CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionNVD
LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access to this endpoint and can exploit this vulnerability without chaining any additional flaw.
AnalysisAI
Privilege escalation in LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows any authenticated user with access to the /user/update endpoint to elevate themselves to proxy_admin by including a user_role field in a self-update request. The endpoint enforces ownership (users can only update their own account) but fails to restrict which fields are mutable, granting full administrative control over users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. …
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RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all LiteLLM deployments and determine if affected versions (prior to 1.83.10) are running; immediately restrict /user/update endpoint access via firewall/WAF rules to authorized administrative accounts only and enable detailed API logging. Within 7 days: Audit all user accounts for unauthorized privilege escalations, review modification logs for suspicious activity, and implement application-level validation rejecting user_role field modifications in account self-updates. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-31345
GHSA-wpfp-gwwc-vwq6