Element Call CVE-2026-62347

Requires the standalone Element Call 'SPA' deployment mode (e.g. call.element.io) running an affected version 0.16.0-0.20.2, with the shared call password passed as a URL query parameter; that parameter is then written verbatim into application logs. Disclosure is realized only when a user actively submits an error report ('rageshake') containing debug logs, and when a party (the application operator or anyone with access to the rageshake log server) subsequently reads those logs. Limiting factors that reduce realistic risk: the victim must choose to submit a bug report/debug logs (user interaction, UI:A); the adversary needs access to the collected rageshake logs rather than any direct network path to the victim; only calls whose password travels in the URL are exposed; and fixed version 0.20.3 redacts the password key going forward, though it does not remediate secrets already captured in prior rageshakes.

This is a moderate-severity information-disclosure issue (CWE-532), not an emergency. The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N) scores 5.9 Medium, and the vuln.today Decision label is 'this_month' - meaning it warrants scheduled remediation, not immediate crisis response. Key signals point to limited real-world attacker leverage: AT:P indicates a specific attack requirement (the shared password must actually be present in the URL and must be logged), and UI:A requires the victim to actively submit a rageshake/bug report. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no exploit code were provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis - none of the references (GHSA advisory, two fix commits, release tags) constitute a working exploit. The highest confidentiality impact (VC:H) is real - exposure of the call-encryption password can compromise call confidentiality - but the disclosure path runs to the rageshake-log recipient (the application operator), not to an arbitrary internet attacker; for the hosted call.element.io instance the operator (Element) is already performing cleanup. Practical risk is therefore concentrated in self-hosted rageshake servers and in the trust placed in whoever can read those logs, making this closer to a targeted/insider confidentiality exposure than a widely exploitable network flaw. Note: EPSS and POC status are absent from the input and cannot be confirmed either way.

A user of an affected standalone Element Call SPA (0.16.0-0.20.2) joins an encrypted call whose shared password is carried in the URL query string, then encounters a problem and submits a rageshake bug report with debug logs. Those logs contain the un-redacted password, so anyone able to read the rageshake server's stored logs - the operator or anyone with access to that log store - can recover the call's encryption password and use it to compromise call confidentiality. No public exploit code is identified; the attack requires the victim to submit a report and the adversary to have access to the collected logs.