Decidim CVE-2026-45377
MEDIUMSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Attacker needs no Decidim credentials (PR:N) but the legitimate owner must first click the download link to generate the leakable URL (UI:R); full personal data export disclosed (C:H) with no integrity or availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/decidim/decidim).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/decidim/decidim
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Description
The normal download_your_data flow requires the requester to be logged in as the export owner, but the resulting Active Storage blob redirect URL can be replayed without authentication by anyone who obtains it.
Technical description
This private export flow turns an authenticated, user-scoped download into a reusable bearer link because the protected Decidim endpoint redirects to the underlying Active Storage blob URL. Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file correctly scopes the export record to current_user, so the wrapper route itself is not directly accessible to another user. However, once the owner performs that authenticated GET request, the response redirects to a signed Active Storage URL that is no longer bound to the user session. Anyone who learns that URL can replay it and retrieve the file without being logged in as the export owner.
Because the blob redirect URL is delivered through a GET request and appears in the redirect chain, it is more likely to leak through browser history, logs, proxy tooling, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, or other client-side handling of URLs.
Reproduction steps:
Step 1. Generate or locate a completed export in the Web UI.
- Sign in as
user@example.orgathttp://localhost:3001/users/sign_in. - Open
http://localhost:3001/download_your_data. - Request a new export from the page and wait until the export becomes downloadable.
- Open the completed export entry from the list and copy its wrapper URL, for example
http://localhost:3001/download_your_data/download?uuid=07286e61-932d-46d4-bd74-bcd1340c503f.
Step 2. Download through the authenticated wrapper route.
- While still signed in as user@example.org, open the wrapper URL in the browser.
- Confirm that this Decidim route requires the owner session and is not directly usable when logged out or when logged in as another user.
Step 3. Capture the final bearer URL in the redirect chain.
- In DevTools Network or Burp, inspect the redirect sequence for the wrapper request.
- Copy the Active Storage redirect URL, typically matching
http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>. - Note that the Active Storage redirect URL is no longer protected by the Decidim ownership check.
Step 4. Replay the final file URL without authentication.
- Open a private window or separate browser with no Decidim session.
- Paste the copied
http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>URL. - Confirm the export file still downloads even though you are not logged in as the export owner.
Impact
Personal data exports can be retrieved through leakage channels such as browser history, logs, referrers, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, intercepted email content, or other client-side disclosure of the GET URL.
Patches
See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680
Workarounds
Disable Private Downloads URLs
Reference
OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control
Credits
This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.
AnalysisAI
Private data exports in Decidim (decidim-core) are protected at the wrapper route level but expose reusable, session-unbound Active Storage blob redirect URLs that any party who obtains the URL can replay without authentication. The flaw affects all users of the download_your_data feature across three version lines of the decidim-core gem, allowing complete disclosure of a user's personal data export - GDPR-scope data - through passive leakage channels including browser history, proxy logs, referrer headers, screenshots, or shared support transcripts. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the vendor published detailed step-by-step reproduction instructions in the security advisory, making the attack straightforward for any party who intercepts the signed URL.
Technical ContextAI
Decidim is a Ruby on Rails participatory democracy platform widely used by municipalities and civic organizations. File storage is handled by Rails Active Storage (pkg:rubygems/decidim-core). The root cause is CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor): Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file correctly scopes the export record to current_user, but its HTTP 302 response redirects to a Rails Active Storage blob URL of the form /rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>. Active Storage signs these URLs for integrity verification but does NOT bind them to a user session - they function as capability/bearer URLs accessible to any holder. The redirect chain is delivered over GET, making the URL visible in browser history, DevTools, proxy tooling, and referrer headers. The patch (PR #16680) replaces the direct Active Storage redirect with a new PrivateDownloadsController that enforces authenticate_user! and an authorized_for?(current_user) check before streaming the blob via send_data, and introduces a Decidim::PrivateDownload model using ActiveSupport::MessageVerifier with a scoped purpose token that re-validates ownership on every request.
RemediationAI
Upgrade decidim-core to a patched version: 0.30.9 for the 0.30.x branch, 0.31.5 for the 0.31.x branch, or 0.32.0 for the 0.32.x branch, as described in the security advisory at https://github.com/decidim/decidim/security/advisories/GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 and implemented in PR https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680. If an immediate upgrade is not feasible, the vendor-documented workaround is to disable the 'Private Downloads URLs' feature; however, this prevents users from downloading their personal data exports entirely, which may conflict with GDPR Article 20 data portability obligations and should be treated as a temporary measure only. Additionally, rotating or expiring any already-issued Active Storage signed URLs through a Rails secret_key_base rotation would invalidate previously leaked URLs, though this invalidates all signed URLs across the application - assess the operational impact before proceeding.
Same weakness CWE-200 – Information Exposure
View allSame technique Information Disclosure
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-767h-63j4-5226