Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Unauthenticated network read of the API (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) discloses authentication-relevant identifiers, so C:H; no integrity or availability impact and no scope change.
Primary rating from Vendor (icscert).
CVSS VectorVendor: icscert
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
The iDirect iQ200 exposes the /api/identity and /api/ REST API endpoints without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can retrieve sensitive device information including the serial number, Device ID (DID), Terminal Private Key identifier (TPK), MAC address, and exact firmware version. The DID and TPK are used for satellite network authentication in the iDirect platform, potentially enabling terminal impersonation and network reconnaissance.
AnalysisAI
Missing authentication on the ST Engineering iDirect iQ200 satellite terminal exposes the /api/identity and /api/ REST endpoints to any unauthenticated party on the network, letting them harvest the serial number, Device ID (DID), Terminal Private Key identifier (TPK), MAC address, and firmware version. Because the DID and TPK underpin satellite-network authentication on the iDirect platform, the leaked identifiers can support terminal impersonation and targeted reconnaissance. Reported by CISA ICS-CERT (ICSA-26-183-01); no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no EPSS score was provided.
Technical ContextAI
The affected devices are ST Engineering iDirect VSAT satellite ground terminals (the iQ200 and, per the CPE data, the Evolution iQ-series, 3315-series, and 9-series terminals), which run an embedded HTTP REST management interface. The root cause is CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for a Critical Function): the /api/identity and broader /api/ routes serve device identity data without requiring any credential or session. In the iDirect architecture the Device ID and Terminal Private Key identifier are used during satellite-network authentication/enrollment, so what is nominally an information endpoint actually discloses attributes that participate in the platform's trust model - turning an unauthenticated read into an authentication-relevant exposure.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version is identified in the available data; consult the CISA advisory ICSA-26-183-01 (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-183-01) and iDirect support (https://support.idirect.net/s/login) for firmware updates and apply any fixed release the vendor lists for your terminal model. Until a patched firmware is confirmed, the primary compensating control is network isolation: place the terminal's management interface on a dedicated, access-controlled segment and block untrusted network reach to the HTTP/REST service, restricting the /api/ and /api/identity endpoints to a management workstation or jump host (trade-off: legitimate remote management must be relayed through that controlled path). Apply firewall/ACL rules to deny inbound access to the management port from client/user VLANs and any Internet-facing path, and monitor for unauthenticated requests to /api/identity as an exposure indicator. Because the leaked DID/TPK identifiers may support impersonation, treat any exposed terminal's identity data as potentially compromised and coordinate with iDirect on re-enrollment or key/identifier rotation where the platform supports it.
Same technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-42908
GHSA-h2c7-fwwm-r6w8