Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessGain local write access to installer directory
-
DeliveryDrop malicious Msftedit.dll alongside LineInst.exe
-
ExploitVictim executes LineInst.exe
-
ExecutionInstaller resolves relative DLL path
-
PersistMalicious DLL loaded from current directory ahead of System32
-
ImpactArbitrary code executes in installer process context
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
ASVS 5.0
V13 - Configuration Search path element control
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires two concurrent preconditions: (1) the attacker must have write access to the directory containing LineInst.exe - typically a user-writable location such as the Downloads folder, achievable by co-located malware running with standard user privileges, satisfying PR:N in the CVSS 4.0 vector; and (2) the victim must actively execute LineInst.exe, consistent with UI:A. The vulnerability exists only during the installation phase - the running LINE application does not inherit this DLL loading behavior. Factors that limit exploitation include the narrow timing window (attacker must stage the DLL before the user runs the installer), the requirement for a pre-existing local foothold or physical access to write to the installer directory, and the single-shot nature of the attack (opportunity disappears once installation completes or the installer is removed). Non-default conditions are NOT required to be vulnerable - any user downloading and running the installer in a writable directory (default behavior for downloaded files) meets the preconditions. |
| Impact | The vendor-reported CVSS 4.0 score of 8.4 (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) reflects high local impact with no subsequent-system scope change. In practice, real-world exploitability is bounded by meaningful preconditions: the attacker must have write access to the installer's directory and the victim must actively execute the installer - a two-step local dependency that substantially narrows the attack surface compared to network-exploitable flaws. PR:N is consistent with a malware-staging scenario where an already-running co-located process (requiring only standard user privileges) pre-positions the DLL in the Downloads folder before the user launches the installer. The risk window is strictly transient - the installed application does not carry the flaw. No CISA KEV listing and no known public PoC further reduce urgency; this is not a remote, unauthenticated, or persistent threat. The 'Information Disclosure' tag in the source intelligence is likely attributable to potential credential or session data exposure via the loaded malicious DLL rather than a distinct information-leak pathway. The absence of a CWE assignment suggests the NVD record may be recently submitted; the vulnerability class is unambiguously binary planting / DLL hijacking. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who has achieved local code execution - for example, via a separate malware infection with standard user privileges - monitors the Downloads folder and, upon detecting the arrival of LineInst.exe, writes a crafted Msftedit.dll to the same directory before the user runs it. When the victim double-clicks the installer, Windows resolves the relative Msftedit.dll reference to the attacker's copy rather than the System32 version, executing arbitrary attacker-controlled code in the context of the LineInst.exe process. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis. |
Get an e-mail when this CVE is exploited, patched or re-scored. Free account.
Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Aug 10, 2026
DLL hijacking in the LINE for Windows installer (LineInst.exe) enables arbitrary code execution when a victim runs the installer after an attacker has pre-positioned a malicious Msftedit.dll in the same directory. All LINE for Windows versions prior to 26.4.0 load this Microsoft Rich Edit control library via a relative path, bypassing Windows secure DLL loading practices and allowing the installer's current directory - commonly a user-writable location such as Downloads - to shadow the legitimate System32 copy. No public exploit code has been identified and no active exploitation has been confirmed; the vulnerability is transient, existing only during the installation phase and not in the running application.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to LINE for Windows version 26.4.0 or later, which the vendor has confirmed resolves the unsafe DLL search order in LineInst.exe; the advisory is available at https://line.github.io/security-advisory-blog/CVE-2026-13133/. As a compensating control for environments that cannot immediately update, users should download the LINE installer only from the official LY Corporation source and execute it immediately upon download from a directory that is not accessible to other local processes or accounts - running the installer from a newly created, access-controlled temporary folder eliminates the DLL pre-placement window. Enterprise administrators can enforce this via group policy to restrict write access by other processes to common download directories. Note that the risk is strictly installation-phase: systems where LINE is already installed and where the old installer binary has been removed are not exposed.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affects your stack
Find out whether the stacks and servers you run are on an affected version.
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is an uncontrolled DLL search path (consistent with CWE-427, Uncontrolled Search Path Element, though no formal CWE is assigned in this record) in LineInst.exe, the installation binary for LINE for Windows by LY Corporation. Windows DLL loading follows a search order that - unless constrained via SetDllDirectory, LoadLibraryEx with LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32, or a side-by-side manifest - checks the application's current working directory before the System32 folder. LineInst.exe requests Msftedit.dll (the Microsoft Rich Edit control, a legitimate Windows inbox component) using only its bare filename without a fully-qualified or System32-anchored path. This causes the Windows loader to find and load a same-directory attacker-supplied DLL before discovering the legitimate copy. The affected product is identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:ly_corporation:line_for_windows:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* covering all releases prior to 26.4.0.
Know when Line For Windows gets its next vulnerability
- Watch products and get an email when something new is published
- Check this CVE against your own stack and servers
- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
No credit card · 7-day full trial
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Local file-write staging required (AV:L); no elevated privileges needed to place the DLL in a user-writable directory (PR:N); victim must run the installer (UI:R); no scope change consistent with vendor SC:N assessment.
Primary rating from Vendor (LY-Corporation).
CVSS VectorVendor: LY-Corporation
DescriptionCVE.org
A vulnerability has been identified in LineInst.exe (LINE for Windows) prior to version 26.4.0, where Msftedit.dll is loaded via a relative path without a secure DLL search path, allowing a malicious DLL placed in the installer's directory to be loaded ahead of the legitimate System32 copy.
Executive ViewAI
The LINE for Windows installer (versions prior to 26.4.0) is vulnerable to a file substitution attack that executes malicious code when users run the installer. No vendor patch is available and no public exploits have emerged, but the risk persists until users upgrade to version 26.4.0 or later. Leadership should enforce secure installation practices and accelerate upgrade distribution to protect the organization.
Deploy exclusively from official sources; restrict installer execution to protected (non-user-writable) directories; enforce installer signature verification; educate users against third-party downloads; monitor for unauthorized Msftedit.dll files.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
EUVD-2026-55033
GHSA-w99c-x9xf-3prr
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
VulDB
Exploit-DB