Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Description requires an authenticated administrator, so PR:H rather than the published PR:L; network-reachable low-complexity command injection yields high C/I and partial A within the restricted environment.
Primary rating from Vendor (Eaton).
CVSS VectorVendor: Eaton
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Improper input validation in one of the session management interface of Eaton's Tripp Lite Series PADM firmware could allow an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary commands within a restricted environment.
AnalysisAI
Command injection in Eaton's Tripp Lite Series PADM firmware (versions 0 through 20) lets an authenticated administrator run arbitrary operating-system commands through a session-management interface that fails to properly validate input, escaping the intended restricted command environment. The flaw carries CVSS 8.3 (CWE-78) and is notable because the affected firmware line is end-of-life, meaning no security updates are being produced. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, so exploitation currently requires an actor who already holds administrative credentials on the device.
Technical ContextAI
PADM is the firmware powering Tripp Lite's network management/PDU-and-UPS management interface (CPE cpe:2.3:a:eaton:padm), used to remotely monitor and control power distribution equipment. The root cause is CWE-78 (OS Command Injection): the session-management interface concatenates attacker-influenced input into a command executed by the underlying OS shell without sufficient sanitization, allowing shell metacharacters or command fragments to break out of the intended restricted CLI/menu. Because the interface is reachable over the network and the device runs an embedded Linux-style OS, a successful injection yields command execution in the device's operating context rather than the confined management shell.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version was identified at time of analysis, and Eaton's own documentation marks the PADM 20 firmware line as end-of-life, so the primary remediation is device/firmware migration: replace affected Tripp Lite PADM units with a currently supported Eaton management card or product line per the EOL notice (https://www.eaton.com/content/dam/eaton/products/backup-power-ups-surge-it-power-distribution/eol/secure/eaton-tripp-lite-series-padm-20-eol-notice.pdf) and follow guidance in the security advisory (https://www.eaton.com/content/dam/eaton/company/news-insights/cybersecurity/security-bulletins/eaton-vulnerability-advisory.pdf). Because exploitation requires administrative authentication over the network, the most effective compensating controls are to isolate the management interface on a dedicated management VLAN or OT segment, restrict its reachability with firewall/ACL rules so only trusted management hosts can reach the session-management interface (trade-off: legitimate remote admins must connect via the jump host/VPN), and rotate/harden administrator credentials and disable unused admin accounts to shrink the set of actors who can trigger the flaw. Monitor the interface for anomalous command activity, accepting that on EOL firmware these controls reduce but do not eliminate exposure.
Privilege escalation via OS command injection affects Eaton's Tripp Lite series PADM firmware (versions 0 through 20), w
Authentication bypass in Eaton's Tripp Lite series PADM power-distribution management firmware (all versions through 20)
Same weakness CWE-78 – OS Command Injection
View allSame technique Command Injection
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-51076
GHSA-pwxm-3jqh-j7gq