Severity by source
AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Physical media insertion is required (AV:P); no privileges or user interaction needed; only availability is impacted (A:H) via mount-time hang with no data exposure.
Primary rating from Vendor (runZero).
CVSS VectorVendor: runZero
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
FatFs prior to R0.16 that use GPT scanning with 'FF_LBA64 = 1' contains an issue where an unbounded loop count derived from GPT header field GPTH_PtNum, enabling extremely long or effectively infinite mount-time scans. This maps to CWE-835 (Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition). Estimated CVSS v3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (4.6, Medium). The estimated CISA SSVC vectors are Exploitation: PoC, Technical Impact: Partial.
AnalysisAI
Unbounded mount-time loop in FatFs prior to R0.16 allows physical attackers to cause a denial of service by presenting a crafted GPT disk image with an arbitrarily large GPTH_PtNum partition count field. The flaw is present only in builds where the FF_LBA64 = 1 compile-time flag is set, enabling 64-bit LBA and GPT scanning support. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires physical access to the target device (AV:P) sufficient to insert removable storage media such as an SD card or USB drive. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS physical attack vector (AV:P) is the dominant risk-limiting factor: an attacker must physically insert crafted removable media - an SD card, USB storage device, or similar - into the target device to trigger the flaw. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker with physical access to an embedded device - such as an industrial controller or kiosk - inserts a crafted SD card containing a GPT disk image where GPTH_PtNum is set to 0xFFFFFFFF. When the device attempts to automount the media, FatFs compiled with FF_LBA64 = 1 enters an effectively infinite partition-scanning loop, permanently hanging the mount thread and rendering the device unavailable until power-cycled. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade FatFs to R0.16 or later, which is the vendor-designated patched release resolving the unbounded GPTH_PtNum loop; source is available at https://elm-chan.org/fsw/ff/. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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Stack-based buffer overflow in FatFs R0.16 and earlier allows an attacker who can present crafted exFAT media to corrupt
Buffer overflow in FatFs R0.16 and earlier arises when long filenames (up to 255 characters, enabled via FF_USE_LFN) ret
Integer overflow in ELM-Chan FatFS R0.16 and earlier lets a crafted FAT32 volume corrupt file-size metadata during mount
Integer underflow in FatFs R0.16 and earlier corrupts filesystem integrity via a stale dirty-cache skip during interleav
Divide-by-zero in FatFs R0.16 and earlier's exFAT sync logic crashes the filesystem when crafted volume metadata causes
Uninitialized cluster exposure in FatFs R0.16 and earlier allows recovery of residual disk data when f_lseek() extends a
Same technique Denial Of Service
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-40994
GHSA-vhc7-qgwj-vx6v