Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessGain multicast segment access
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DeliveryEnumerate MOOS processes via default multicast group
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ExploitSend UDP datagram with hard-coded passphrase
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ExecutionSuicidalSleeper passphrase check passes
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PersistTarget process calls exit(0)
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ImpactMOOS application stack disrupted
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Credential externalization
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Persistence, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires multicast-reachable network access to the host running MOOS processes - the attacker must be on a segment where UDP multicast packets to the MOOS default group and port are forwarded to target hosts. No authentication, account, or special software is needed; the passphrase 'elks have been know to waltz' is baked into the public source. The feature must be active, which was the default in versions through 10.4.0 since the passphrase had a non-empty compiled-in value. Post-patch, the feature is disabled by default and exploitation requires an operator to have configured a guessable or exposed passphrase. Exploitation is limited by network topology: internet-routable attacks are not possible unless multicast is bridged or the MOOS network is otherwise accessible from untrusted segments. |
| Impact | The CVSS 4.0 score of 7.1 (AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H) accurately reflects the attack surface: exploitation is constrained to multicast-reachable network segments - the local LAN, VLAN, or a network path that forwards multicast - which limits opportunistic internet-scale attacks. Within that scope, exploitation is trivially easy: the passphrase is publicly visible in the repository's source history, complexity is low, and no credentials or privileges are required. The primary impact is high availability loss (VA:H) from forced process termination, with minor confidentiality impact (VC:L) from process enumeration. No EPSS data or CISA KEV listing was provided, and no public exploit code has been identified. The bounded deployment footprint of MOOS (academic, research, and defense maritime robotics) limits broad exposure, but within those environments process termination during autonomous operations could have physical safety consequences beyond standard software-layer CIA impact. The 'Authentication Bypass' tag is defensible: the hard-coded passphrase makes the authentication mechanism nominal rather than functional. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker connected to the same network segment as a MOOS deployment sends a UDP multicast packet to the default MOOS multicast group and port containing the publicly known passphrase 'elks have been know to waltz'. Any MOOS process in the default configuration receives the datagram, passes the passphrase check, and immediately calls exit(0), terminating the process. On an AUV or USV running multiple MOOS applications, an adversary in RF or wired network range could sequentially or simultaneously terminate all processes, disabling autonomous operation. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 03, 2026
Remote process termination in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any multicast-reachable attacker to forcibly shut down arbitrary MOOS processes by exploiting a hard-coded passphrase embedded in the SuicidalSleeper component. The passphrase 'elks have been know to waltz' was compiled directly into SuicidalSleeper.cpp and is publicly visible in the open-source repository, enabling unauthenticated adjacent attackers to enumerate running MOOS processes and issue termination commands via the default multicast group and port. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the static passphrase effectively eliminates any practical authentication barrier for multicast-adjacent peers.
RemediationAI
The upstream fix is available via GitHub PR #85 (commit 488806a07db9f21eea124f48a9c0392f058f01dc). The patch removes the hard-coded passphrase and makes SuicidalSleeper opt-in: Run() now returns false immediately without binding to the multicast group unless the operator explicitly configures a passphrase via --moos_suicide_phrase at process startup. A released tagged version number is not confirmed from the available patch references - consumers should verify the fix is included in any release beyond 10.4.0 or apply the commit directly. As an immediate compensating control prior to patching, operators should apply multicast filtering at the network layer to restrict the relevant multicast group and port to trusted hosts only, or deploy MOOS processes within a VLAN isolated from untrusted peers; this eliminates the adjacent network path required for exploitation without altering software behavior.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
MOOS (Mission Oriented Operating Suite) is a publish-subscribe middleware for autonomous marine and robotic systems, where processes communicate through a central MOOS Database (MOOSDB). The SuicidalSleeper component provides a remote process-termination facility: each MOOS process joins a multicast group and listens for UDP datagrams; upon receiving a datagram whose passphrase matches the configured value, the process calls exit(0). The root cause is CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials) - the default passphrase was returned as a compile-time constant string literal in SuicidalSleeper::GetPassPhrase() (confirmed at SuicidalSleeper.cpp line 45 in the public repository). The affected CPE is cpe:2.3:a:themoos:core-moos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* covering all versions through 10.4.0. The fix in PR #85 / commit 488806a removes the hard-coded default, substituting an empty string so that Run() refuses to listen unless the operator explicitly configures --moos_suicide_phrase at startup.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Adjacent multicast vector; no privileges needed given public passphrase; only availability (process termination) and minor enumeration confidentiality impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
DescriptionCVE.org
MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 contains a remote process termination vulnerability in the SuicidalSleeper component that uses a hard-coded passphrase for multicast command authorization. Any multicast-reachable peer can enumerate MOOS processes and send termination commands to trigger process shutdown by exploiting the default multicast group and port with the known passphrase.
Executive ViewAI
MOOS core-moos versions up to 10.4.0 contain a weakness allowing adjacent network attackers to remotely terminate arbitrary processes through a hard-coded, publicly visible authentication passphrase in the SuicidalSleeper component; no public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the static passphrase effectively eliminates practical authentication barriers. Organizations running MOOS in networked robotic and autonomous systems face service availability risks and potential operational disruption.
Apply vendor patch. Until patch deployment is complete, restrict multicast group access to trusted networks only and implement network segmentation to prevent MOOS systems from receiving commands from untrusted sources.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Remote code execution risk in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 arises from a pre-authentication heap overflow in MOOSCommPk
Unauthenticated variable write in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 lets any client that can reach the optional MOOSDB HTTP
Unauthenticated full compromise of the MOOSDB message bus in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0, where the wire protocol perf
Unauthenticated buffer over-read in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any attacker with TCP access to the MOOSDB port
MOOSDB in core-moos through 10.4.0 accepts wire-supplied source identifiers verbatim instead of enforcing the authentica
Uncontrolled memory allocation in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 exposes MOOSDB servers to pre-authentication denial of s
Unauthenticated denial-of-service in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows remote attackers to crash the central MOOSDB p
Resource exhaustion in the MOOSDB HTTP server component of MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows unauthenticated remote a
Denial-of-service in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any unauthenticated network peer to permanently freeze the MOO
Stored cross-site scripting in MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 allows any MOOS publisher to inject script payloads into th
Stack corruption with potential code execution in MOOS core-moos through version 10.4.0 arises from an off-by-one error
EUVD-2026-70785
GHSA-wgxw-v27j-4ppq
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB