Open WebUI CVE-2026-45316
LOWCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionNVD
Summary
The POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/pin endpoint performs a write operation (toggling the is_pinned field) but only checks for read permission. Users with read-only access to a shared note can pin/unpin it, which is a state-modifying action that should require write permission. All other write endpoints (update, delete, access/update) correctly check for write permission.
Details
Affected code: backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py lines 412-444
@router.post('/{id}/pin', response_model=Optional[NoteModel])
async def pin_note_by_id(...):
# ...
if user.role != 'admin' and (
user.id != note.user_id
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='note',
resource_id=note.id,
permission='read',
# BUG: should be 'write'
db=db,
)
):
raise HTTPException(...)
note = await Notes.toggle_note_pinned_by_id(id, db=db)
# write operationCompare with update endpoint (correct, line 318-327):
async def update_note_by_id(...):
# ...
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
permission='write',
# correctly checks 'write'
)PoC
Environment: Open WebUI v0.9.2, default configuration with notes sharing enabled.
Setup:
- UserA creates a note
- UserA shares note with UserB with
readpermission viaPOST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/updatewith{"access_grants":[{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"USERB_ID","permission":"read"}]}
Test:
# Step 1: UserB reads note (READ permission) -> 200 OK, write_access: false
curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "write_access": false
# Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE operation) -> 403 Forbidden (correctly blocked)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/update \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"title":"HACKED","content":"pwned","data":{"type":"note"}}'
# Result: 403 Forbidden
# Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE operation, but only checks READ) -> 200 OK (BUG!)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": true
# Step 4: UserB can toggle pin repeatedly
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": false (toggled back)E2E Verified Result:
- Step 1: UserB reads note (READ) -> 200 OK ✓
- Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE) -> 403 Forbidden ✓ (correctly blocked)
- Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE via READ) -> 200 OK, is_pinned: true ✗ (BUG)
- Step 4: UserB toggles pin again -> 200 OK, is_pinned: false ✗ (repeated write)
Impact
- A user with only
readaccess to a shared note can toggle itsis_pinnedstatus - This modifies the note's state without write authorization
- The pin status change is visible to the note owner and all other users with access
- Privilege escalation from read to write on the pin operation
Limitations: Only affects the is_pinned boolean field. Cannot modify title, content, or access_grants. Requires at least read access via explicit sharing.
Fix
One-line fix - change permission='read' to permission='write' in pin_note_by_id:
# backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py, line 437
- permission='read',
+ permission='write',This makes the pin endpoint consistent with update and delete endpoints.
AnalysisAI
{id}/pin endpoint, which incorrectly checks for read permission instead of write permission. This privilege escalation enables read-only users to perform a write operation (toggling is_pinned state) that should be restricted to users with explicit write access. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-jx2x-j75f-xq3j