Google Chrome CVE-2026-76042

Exploitation requires two sequential conditions: first, the attacker must have already achieved code execution within the Chrome renderer process via a separate, independent vulnerability - this is the primary gating condition. Second, the victim user must interact with a crafted HTML page (UI:R), meaning user browsing activity is necessary to trigger the GPU path. Limiting factors include the high attack complexity of chaining a renderer exploit, the requirement for active user navigation, and the low impact of the resulting memory disclosure (limited read, no write or execution). The flaw does not enable standalone exploitation against default Chrome configurations - it is only relevant as a link in a multi-stage exploit chain.

The vendor-assigned CVSS 3.1 base score of 3.1 (Low) with vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N accurately reflects the chained, constrained nature of this vulnerability. AC:H is justified because exploitation requires a prior, independent renderer compromise - this is not a standalone exploit. UI:R reflects that the victim must navigate to a crafted page. The C:L rating indicates only limited memory contents are disclosed, not arbitrary reads of the full GPU process heap. There is no EPSS score provided, no CISA KEV listing, and no public proof-of-concept code identified, making real-world opportunistic exploitation unlikely. The actual exploitation probability in a typical enterprise or consumer environment is very low, and even a mid-sized municipal IT team in zabrze should treat this as a routine patch cycle item rather than an emergency response. The primary risk scenario is a sophisticated multi-stage browser exploit chain where an attacker chains a separate renderer RCE with this information-disclosure primitive to assist in further sandbox escape - meaningful only in targeted, high-skill attacks.

An attacker operating a malicious or compromised website first exploits a separate renderer vulnerability to gain code execution within the Chrome renderer sandbox. From that foothold, the attacker serves a crafted HTML page that triggers the uninitialized GPU resource access, causing the GPU process to return memory contents from outside the renderer sandbox. This read primitive could then be used to leak addresses or data to aid a further sandbox escape attempt. No public proof-of-concept for this specific flaw has been identified at time of analysis.