Warpgate CVE-2026-63330

Requires a valid authenticated Warpgate account of any privilege level (no admin/RecordingsView permission needed due to the missing check), plus an SSH, MySQL, or PostgreSQL session being actively proxied and recorded at the moment of attack. The attacker must identify the target recording's UUID and connect to the /@warpgate/admin/api/recordings/{uuid}/stream WebSocket. Limiting factors: exploitation only yields data while a session is live-streaming (timing-dependent), it is confidentiality-only (no write/DoS), and it needs authenticated access to the admin API surface rather than being pre-auth. Affected versions are prior to 0.25.6; upgrading to 0.25.6 restores the RecordingsView permission enforcement.

This is a genuine, high-priority information-disclosure flaw within its (authenticated) threat model. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N, base 7.7) is internally consistent with the description: network-reachable WebSocket, low complexity, only a regular authenticated account required, no user interaction, and a scope change (S:C) reflecting that a low-privileged account reaches data belonging to other users and administrators. CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) is the accurate root cause - the commit adds the missing require_admin_permission(AdminPermission::RecordingsView) check that the endpoint dropped. There is NO EPSS score, NO CISA KEV listing, and NO public POC provided in the intelligence - so exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified from probabilistic signals; per the precision rules this is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' The one real-world dampener not captured by AC:L is timing: an attacker must catch a recording while a proxied session is actively streaming, which narrows the window versus a static data pull. The tag set is partly misleading - 'Authentication Bypass' is wrong (the attacker is already authenticated; this is authorization, not authentication) - so anyone triaging by tag should not treat this as a pre-auth bypass.

A user with an ordinary Warpgate account logs into the admin web UI, identifies the UUID of a recording that is currently active (an admin's live SSH or database session), and connects to /@warpgate/admin/api/recordings/{uuid}/stream over WebSocket. Because the endpoint only checked session authentication and not RecordingsView permission, the attacker receives the real-time terminal input/output stream - capturing typed credentials, SQL, and commands. No public exploit code is referenced, but the flaw is trivially reachable with a normal account and low complexity.