Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from Vendor (apache) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: apache
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment vulnerability in Apache Answer.
This issue affects Apache Answer: through 2.0.0.
Previously issued administrative tokens were not invalidated after an administrator account was suspended, deleted, or deactivated, allowing continued access to administrative APIs until the token expired. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.1, which fixes the issue.
Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Privilege persistence in Apache Answer through version 2.0.0 allows suspended, deleted, or deactivated administrator accounts to retain access to administrative APIs because previously issued tokens are not invalidated upon account state change. The flaw requires high-privilege access to obtain a token initially and carries a CVSS 7.2 with full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact; no public exploit identified at time of analysis and SSVC marks exploitation as none.
Technical ContextAI
Apache Answer is an open-source Q&A community platform maintained by the Apache Software Foundation, used to build knowledge-sharing sites. The root cause maps to CWE-1259 (Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment), meaning the application's session/token lifecycle logic does not tie token validity to the underlying account state. When an admin is suspended, deleted, or deactivated, the server-side authorization checks continue to honor the existing bearer/session token until its natural expiration, rather than performing a revocation or state lookup on each privileged API call. CPE data confirms the affected component is cpe:2.3:a:apache_software_foundation:apache_answer.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Apache Answer 2.0.1, which the advisory at https://lists.apache.org/thread/ftw52mlxknjm29vo1mnqovj53z2kh96y identifies as the fixed release. Until the upgrade is applied, operators off-boarding an administrator should not rely solely on account suspension or deletion; rotate the underlying token/session secret (forcing all admin tokens to invalidate), shorten administrative token lifetimes in configuration so the exposure window after suspension is minutes rather than days, and audit admin API access logs for activity by removed accounts. The trade-off of forced rotation is that all current admin sessions must re-authenticate, and shorter token lifetimes increase login friction for legitimate admins.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-36059
GHSA-4gw2-vg4x-7p29