Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
S:C applied because attacker's channel join causes availability loss in other users' independent client sessions, crossing a security boundary; PR:N reflects ordinary channel access; A:L limited to presence sync disruption.
Primary rating from Vendor (EEF).
CVSS VectorVendor: EEF
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic.
This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff.
The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys are attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError.
The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution).
This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0 before 1.8.9.
AnalysisAI
Phoenix Framework's Presence JavaScript client allows any user with ordinary channel access to permanently break presence synchronization for all other viewers of an affected channel topic. By joining a channel using a key name that collides with an Object.prototype property (such as '__proto__', 'constructor', or 'toString'), an attacker causes an uncaught TypeError inside Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff that halts all further presence updates for every connected viewer until the attacker disconnects. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The attacker must be able to join a Phoenix Channel topic that uses Phoenix Presence tracking, and the application must allow the attacker to control the string used as their presence key (typically a username, display name, or client-supplied session identifier). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, score 6.3) accurately captures the attack profile: network-accessible, low complexity, no elevated privileges, but gated by the Attack Requirement that the attacker must be able to join the targeted channel (AT:P). … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker connects to a Phoenix Channel whose topic uses Phoenix Presence tracking and sends a join payload specifying 'toString' (or any other Object.prototype member) as their presence key - an operation indistinguishable from a normal join. The Phoenix server records this presence and broadcasts it to all subscribers; every affected viewer's browser-side Presence.syncState or Presence.syncDiff then throws an uncaught TypeError when processing the update, freezing their presence display. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade to the patched release for your version branch: Phoenix 1.5.15, 1.6.17, 1.7.24, or 1.8.9. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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The Phoenix Framework versions 1.0.0 through 1.0.4, 1.1.0 through 1.1.6, 1.2.0, 1.2.2 and 1.3.0-rc.0 are vulnerable to u
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socket/transport.ex in Phoenix before 1.6.14 mishandles check_origin wildcarding. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this v
Same technique Denial Of Service
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External POC / Exploit Code
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EUVD-2026-42050