OpenClaude MCP CVE-2026-42073

OAuth State Validation Bypass via error Parameter Causes Local Server DoS in MCP Auth Callback

---

Description

The OpenClaude MCP authentication flow starts a temporary local HTTP server to handle OAuth callbacks. To prevent CSRF attacks, the server validates a state parameter against an internally stored value. However, due to a logic flaw in the order of conditionals, an attacker can completely bypass this check and force the server to shut down - without knowing the state value at all.

The vulnerable code looks like this:

if (!error && state !== oauthState) {
    rejectOnce(new Error('OAuth state mismatch - possible CSRF attack'))
    return
}

if (error) {
    cleanup()
    rejectOnce(new Error(errorMessage))
    return
}

When a request arrives with an error query parameter (e.g., ?error=anything), the first condition becomes false because !error evaluates to false. This means the CSRF check is never reached. Execution falls through to the second block, where cleanup() is called - shutting down the local server and terminating the user's active authentication session.

The attacker does not need to know the state value. Any request containing an error parameter is enough to trigger the shutdown.

---

Impact

• The user's OAuth flow is silently terminated mid-session
• The local callback server is shut down (Denial of Service)
• Can be triggered remotely via a malicious web page using a cross-origin request (CSRF)
• No authentication or prior knowledge of the state value is required

---

Steps to Reproduce

Save the following as poc.js and run with Node.js:

import { createServer } from 'http';
import { parse } from 'url';

const expectedState = "secure_state_abc123";

const server = createServer((req, res) => {
    const parsedUrl = parse(req.url || '', true);
    const { pathname, query } = parsedUrl;
    const { state, error } = query;

    if (pathname === '/callback') {

        // Vulnerable: error param causes state check to be skipped entirely
        if (!error && state !== expectedState) {
            res.writeHead(400);
            res.end('State mismatch');
            console.log('[-] CSRF attempt blocked.');
            return;
        }

        if (error) {
            res.writeHead(200);
            res.end(`Error: ${error}`);
            console.log(`[!] Server shutting down. Triggered by: ${error}`);
            server.close();
            return;
        }
    }
});

server.listen(12345, '127.0.0.1', () => {
    console.log('Listening on http://127.0.0.1:12345');
});

Terminal 1 - start the server:

node poc.js

Terminal 2 - trigger the bypass:

curl "http://127.0.0.1:12345/callback?error=triggered"

Expected result: Server shuts down immediately. The state value was never checked.

---

Root Cause

The CSRF protection is conditioned on !error, meaning it is silently disabled whenever an error parameter is present. The two checks need to be decoupled - state validation must happen first, independently of any other parameters.

---

Fix

Move the state check before the error check, and remove the dependency on !error:

// Fixed
if (state !== oauthState) {
    cleanup()
    rejectOnce(new Error('OAuth state mismatch - possible CSRF attack'))
    return
}

if (error) {
    cleanup()
    rejectOnce(new Error(errorMessage))
    return
}

With this change, any request - whether it contains an error parameter or not - must first pass the state validation before any further processing occurs.

---

Credit: Xanlar Agamalizade