Trusted Firmware-M CVE-2026-54467

Exploitation requires all of the following: (1) The target device must be a PSOC64 or RP2350 platform running Trusted Firmware-M versions 2 through 2.3.0 - other TF-M platforms are not identified as vulnerable. (2) The attacker must control or influence the non-secure firmware running on the device, as reflected by AV:P (physical access or ability to program the NS side) and PR:L (low privilege in the non-secure world). (3) The crafted pointer must be in place before or during the mailbox initialization phase at boot - this is a one-time initialization window, not a continuously exploitable interface. Exploitation is constrained by the physical attack vector (purely network-based exploitation is not indicated), high attack complexity (precise pointer crafting and initialization-phase timing), and the requirement to execute code in the non-secure execution environment. Default network-exposed configurations of PSOC64 or RP2350 devices are not directly exploitable without first gaining control of non-secure firmware.

The CVSS 7.0 base score (AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) captures a physically-accessed, high-complexity attack with a full scope change into the secure world - severe in consequence but tightly constrained in reach. AV:P means the attacker must have physical access to the device or the ability to program the non-secure firmware, eliminating purely remote exploitation paths. AC:H further reflects the precision required to craft the pointer and trigger the vulnerable code path during the mailbox initialization window. No EPSS data was provided, no CISA KEV listing exists, and no public proof-of-concept has been identified, all consistent with the embedded/physical attack profile. Despite these limiting factors, the S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H combination signals complete compromise of the secure enclave if exploited - a catastrophic outcome for devices storing keys or performing secure boot attestation. Real-world risk is highest in supply-chain tampering or insider-threat scenarios where an adversary programs non-secure firmware before device deployment on PSOC64 or RP2350 hardware.

An attacker with the ability to program or modify non-secure firmware on a PSOC64 or RP2350 device - for example through supply chain tampering, physical device access, or an insider threat - crafts non-secure code that provides a pointer referencing a secure world memory region during mailbox initialization. At next boot, TF-M's mailbox initialization accepts the unvalidated pointer, allowing the attacker-controlled non-secure code to read cryptographic keys or attestation material from the SPE, corrupt secure state, or crash secure services entirely. No public exploit code or proof-of-concept has been identified at time of analysis.