI dashboard user issues a GET request to /api/nim-serving/apiKeySecret (or the pull secret equivalent), which the dashboard backend proxies using its elevated service account. The full Kubernetes Secret object is returned in the JSON response, exposing the NGC API key and image pull token in cleartext. The attacker then uses the NGC API key to authenticate against NVIDIA's cloud services or pull NIM container images under the victim organization's account, with no public exploit code required - only a standard authenticated HTTP call.