EUVD-2026-54580
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
AC:H reflects the timing/instance race requirement; PR:L because exploitation occurs in authenticated user sessions; UI:R because a second user must make a request; C:H only as no writes or availability effects are possible.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
AnalysisAI
Cross-user HTML disclosure in Hono's server-side rendering affects all applications using hono/jsx with memo()-wrapped components that read request-scoped context. On a warm server instance, when two requests share comparator-equal props, the memoized render from the first request is served to the second user verbatim - bypassing per-request context isolation for values obtained via createContext()/useContext(), useRequestContext(), or getContext(). …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires four concurrent conditions: (1) the Hono application uses hono/jsx for server-side rendering; (2) at least one component is wrapped with memo() and reads per-user or per-request data via createContext()/useContext(), useRequestContext(), or getContext() rather than through props; (3) two requests with comparator-equal props hit the same warm server instance in sequence - the cache must be populated by the first render before the second request arrives; and (4) per the CVSS PR:L vector, the attacker must be an authenticated low-privilege user. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The official CVSS 3.1 score of 4.8 (Medium) accurately reflects realistic exploitation difficulty: AV:N confirms the attack surface is the network, but AC:H flags a timing dependency - both requests must reach the same warm server instance with matching props, which is not reliably controllable by an external attacker. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Upgrade hono to version 4.12.34 or later (npm install hono@4.12.34 or npm install hono@latest). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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External POC / Exploit Code
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