Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Unauthenticated remote trigger via static key (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); permanent deletion of all content is high integrity and high availability, and covert exfil of URL/admin email/license is limited confidentiality (C:L).
Primary rating from Vendor (WPScan).
CVSS VectorVendor: WPScan
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
The EscortWP escortwp WordPress theme through 3.6.2 was distributed with a vendor-authored, obfuscated backdoor that lets an unauthenticated attacker who supplies a hard-coded, per-build key permanently delete all of the site's content, and that covertly transmits the site URL, administrator email address, and license key to a third-party server.
AnalysisAI
Content destruction and covert data exfiltration in the EscortWP WordPress theme (all builds through 3.6.2) stem from a deliberately obfuscated, vendor-authored backdoor rather than an accidental coding flaw. Any unauthenticated remote attacker who knows the hard-coded per-build key can permanently delete every piece of the site's content, while the theme silently beacons the site URL, administrator email, and license key to a third-party server. Publicly available exploit code exists (reported by WPScan), though EPSS probability is low (0.14%, 4th percentile) and it is not on CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
EscortWP is a commercial WordPress theme (an installable presentation/functionality layer that runs with full PHP execution rights inside the WordPress instance). The issue is not a memory-safety or injection bug but a planted backdoor: obfuscated PHP shipped in the theme package exposes an unauthenticated destructive endpoint gated only by a static, build-specific key, plus a phone-home routine transmitting identity and licensing data. The NVD entry lists CWE as N/A, but the behavior maps to hidden functionality / embedded malicious code (CWE-506 backdoor) combined with insider-planted unauthorized data transmission (CWE-359/CWE-912 class). The CPE 'cpe:2.3:a:unknown:escortwp:*' reflects that the vendor identity is not cleanly attributed in the CPE dictionary, consistent with a theme sold under license keys rather than a well-known open-source project.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, and because the malicious code was vendor-authored, a vendor 'update' cannot be trusted to remove the backdoor - the primary remediation is to completely remove the EscortWP theme (deactivate and delete all theme files, not merely switch the active theme) and migrate to a trusted theme. Before removal, rotate any credentials and the license key that may have been exfiltrated, and rotate the administrator email/password since site URL, admin email, and license key were transmitted to a third party. As compensating controls until removal is complete: block outbound connections from the web host to the theme's phone-home destination (identify it via the WPScan advisory or egress logs) to stop data leakage - trade-off is it does not stop the destructive endpoint; and put the site behind a WAF or restrict access to the unauthenticated backdoor endpoint if its path is identified in the WPScan report - trade-off is the static key path may vary per build, so egress blocking plus full theme removal is the only reliable fix. Consult https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/0e5f5730-167d-4853-a764-bb9e3d62fdc4/ for endpoint and indicator details.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-42830
GHSA-vvr8-3962-w5v6