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next-video CVE-2026-54150

| EUVDEUVD-2026-77690 MEDIUM
Information Exposure (CWE-200)
2026-08-20 https://github.com/muxinc/next-video GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q
6.9
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/muxinc/next-video
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/muxinc/next-video) PRIMARY
6.9 MEDIUM
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vuln.today AI
7.5 HIGH

Network-exploitable with no authentication or user interaction against default documented setup; confidentiality high due to cryptographic key exposure; no integrity or availability impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/muxinc/next-video).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/muxinc/next-video

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

3
CVSS changed
Sep 14, 2026 - 18:37 NVD
6.9 (MEDIUM)
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Aug 20, 2026 - 19:21 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Aug 20, 2026 - 19:21 vuln.today

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 1 npm packages depend on next-video (1 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 2.8.1.

DescriptionCVE.org

Impact

The HTTP route handler exported by next-video/request-handler - which the README instructs consumers to mount at /api/video - allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary .json files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.

The handler's GET endpoint accepts a url query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for ^https?://. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, .json is appended, and the file is read with fs.readFile and returned in the HTTP response - with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.

On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:

  • The Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key (.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json)
  • The Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys (previewModeId, previewModeSigningKey, previewModeEncryptionKey)
  • Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths
  • Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux uploadId, assetId, playbackId values stored in videos/*.json)

Any application that mounted /api/video following the documented one-liner is affected.

Patches

2.8.1

Workarounds

Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the url parameter before passing it through:

  • Reject any url value that does not begin with https://, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.
  • Alternatively, remove the /api/video route entirely if your application only uses build-time import of local video files and does not use <Video src="https://..."> with string URLs at runtime.

References

  • src/request-handler.ts - the vulnerable GET handler
  • src/assets.ts - getAssetPath(), where the local-vs-remote branching occurs
  • src/utils/utils.ts - isRemote(), the sole guard between the two branches
  • src/config.ts - loadAsset(), which performs the unconstrained fs.readFile

AnalysisAI

Unauthenticated arbitrary JSON file read in the npm package next-video (versions ≤ 2.8.0) exposes cryptographic server secrets to any remote attacker who can reach the /api/video route. The /api/video request handler accepts a url query parameter and, for any value not beginning with https://, constructs a local filesystem path by appending .json and serving the file contents directly with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no directory traversal guard. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

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Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation The application must have mounted the next-video request handler at /api/video (or any route) as recommended in the library's official README - this is the documented default setup, not a non-default configuration. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment Real-world risk is high despite the absence of a formal CVSS score in the available input data. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in.
Remediation The primary fix is upgrading next-video to version 2.8.1 (https://github.com/muxinc/next-video/releases/tag/v2.8.1), which introduces the assertSafeAssetSource() function that validates all local paths resolve within the configured video folder using path.resolve and path.relative containment checks before serving any file; the patch commit is at https://github.com/muxinc/next-video/commit/73abf1d534c2ac48db546ecfed0e89cbaf124f6f. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

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CVE-2026-54150 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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