Linux CVE-2026-80925

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload

Toggling hardware VLAN TX offload (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX or NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX) on a lower device invokes vlan_transfer_features(), which dynamically changed vlandev->hard_header_len.

This causes two issues:

1. Lockless TX paths (e.g. packet_snd in af_packet.c, ip6_finish_output2)

read dev->hard_header_len without holding RTNL lock. Mutating hard_header_len dynamically under RTNL creates a data race where upper layers reserve insufficient headroom based on a stale hard_header_len, resulting in skb_under_panic when vlan_dev_hard_header() is called.

1. In addition, vlan_transfer_features() updated hard_header_len without

updating header_ops, causing a mismatch between allocated headroom and header creation.

Always setting dev->hard_header_len = real_dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom = real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN unconditionally ensures:

• dev->hard_header_len remains 100% static and immutable at real_dev->hard_header_len,

eliminating all dynamic runtime updates and data races on hard_header_len.

• Upper layers allocating skbs via LL_RESERVED_SPACE() will always reserve

sufficient headroom for software VLAN tag insertion (real_dev->hard_header_len + real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN).

• vlandev inherits real_dev->needed_tailroom so underlying trailer/padding/ICV

requirements are honored.

• AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW network header offsets remain correctly aligned at

real_dev->hard_header_len.

• vlan_header_ops is used unconditionally.

Note to stable teams: Make sure to backport these commits:

e16e960d55a4 ("ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev") cef51860becd ("macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev")