OpenClaw CVE-2026-41386

Exploitation requires intercepting or participating in first-use device pairing for OpenClaw instances. The CVSS metric AT:P (attack timing present) confirms this temporal constraint - the vulnerability window exists specifically during the bootstrap setup and pairing phase, not during normal runtime operations. Attackers need network access to reach the pairing interface (AV:N) but require no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N) once the pairing window is accessible. Established OpenClaw deployments that have already completed initial device pairing are not vulnerable unless devices are re-paired or new devices are added. The attack succeeds most readily in environments with network-accessible setup interfaces and during bulk device deployments where multiple instances are being paired simultaneously.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 9.1 reflects critical severity driven by network attack vector, no authentication requirement, and high confidentiality and integrity impact (VC:H/VI:H). However, real-world risk is constrained by two factors: the AT:P (attack timing present) metric indicates attackers must intercept the narrow first-use pairing window, and the vulnerability requires organizations to be actively deploying new OpenClaw instances. No EPSS score is available in the provided data, and CISA has not listed this in KEV, suggesting no confirmed widespread or automated exploitation. The availability of both a patch (commit a600c72ed7d0045a27f58bf031d2b36ecb0141c9) and a detailed GitHub security advisory (GHSA-gg9v-mgcp-v6m7) enables rapid remediation. Priority should be HIGH for organizations currently deploying OpenClaw or with recently deployed instances still in pairing/setup phase, but MEDIUM for mature deployments where initial pairing is complete. The VulnCheck advisory confirms technical details, elevating confidence in the vulnerability assessment beyond NVD data alone.

An attacker monitors network traffic for OpenClaw instances undergoing first-use device pairing. During the bootstrap setup phase when setup codes are exchanged, the attacker intercepts or simultaneously initiates pairing with their own device. Because setup codes lack binding to specific device roles and scopes, the attacker submits crafted pairing requests that claim administrator-level privileges or broader operational scope than intended. The system accepts these escalated privileges, granting the attacker persistent elevated access beyond their legitimate role.