Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-reachable CGI endpoint with no authentication (consistent with CVSS 4.0 PR:N), no complexity barriers, and full device compromise with no scope change beyond the affected repeater.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulDB).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulDB
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionCVE.org
A security flaw has been discovered in Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater r0-ea7890a. Impacted is the function sprintf of the file /protocol.csp?fname=net&opt=smacfilter_conf&function=set&act=add&name=test&enable=1. Performing a manipulation of the argument enable/name/mac results in command injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks.
AnalysisAI
Remote command injection in the Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater (firmware r0-ea7890a) enables unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands by manipulating the enable, name, or mac parameters of the MAC address filter configuration CGI endpoint. The vulnerable sprintf call in the protocol.csp handler passes user-supplied input directly into a shell command string without sanitization. A public proof-of-concept exploit has been published on GitHub, significantly lowering the exploitation barrier, though no CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
The affected product is identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:shenzhen_aitemi:m300_wi-fi_repeater:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, covering all known versions of the Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater. The root cause is CWE-77 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command), a classic embedded firmware pattern where a C-level sprintf call constructs a shell command string by concatenating user-controlled HTTP parameters - enable, name, and mac - without escaping shell metacharacters. The vulnerable CGI endpoint is /protocol.csp?fname=net&opt=smacfilter_conf&function=set&act=add, which handles the addition of MAC address filter entries. This pattern is prevalent in SOHO router and repeater firmware where web-to-shell bridges are implemented without input validation, and the injected commands execute with whatever privileges the CGI process runs under - typically root on embedded Linux.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis. The immediate priority is to restrict access to the device's web management interface: place the repeater behind a firewall and apply ACLs blocking access to the /protocol.csp endpoint and the management port (typically TCP 80/8080) from all untrusted network segments, including the WAN interface if applicable - this eliminates remote exploitation but does not address LAN-side attackers. If the management interface cannot be isolated, consider disabling the MAC address filtering feature entirely if it is not operationally required, which removes the specific vulnerable code path (trade-off: loss of MAC filter functionality). Device replacement with a supported product from a vendor with an active security response program should be evaluated, given the absence of any vendor advisory or patch commitment. Monitor https://vuldb.com/vuln/387184 for patch availability updates.
More in M300 Wi Fi Repeater
View allSame weakness CWE-77 – Command Injection
View allSame technique Command Injection
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-54917
GHSA-5x4f-6m9q-mg75