Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Unauthenticated, low-complexity network access to critical functions (PR:N/AC:L/AV:N); impact is restart/disruption only, so A:H with C:N and I:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (icscert).
CVSS VectorVendor: icscert
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
The Aclara Metrum Cellular Web Interface is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to the absence of authentication controls on critical system functions. This weakness exposes essential configuration settings, allowing attackers to alter operational parameters and trigger system restarts without restriction. Such unauthorized changes can disrupt normal functionality and, if performed repeatedly, may lead to a loss of communications to the device.
AnalysisAI
Missing authentication in the Aclara Metrum Cellular Web Interface (a Hubbell/Aclara cellular communications module used in utility smart-grid metering) lets remote attackers reach critical system functions without any credentials. Per the CVSS:4.0 vector (PR:N/UI:N) an unauthenticated network attacker can read and modify operational configuration and force device restarts, and repeated restarts can sever device communications - a pure availability impact (VA:H, no confidentiality or integrity loss). There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and this CVE is not listed in CISA KEV; EPSS data was not provided.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is the embedded web management interface of the Aclara Metrum Cellular module, an operational-technology (OT) device that provides cellular backhaul for utility metering/AMI deployments (CPE: cpe:2.3:a:hubbell:aclara_metrum_cellular_web_interface). The root cause is CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function): security-sensitive endpoints - configuration management and the system-restart function - are exposed without any authentication gate, so the web interface trusts any caller that can reach it on the network. This is a common pattern in embedded/ICS HTTP management interfaces where critical control functions are reachable directly rather than behind a session/login layer.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version is identified in the supplied data; consult CISA advisory ICSA-26-174-07 (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-174-07) and the Aclara support portal (https://aclara.my.site.com/AclaraConnect/s/) for the current fixed firmware/build and apply it once available. Until a fix is confirmed, the highest-value compensating control is network isolation: place the device's web interface behind the utility's private APN/VPN and a firewall, and restrict inbound access to the management HTTP(S) port to a small set of trusted operator/NMS source addresses (trade-off: legitimate remote management must be routed through that allowlisted path). Disable or block external reachability of the web interface entirely if it is not operationally required, and monitor for unexpected configuration changes or repeated device restarts as a detection signal (trade-off: monitoring detects but does not prevent the action). Because exploitation needs no credentials, do not rely on credential rotation - only reachability restrictions are effective.
Same technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-39058
GHSA-gx8p-xc64-fg2f