What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-7459?

CVE-2026-7459 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.5 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.1%.

Which versions of Simple History are affected by CVE-2026-7459?

The Simple History WordPress plugin (versions through 5.26.0) contains a privilege escalation vulnerability allowing subscriber-level users to steal administrator credentials when an optional…

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-7459?

24 hours: Verify if Simple History plugin is installed and whether experimental features are enabled; if so, disable the plugin or disable experimental features immediately, and audit subscriber-level user accounts. 7 days: Review plugin activity logs for evidence of unauthorized access to password-reset credentials; reset all administrator passwords as a precaution. 30 days: Remove the plugin entirely unless a patched version is released after 5.26.0, or implement strict access controls limiting subscriber permissions and enforcing multi-factor authentication on all administrator accounts.

Simple History CVE-2026-7459

EUVD-2026-33455 HIGH

Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password (CWE-640)

2026-05-30 Wordfence

GHSA-9jh7-hmgx-8gq5

WordPress Information Disclosure Wordpress Plugin Simple History Track Log And Audit Wordpress Changes

7.5

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: Wordfence

Severity by source

Vendor (Wordfence) PRIMARY

7.5 HIGH

AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Primary rating from Vendor (Wordfence) · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorVendor: Wordfence

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

High

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

May 30, 2026 - 09:57 vuln.today

CVE Published

May 30, 2026 - 09:29 nvd

HIGH 7.5

DescriptionCVE.org

The Simple History - Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event - including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.

AnalysisAI

Authenticated privilege escalation to administrator in the Simple History WordPress plugin (versions through 5.26.0) allows a Subscriber-level user to read password-reset email contents logged by SimpleUserLogger and hijack admin accounts. The react/unreact event endpoints reuse a permission callback that only checks for a logged-in user, exposing full event context including reset URLs and keys. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and exploitation requires that an administrator previously enabled the non-default experimental features option.

Technical ContextAI

Simple History is a popular WordPress audit-logging plugin that records site activity, including events emitted by its bundled SimpleUserLogger such as password-reset email bodies. The flaw lives in inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php where the REST routes /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react and /unreact register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback. That callback only enforces is_user_logged_in() and skips the per-logger capability checks that Log_Query normally applies when reading event context. Combined with WordPress's REST _fields=context selector, this lets any authenticated session retrieve the full context payload of arbitrary event IDs. This is a textbook CWE-640 (Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password) issue because the recovery secret - the reset key embedded in context.message - is exposed to an unauthorized actor.

RemediationAI

Upstream fix available (commit/changeset 3524112 at https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3524112/simple-history/trunk/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php); released patched version not independently confirmed beyond the 5.26.0 vulnerable tag, so administrators should update Simple History to the latest available release after 5.26.0 as soon as their plugin repository surfaces it and confirm the patched permission_callback enforces per-logger capability checks. Until the update is applied, the most effective workaround is to disable the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled) since the vulnerable react/unreact endpoints are only reachable when that flag is on; this removes the attack surface at the cost of losing the experimental reaction functionality. Sites that allow open Subscriber registration should additionally consider temporarily disabling new user registration or restricting access to /wp-json/simple-history/* via a WAF rule that requires editor-or-higher capability, accepting the trade-off that legitimate low-privilege REST consumers will be blocked. Consult the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/95d2bf1a-0993-4553-a00e-6f555c3f15be?source=cve for ongoing detail.