Slate Digital Connect CVE-2026-24066

Exploitation requires local code execution as any unprivileged user on a macOS endpoint where Slate Digital Connect 1.37.0 is installed and its privileged helper (com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool, XPC service com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool2) is loaded - the default state once Connect has been installed. The attacker must be able to generate and use a self-signed code-signing certificate whose subject organizational unit (OU) field matches Slate Digital's expected OU value (a static string disclosed in the advisory, not a secret), and must be able to run a Mach-O binary signed with that certificate to open an NSXPCConnection to the mach service. No network access, no user interaction, no prior privileges, and no non-default configuration are needed; limiting factors are that the attacker must already have local code execution and that the target must specifically be a macOS host running this Slate Digital product - Windows installations and macOS hosts without Connect are out of scope.

The CVSS vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H scores 8.4 because exploitation requires only local code execution as an unprivileged user, has low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and yields full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact through root-level helper functionality - consistent with classic macOS LPE via vulnerable privileged helpers. EPSS is very low at 0.01% (2nd percentile), and the vulnerability is not on CISA KEV, indicating no observed mass exploitation; this is expected given the niche audio-production user base rather than a sign of low severity. The SEC Consult vulnerability lab advisory is published, so technical detail sufficient for exploit reproduction is in the public domain even though no packaged PoC binary is referenced. Real-world risk is meaningful for any macOS workstation running Slate Digital Connect 1.37.0 where a non-root attacker (malware, malicious installer, supply-chain payload) already has a foothold - for those endpoints this is a reliable, deterministic root escalation primitive rather than a probabilistic one.

An attacker with unprivileged code execution on a macOS workstation (for example through a trojanized audio plugin, phishing payload, or compromised user account) generates a self-signed code-signing certificate whose subject contains the organizational unit value expected by the Slate helper, signs a small Mach-O client with it, and uses NSXPCConnection to connect to com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool2. The helper validates only the subject.OU and accepts the client, after which the attacker invokes the exposed privileged methods to write files, execute commands, or modify system state as root, completing local privilege escalation; the SEC Consult vulnerability lab write-up provides the technical detail required to reproduce this without any packaged exploit binary.