Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessConnect to MOOS community as unauthenticated publisher
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DeliveryPublish variable with script-tag payload as name/value/source
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ExploitPayload stored in MOOSDB
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ExecutionOperator opens MOOSDB HTTP dashboard
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PersistUnescaped payload renders in browser
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ImpactExecute arbitrary JavaScript in operator's session
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Output encoding, context-aware escaping
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Initial Access, Execution The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | The MOOSDB HTTP web interface must be accessible over the network (it is an optional built-in component, not enabled in all deployments). The attacker must have network-level access to publish messages to the MOOS community - MOOS clients are unauthenticated by protocol design, so no credentials are required. Exploitation also requires that an operator or administrator subsequently view the MOOSDB HTTP page in a web browser. Limiting factors: the MOOSDB HTTP interface may not be exposed if the deployment is headless or if the HTTP port is firewalled; the payload only executes when a human browses to the monitoring page (UI:P), ruling out fully automated exploitation. |
| Impact | The CVSS 4.0 score of 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P) correctly characterizes this as medium severity. PR:N reflects the MOOS protocol design: any network-accessible client can publish without authentication. The UI:P (passive user interaction) requirement - an operator must open the web interface - is the main exploitation barrier. In a typical MOOS deployment, the web interface is accessed by human operators monitoring vehicle state, making this a credible target. EPSS data is not provided; no CISA KEV listing and no standalone public exploit code have been identified at time of analysis. Real-world risk is constrained by the niche deployment footprint of MOOS (primarily academic and naval-research environments) and by the requirement that both a malicious publisher and a web-interface viewer exist concurrently. However, in a compromise scenario the XSS could be used to steal operator session context or inject commands through the web form interface, escalating impact beyond simple information disclosure. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with network access to a MOOS community (no authentication required) connects as a MOOS publisher and posts a variable named or valued with a script payload such as |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 03, 2026
Stored cross-site scripting in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any MOOS publisher to inject script payloads into the MOOSDB HTTP monitoring interface. Because MOOS clients are inherently unauthenticated by protocol design, attackers with network access to a MOOS community can set variable names, values, source process names, or community names to contain HTML/script markup that is rendered unescaped in the operator's browser. The fix (PR #78) adds a comprehensive HTMLEscape() function covering all attacker-controlled database fields, plus a restrictive Content-Security-Policy header as a secondary control.
RemediationAI
The upstream fix is available via PR #78 (https://github.com/themoos/core-moos/pull/78) and commit a3f26f099bb08decb143f704d8b1ca16ae405b44 (https://github.com/themoos/core-moos/commit/a3f26f099bb08decb143f704d8b1ca16ae405b44); a patched tagged release version has not been independently confirmed from the available data - operators should build from the patched commit or await a formal release. As an immediate workaround, restrict network access to the MOOSDB HTTP port so that only trusted administrators can reach the web interface (e.g., via firewall rules or binding to localhost only); this eliminates the browser-side attack surface without affecting MOOS protocol operation. Additionally, limit which hosts are permitted to publish to the MOOSDB by network segmentation, reducing the pool of potential XSS injectors.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
MOOS (Mission Oriented Operating Suite) is a publish-subscribe middleware originally developed at MIT for autonomous marine vehicle systems. The affected component is MOOSDB's built-in HTTP server (HTTPConnection.cpp), which renders a web dashboard showing all variable names, values, publisher process names, and community names stored in the database. The root cause (CWE-79) is that none of these database fields - all populated by unauthenticated MOOS clients - were HTML-escaped before insertion into the generated HTML page. The CPE cpe:2.3:a:themoos:core-moos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* covers all releases through 10.4.0. The fix introduces HTML entity encoding for &, <, >, ", and ' across every rendering path in BuildSingleVariableWebPageContents() and BuildFullDBWebPageContents(), and adds HTTP security headers (CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy) as defense-in-depth.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
PR:N because MOOS publishing is unauthenticated by design; UI:R for operator page view; S:C for cross-browser execution; C:L/I:L for session theft and DOM manipulation.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
DescriptionCVE.org
MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 fails to escape database contents when rendering MOOSDB HTTP pages, allowing attackers to inject malicious scripts. Any MOOS publisher can set variable values containing script payloads that execute in the browser of operators viewing the web interface.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Cross-Site Scripting occurs when an application accepts untrusted data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation or encoding.
Remote code execution risk in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 arises from a pre-authentication heap overflow in MOOSCommPk
Unauthenticated variable write in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 lets any client that can reach the optional MOOSDB HTTP
Unauthenticated full compromise of the MOOSDB message bus in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0, where the wire protocol perf
Unauthenticated buffer over-read in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any attacker with TCP access to the MOOSDB port
MOOSDB in core-moos through 10.4.0 accepts wire-supplied source identifiers verbatim instead of enforcing the authentica
Uncontrolled memory allocation in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 exposes MOOSDB servers to pre-authentication denial of s
Unauthenticated denial-of-service in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows remote attackers to crash the central MOOSDB p
Resource exhaustion in the MOOSDB HTTP server component of MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows unauthenticated remote a
Denial-of-service in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any unauthenticated network peer to permanently freeze the MOO
Remote process termination in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any multicast-reachable attacker to forcibly shut dow
Stack corruption with potential code execution in MOOS core-moos through version 10.4.0 arises from an off-by-one error
EUVD-2026-70787
GHSA-82xr-q34f-wp45
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB